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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation investigates individual and organizational effects of 
knowledge production in three chapters. I depart from the notion that both 
interpersonal collaboration between and within organizations as well as 
recombination of knowledge components are instrumental in the production of 
new knowledge.  
The first chapter investigates the origins of collaborative knowledge 
production in plastics electronics. Using survey data, I explore how individual 
and organizational characteristics drive collaboration preferences. I avoid 
looking at established collaborations because these bias collaboration 
determinants. I find that resource provisioning and social similarity influence 
preferences and that these effects are moderated by collaboration experience 
and organizational objectives. Additionally, the study suggests that individuals 
facing an aspiration gap are more favourable towards collaboration, and 
proposes that relational capability, in the form of networking skills, openness, 
and information will moderate this relationship. 
 The second chapter looks at the recombination of knowledge 
components. Using patent data from US semiconductor firms, we explore how 
firms build on old knowledge components to create new patented inventions. 
The findings suggest that familiarity of components contributes to innovative 
success but that adding novelty to familiar combinations is on average even 
more successful. We also find that the effects of different types of knowledge 
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recombinations are moderated by the time in between these collaborations as 
well as by the search for non-domain specific knowledge. 
 The final chapter posits that the search for knowledge components and 
the search for collaboration partners should not be understood as two isolated 
determinants of invention. I submit that finding knowledge components 
(objects) or knowledgeable partners (holders) can be construed as alternative 
solutions to the same knowledge problem and describe a process model of 
invention as escalating recombinant search. The dissertation ends with a 
reflexive conclusion on the contributions made in these three chapters. 
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FOREWORD 
How will we as a society evolve? How do we deal with the big societal 
challenges? How do we make our lives a bit easier, a bit better? No matter 
which important question you ask, a managerial reply could often be ‘through 
innovation’. As the economy forces itself through “gales of creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter, 1942), the obsolete get weeded out, and new inventions take 
centre stage, until the next wave comes. It is this process of entrepreneurial 
discovery, not the invisible hand of the market that drives economic progress 
(Kirzner, 1997).  
The study and practice of management, strategy, entrepreneurship, and 
innovation, is the study and practice of how individuals, teams, and firms defy 
the invisible hand. If the basic models of economics were accurate 
representations of reality – which not even economists claim they are – then 
there would be no need for managers, entrepreneurs, or strategic decisions, 
because in a world of perfect information, equitable distribution of resources, 
equal access to opportunities, zero transaction costs, clearly defined property 
rights, no market power, perfect factor mobility, and so on, managerial, 
entrepreneurial, and decision-making services could be traded in the market 
without any difficulty. The market would fulfil its role as the ultimate mediator 
perfectly and the firm would be a fiction, not a fact (Williamson, 1975). Yet this 
is clearly not the world we live in. Firms are extremely important tools in the 
process of invention because they facilitate knowledge integration, knowledge 
application, and knowledge absorption by being an organizational home for 
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ideas and their development (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996; 
Zander and Kogut, 1995). 
Within this broad subdomain of the social sciences, the generation of new 
and successful ideas is of fundamental importance. The study of innovation 
and invention is principally preoccupied with the questions “What are good 
ideas?”; “Where does novelty come from?”, “What is and who appropriates the 
value of invention?”, “What are the drivers of invention?” and “How is invention 
organized”? Despite the famous, proverbial, Newtonian apple, and our tendency 
to believe in individual strokes of brilliance that change a generation, most 
evidence suggests that good ideas are co-created, that they need to be 
recombined or as Johnson (2011) stated, “have sex”. It is the recombination of 
the familiar into something new or the addition of a novel component to a few 
known ones that generates great success (Boyd and Goldenberg, 2013a, 
2013b). It is the happy coincidence or the openness to serendipity that leads to 
a Eureka moment for the right person at the right time (Denrell et al., 2003).  
As Newton (1676) wrote “if I have seen further, it is by standing on the 
shoulders of giants”. It is therefore no surprise that inventor teams are more 
likely to generate high impact inventions and that they are less likely to face 
particularly poor outcomes, when liken to lone inventors (Singh and Fleming, 
2010). A recent study has shown that teams are especially creative when 
diverse team members are actively trying to see the problem at hand through 
the eyes of others via perspective taking (Hoever et al., 2012). It is the bringing 
together of people in collaborations, alliances, partnerships, or in physical 
spaces that enables ideas or half-hunches to mingle, and in doing so leads to 
15 
 
both marginal improvements and breakthrough inventions (Johnson, 2011; 
Schumpeter, 1942). “The recombination of different technologies to generate 
radical innovations has been viewed as the holy grail of innovation research 
since the first half of the 20th century” (Gruber, Harhoff, and Hoisl, 2013, p. 
837). 
 Innovation requires this complex combination of tangible and intangible 
resources, of people with the right attitude, the right capabilities, and the 
willingness to act, and often of different organizations that straddle scientific 
domains and break out of their boundaries to collaborate with known or 
emerging goals in mind. In a famous quote, George Bernard Shaw (1903, p. 
134) stated that “The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the 
unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all 
progress depends on the unreasonable man”. It is this willingness and ability to 
challenge the status quo that inventors have in common, and it is their work, 
their process, their collaborators, and their success that I am studying.  
Much like the process of invention, the production of academic 
knowledge builds on the combined work of the many that came before me and 
hopefully many will build on this work in the future. This dissertation will focus 
on three aspects of the generation of new ideas.  
Firstly, I will look at how preferences to collaboratively generate new 
ideas are influenced by both organizational and individual characteristics. I 
find that different funding sources and interpersonal similarity have an 
important influence on the determinants of collaboration preferences. Also, 
prior collaborative experience moderates the importance of the funding sources 
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whereas the purpose of the collaboration moderates both resource provisioning 
and similarity. In a subsequent study, I focus on individuals’ aspirations and 
how they are moderated by networking skills, knowledge, and openness in the 
determination of collaboration preferences. While this relation might seem self-
evident, very little management research so far has paid attention to individual 
characteristics in the process of collaboration. Moreover, the few papers that 
have looked at this, have focused either on interpersonal qualities such as trust 
and affect (Casciaro and Lobo, 2008), or at scientific capabilities, i.e. the 
objective focal knowledge a person possesses that is needed in the 
collaboration. While trust and scientific capabilities clearly matter, an exclusive 
focus on these aspects downplays the importance of professional 
characteristics. I argue and find that these more generic characteristics 
influence individuals’ predisposition towards collaboration above and beyond 
the influence of their scientific knowledge and what we know about the type 
and objective of the collaboration. In doing so, I contribute to the literature on 
the antecedents of collaborative generation of inventions. By taking a micro-
foundational approach and focusing on individual characteristics and 
individual preferences, this study underwrites the importance of behavioural 
aspects in collaborative invention.  
Secondly, I investigate how firms combine old and new knowledge 
components to generate high impact inventions. It is common knowledge that 
firms recombine old ideas to generate new inventions (Fleming, 2001). Given 
that invention requires complex coupling of markets and technologies, it is 
prone to failure. Inventors make mistakes or get overtaken in the rat race to 
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create high impact inventions. While overall, radical breakthroughs are often 
the result of distant coupling of completely novel ideas, most successful 
inventions occur closer to home; in more familiar waters one might say (Boyd & 
Goldenberg, 2013a). The idea that we have to think outside the box to generate 
new inventions, obfuscates the fact that thinking inside the box can be a very 
fruitful endeavour. Biologist Jennifer Owen spent 30 years researching her own 
small garden in a Leicester, England. During that time, she and her husband 
identified 2,673 different species, 20 of which had never been seen in the UK 
and 4 of which had not yet been discovered. She acknowledges that with more 
time and additional expertise, the total tally could have reached about 8,000 
(Brown, 2010). There is richness in familiarity.  
However, while thinking inside the box can spark diverse findings, 
eventually one is bound to approach the knowledge frontier. Thus knowing the 
box and only the box is likely to lead to non-benign competency traps 
(Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2005). Hence, ever since March (1991), academics 
have been researching the highly elusive balance between exploitation and 
exploration. And while the relevant contingencies and the necessary trade-offs 
are still debated (e.g. Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010; Uotila et al., 2009), what 
seems clear is that across time, firms will need a bit of both to survive and 
thrive. An associated stream of literature looks at how firms recombine 
knowledge components to generate new inventions (Fleming, 2001; Fleming, 
2002; Katila, 2002; Katila and Ahuja, 2002), building on the Schumpeterian 
notion of recombination (Schumpeter, 1934).  
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In this joint work with Dr. Tufool Al-Nuaimi and Prof. Gerry George, we 
unpack how firms recombine knowledge components in different ways to 
generate new patented inventions. We posit that firms re-cycle and re-new old 
ideas and that the result of these combinatory processes fare differently in the 
market. Both recycling and renewing existing combinations result in higher 
impact than using virgin combinations while time between two inventions and 
distant search moderate the success of recycled and renewed inventions in 
unexpected ways.  
In the third and final chapter, I develop a model of invention as a process 
of escalating recombinant search. The question I am trying to solve is the 
following: How does invention happen from an evolutionary perspective? Two 
aspects of the previous empirical studies inspire this question. In the first 
study, the implicit assumption is that collaboration beyond the boundaries of 
the organization is the answer to the problemistic search for knowledge. In the 
second chapter, the search for knowledge occurs by the firm’s inventors and is 
directed towards accessing information that is somehow objectively out there.  
While these two processes seem to be logically intertwined, the search for 
collaborators can bring about new information, and the search for information 
can connect the searcher with individuals or organizations that control the 
needed information. Hence, if search is the driving force behind both the 
integration of new knowledge components and the integration of new 
collaborators, how does this realization affect the process of invention? 
I argue that invention can be understood as a process in which the unit 
of invention escalates over time. Every escalation increases the number of 
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people directly involved in the inventive process, from individual over team and 
firm to potentially dyadic collaborations or even open innovation. This 
escalation has as key purpose to increase the knowledge absorption the group 
of inventors can manage, while at the same time generating problems around 
knowledge flow and increasing the importance of knowledge articulation. The 
final chapter aims to unfold this complex evolutionary process. 
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I – CHAPTER ONE:  
WHY DO WE COLLABORATE AND WITH WHOM? A STUDY OF 
PREFERENCES IN THE PLASTICS ELECTRONICS SECTOR 
 
I - 1: Abstract 
We examine individual collaboration preferences of corporate and academic 
members of a UK-based Knowledge Transfer Network. Using conjoint analysis, 
we provide insights into the relative importance of various characteristics of 
potential collaborations in determining preferences. In doing so, we avoid the 
bias of sampling on actual collaborations and thus improve understanding of 
the actual drivers of collaborations. We present two separate empirical studies. 
The first study interprets individuals’ responses as organizational choices and 
finds that research funding and similarity are key predictors of collaboration 
preferences. We find that both are moderated by the purpose of the 
collaboration and that prior experience also matters differently depending on 
the type of funding. 
The second study uses a subset of the dataset for which we have additional 
information on respondents. We hypothesize and find that individuals facing an 
aspirational gap (either positive or negative) are more favourable to 
collaboration in general and that relational capability, with proxies network 
information, networking skills, and networking openness, moderates these 
aspirational effects in complex ways. 
These two studies contribute to our understanding of the drivers of 
collaboration formation. Our finding that both organizational and individual 
idiosyncrasies determine preferences suggests more multi-level research could 
further develop our knowledge about interorganizational relationships.   
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I - 2: Introduction 
Collaborations between and within industry and universities are critical 
for innovation. Interorganizational relationships are increasingly important 
sources of competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998), and firms that draw 
from university research are known to foster economic growth (Mueller, 2006). 
However, opportunities to form collaborative partnerships are unequally 
distributed across organizations (Ahuja, 2000b; Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009). 
The network literature suggests that being part of a network increases the 
chances of forming a tie with a member within that network, especially when 
these networks are dense (Goerzen, 2007; Schilling and Phelps, 2007). 
Structural positions within a network are found to be important in tie 
establishment, as well as spatial proximity and collocation (Narula and 
Santangelo, 2009; Stuart, 1998).  
We study collaboration within a UK-based plastic electronics knowledge 
transfer network (KTN). Plastic electronics is an emerging industry in which 
innovations in solution-based chemistry and materials science are brought 
together to create lightweight, robust, and disposable electronic devices on 
flexible surfaces. New product development in plastic electronics spans the 
disciplines of chemistry, physics, and engineering, as well as the electronics, 
printing and chemicals industries, requiring partnerships that have not been 
observed before. Research has shown that especially when the knowledge base 
of an industry is complex and expanding, as is the case in this study, the locus 
of innovation tends to be found in learning networks (Powell, Koput, and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996). Additionally, this novel context provides an interesting 
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extension to research that has largely focused on US biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical collaborations (McKelvey, Alm, and Riccaboni, 2003).  
Even within established learning networks, differences between SMEs, 
large organizations, and universities are likely to affect chances of tie formation. 
We know that the institutional norms of the academic and the commercial 
spheres diverge (Dasgupta and David, 1994), yet there is also evidence that 
universities increasingly patent their own research and are willing to license 
technologies which, in combination with businesses’ reliance on external R&D, 
implies that the divide between open and commercial science has somewhat 
narrowed (Mowery et al., 2001; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Thursby and 
Thursby, 2002). This tendency is also evident in the growing literature on 
university entrepreneurship, intellectual property protection, and research-
based spinoffs (Clarysse et al., 2007; Lockett and Wright, 2005; Mustar et al., 
2006; Rothaermel, Agung, and Jiang, 2007; Vohora, Wright, and Lockett, 
2004). Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the apparent convergence between 
industry and universities has truly eliminated barriers to collaborate (Bruneel, 
D’Este, and Salter, 2010; Siegel et al., 2003). Barriers are likely to persist and 
to affect organizations with different resources differentially.  
Fontana, Geuna, and Matt (2006) found that the propensity to forge 
university – industry collaborations depends on firm size, while Santoro and 
Chakrabarti (2002) conclude that size influences the task-orientation of 
collaborations with universities, with smaller firms focusing on core technology 
and larger firms on non-core technological competencies. Also, despite SMEs’ 
lack of R&D self-sufficiency, they are less inclined to work with research 
institutes than larger organizations (Tether, 2002; Woolgar et al., 1998). In 
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addition to such general tendencies, SMEs are known to have lower slack 
resources (George, 2005) and to face liabilities of size when they enter in 
collaborative relationships (Rao, Chandy, and Prabhu, 2008). Therefore, SMEs 
are in general less selective when choosing partners to collaborate with and 
tend to stay more local (De Jong and Freel, 2010; Narula, 2004). Besides 
organization size, it has been shown that experience with collaboration shields 
organizations from behavioural and outcome uncertainties, inherent in 
collaborations (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Also, prior partners are often favoured 
for future interactions, although this is not always an optimal choice (Goerzen, 
2007). Various characteristics of an organization will thus influence the 
likelihood of establishing a partnership. The same characteristics will 
correspondingly determine a potential partner’s preference of establishing a tie 
as well. Thus, tie formation is not only about who you are but also about who 
wants to partner with you (Mindruta, 2013; Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009).  
Most of the current research is based on existing partnerships, which 
makes it difficult to know whether established knowledge regarding focal 
organization characteristics that drive collaboration reflect actual preferences of 
that organization or are the consequence of selection through the matching 
process. Stuart and Sorenson (2007) thus argued that much extant work on 
collaboration antecedents suffers from positive selection bias. Using insights 
from matching theory (Jovanovic, 1979; Logan, 1996), the formation of inter-
organizational partnerships has previously been construed as a selective 
matching process or an assignment game, in which each player ranks others 
and forms a tie with the most desirable partner who is also available (Mindruta, 
2013; Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009). Matching theory asserts that, to 
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understand the determinants of relationships that are entered into voluntarily, 
it is necessary to consider the characteristics and resources that each potential 
partner values in all other potential partners (Logan, 1996). To better 
understand the desired match characteristics, we look at preferences for 
collaboration before the establishment of an actual tie.  
Ranking potential partners on the basis of preferred characteristics is 
fundamental to matching theory. Preference ordering has been examined in the 
choice of marriage partners, entrepreneurial ties, and employment 
relationships (Ferris and McKee, 2005; Logan, Hoff, and Newton, 2008; Vissa, 
2011) but has not explicitly addressed technology development collaborations 
that suffer from high outcome uncertainty and potential for opportunism 
(Wathne and Heide, 2000). High uncertainty in collaborations is exemplified in 
frequent failures to create value, for instance due to unrecognized transaction-
specific investments (Madhok and Tallman, 1998) such as establishing 
common ground (Bechky, 2003; Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009).  
We investigate how resource provisioning (in the form of research 
funding) and similarity influence a respondent’s preference for a potential 
match and investigate the moderation effects of prior experience and 
collaboration purpose. As research funding is being put forward by 
governments and commercial organizations to stimulate growth in the plastic 
electronics industry, investigating the effectiveness of different sources of 
research funding in influencing match preferences has relevance for 
policymakers.  
This work offers various contributions to the literature. To the best of our 
knowledge, no prior research has looked at preference ordering of desired 
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matches, which responds to demands for more work on the understudied 
origins of partner selection, alliance formation, and collaboration (Li et al., 
2008; Stuart and Sorenson, 2007) and overcomes the ex post selection bias 
inherent in much research that focuses on established alliances and 
collaborations (Mindruta, 2013). We find that both resource provisioning and 
similarity have a positive impact on collaboration preferences but with some 
important contingencies. Who provides the funding matters a great deal: 
partner funding is preferred over government funding and both are preferred 
over no funding and self-funding. This preference is reinforced by prior 
collaboration experience. However, when the focal firm is seeking to establish 
an R&D partnership the relative influence of funding diminishes. Further, we 
find that while similarity has a positive impact on preferences, this linear 
relationship is moderated by the objective of the partnership (R&D or not). 
Finally, the method of conjoint analysis (Green, Krieger, and Wind, 2001), 
which is common in marketing, has had limited use in innovation studies (for 
an exception see, Riquelme & Rickard (1992)). In both studies we use the 
conjoint method in slightly different ways and analyze the data with different 
regression techniques. We submit this method could be very useful in future 
research that aims to understand strategic decision-making and trade-offs.  
One of the key weaknesses of this approach is what behavioral strategists 
have called “mental scaling”, which refers to assuming organizational actions or 
decisions necessarily correspond with the ones of individuals (Powell, Lovallo, 
and Fox, 2011). As our theorizing is rooted in organizational theories while our 
data consists of survey responses from individuals, we implicitly assume that 
what goes for the individual also goes for the organization. While this has been 
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done before (e.g. Gupta and Sapienza, 1992), we acknowledge the limitations 
this puts on our work.  
The second part of this chapter turns this weakness into strength. Using 
a subsample of the same collaboration data for which we have additional 
information, we theorize and investigate how individual characteristics will 
affect collaboration preferences, while we control for organization- and 
collaboration-specific effects. Because this second part builds on aspiration 
theories, focuses on the individual, rather than the organization, and uses 
some different operationalizations of data, we refrain from integrating it 
completely with the first part. To maintain the logical flow of theoretical 
argumentation, this chapter is thus split into two separate parts with their own 
theory development, empirical analysis, and results discussion. The findings 
are jointly discussed at the end of the chapter.   
I - 3: Theory: Organizational Determinants of Collaboration 
Preferences 
Matching theory has moved from the laboratories of experimental 
psychology (Herrnstein, 1961, 1970) into marketing research like consumer 
brand choices (e.g. Foxall and James, 2003; Foxall and Schrezenmaier, 2003). 
The key characteristic of this branch of matching theory is that a specific 
reinforcement influences the choice behaviour of subjects so that at 
equilibrium the subject distributes its responses in proportion to the patterns 
of rewards obtained by their consequences. Almost in parallel, a similar 
matching theory emerged from a mathematical treatise to optimize partner and 
college allocations (Gale and Shapley, 1962) which had a significant influence 
on research about employer-employee relationships (Jovanovic, 1979; Logan, 
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1996). Here, two actors seek a match based on their preferences about the 
other’s resources. Therefore, this theory differentiates between the 
determinants and the consequences of choice (does the ego want to match with 
the alter?) and those of opportunity (is the alter interested in matching with the 
ego?) (Logan, 1996). Both the non-exclusive matching theory of Herrnstein 
(1961, 1970) in which the subject can constantly alter its choices to optimize 
the outcome and the exclusive matching theory of Gale and Shapley (1962) in 
which a single choice must be made between ‘mutually-excluding alternatives’ 
thus share the disposition that choice or preference is subject to some kind of 
reinforcement, either through an exogenous characteristic (e.g. brand 
appreciation) or through an endogenous match criterion (e.g. similarity). Our 
research builds on both traditions as we look into non-exclusive preferences 
(matches are not established) for and from network members that could 
collaborate.  
Recently, matching theory has been introduced to management in 
studies of alliances (Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009), the selection of outside 
CEOs (Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz, 2010), entrepreneurial tie formation 
(Vissa, 2011) and university-firm collaboration (Mindruta, 2013). These studies 
have started to write on the blank slate matching theory provides in order to 
improve understanding of the resources and characteristics that drive partner 
selection and match quality. Mitsuhashi and Greve (2009) found that 
compatibility of observable resources, and market complementarity drive 
alliance formation in the shipping industry and that matches that score high 
on both characteristics improved firm performance. Vissa (2011) extended 
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research on entrepreneurial tie formation, and found that both task 
complementarity – the overlap between the actor’s current task priorities and 
the resources potentially available from the partner – and social similarity are 
important matching criteria that influence tie formation intentions and actual 
match formation. Beyond matching theory, empirical research that looks at 
alliance formation has found that specific characteristics of the focal 
organization such as resource endowments, network positions, and prior 
familiarity inspire the formation of a tie (Ahuja, 2000b; Geringer, 1991; Gulati 
and Gargiulo, 1999).  
Implicit in most alliance research is the idea that the beneficial 
characteristics sought for in a partnership or collaboration, are transparent in 
existing matches. This is not necessarily self-evident. Existing matches may be 
mismatches based on incorrect assumptions or information asymmetry, or may 
be construed by lack of alternative. Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) for instance found 
that CEOs are more likely to become board members of other firms if those 
firms are geographically close and similar with regards to governance, financial, 
and investment policies, but failed to find evidence of positive impact of these 
board interlocks on performance or on returns from acquisitions. Goerzen 
(2007) found that prior experience with a specific partner increases the 
likelihood of entering into another collaboration with this partner, but that 
such collaborations experience inferior performance. There is thus evidence 
that existing matches are not automatically beneficial for the partners. This 
might be explained by cognitive limitations and local search (Cyert and March, 
1963; Simon, 1947), but could also be explained by the two-sided market 
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dynamics of match formation: the decision to tie with a partner is 
fundamentally constrained by the decisions of all the other partners to 
establish a match as well (Mindruta, 2013). Looking at existing matches to 
retrospectively understand underlying preferences – by interpreting match 
antecedents as drivers of tie formation – results thus in a biased sample. 
Given that ex-post matches are not self-evident proof of ex-ante desired 
partner combinations, it is valuable to investigate pure preferences. To do this, 
we require information about desired matches and their characteristics. This is 
relevant to better understand what resource-constrained organizations such as 
SMEs that frequently cannot afford to be picky when it comes to available 
partners, are actually looking for in terms of partners (Narula, 2004). Matching 
theory is particularly useful for such research because the theory implies that 
people or organizations will be ranked on the basis of their perceived value to 
the seeking actor (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Despite its importance in the 
formation of inter-organizational relationships, relatively little attention has 
been devoted to partner selection (Li et al., 2008). Therefore, extending our 
understanding of which characteristics augment matching preferences is 
relevant to improve our broader understanding of firms’ relational behaviour.  
I - 3.1: Matching Preferences for Collaboration 
 
Matching theory requires the existence of “inspection characteristics” 
that enable an actor to rank preferences without experiencing them. Such 
characteristics have been described in job matching research as online and 
offline search attributes (Lippman and McCall, 1976), and in marketing as 
experience and inspection goods (Hirshleifer, 1973; Nelson, 1970). As 
30 
 
collaboration preference formation occurs before the partners have experience 
with working together, they have to build their preferences using cognitive 
rather than experiential logics (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). We investigate two 
such inspection characteristics that influence matching preferences: resource 
provisioning and similarity. 
I - 3.1.1: Resource Provisioning 
Resource provisioning in the form of research funding between parties is 
likely to affect tie formation (Lee, 2000). Funding has been shown to be a 
primary reason for universities to collaborate with industry (Meyer-Krahmer 
and Schmoch, 1998) and economic rationality in general dictates a preference 
for funding inflow over outflow, ceteris paribus. Our empirical context allows 
for funding to be provided by the partner (P) or the government (G), as well as 
collaborations in which the respondent’s organization self-funds the 
collaboration, including the partner’s expenses (S) or collaborations with no 
funding (N). It seems intuitive to assume that respondents would rank their 
funding preference as follows: P > G > N > S1 with the preference for partner 
funding over government funding explained by the relative absence of 
associated bureaucracy and perhaps a higher commitment by the partner as a 
consequence of cash investment.  
However, this rationale is likely to be influenced by the objective of the 
collaboration. While firms are increasingly looking outside their boundaries to 
build technological capabilities by accessing patents, know-how, equipment, or 
                                       
1 This does not mean partner funding is higher than government funding in monetary terms. 
We do not make any claims about the amount of funding as our survey did not enquire about 
this. We use the ‘greater than’ (>) symbol merely to reflect preferences.  
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materials generated as a result of the partner’s R&D activity (Chesbrough, 
2003; Hung and Tang, 2008; Laursen and Salter, 2006), such activities are 
characterized by high uncertainty as the outcomes of exploratory technology-
oriented R&D are very difficult to anticipate (Shah and Swaminathan, 2008). 
Firms seeking external sources of R&D are typically required to invest financial 
and other complementary resources in order to secure the partner’s 
cooperation. Additionally, firms that provide funding are likely to be in a better 
state to control the outcomes of the partnership and appropriate the knowledge 
that is being developed. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The positive relationship between resource 
provisioning and collaboration preferences (P > G > N > S) will be 
weakened when organizations are seeking to develop R&D 
partnerships.   
 
We argue that organizations with prior collaboration experience will be 
more susceptible to resource provisioning and propose three supporting 
arguments. Relational capabilities, built up from prior experience of 
collaboration, compensate for behavioral uncertainty and facilitate knowledge 
integration (Powell et al., 1996; Tzabbar, Aharonson, and Amburgey, 2012). 
Organizations with such capabilities are better at establishing common ground 
and leverage the latent value in partnerships (Bechky, 2003; Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Kale, P., Singh, H., and Perlmutter, H., 2000). Therefore, having prior 
experience is likely to make organizations less interested in self-funding 
collaborations (they can extract value anyway) and more favorably disposed 
towards having someone else pay. This effect is strengthened when positive 
prior experience (e.g. through collaboration with high status or high quality 
organization) is associated with higher status within the network so that 
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organizations that have such experience might be more desirable partners and 
feel a sense of entitlement (Lin, Yang, and Arya, 2009). In essence, such 
organizations are more worthy collaborators and hence entitled to be 
benefactors of funding. However, when prior experience is negative, for instance 
because costs spiral out of control, organizations will be less willing to provide 
funding. Because we cannot assess the quality of prior experience, we cannot 
hypothesize about the main effect of this variable. Regardless, prior 
experience’s contingent effect on resource provisioning is likely more 
predictable. We thus state:   
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between resource provisioning and 
collaboration preferences (P > G > N > S) will be strengthened when 
organizations have prior collaboration experience.  
 
I - 3.1.2: Partner Similarity 
Homophily refers to the idea that similar actors will be drawn to each 
other (Lincoln and McBride, 1985), which suggests that similarity will increase 
the likelihood of tie formation and preference for a specific partner. Vissa (2011) 
extended research on entrepreneurial tie formation, and found that social 
similarity influences both tie formation intentions and actual match formation.  
At the organizational level, Das and Teng (2000) theorized that resource 
similarity is positively associated with alliance performance while empirical 
research showed that status similarity (Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000) and 
technology similarity (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008) increase the likelihood of 
tie formation. Similar third party connections are also indicative of shared 
attitudes, and increase the likelihood of social sanction if a partner behaves 
opportunistically (Burt, 1987; Granovetter, 1985; Reagans and McEvily, 2003).  
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Following a planned behavior rationale (Ajzen, 1991), it seems likely that 
similarity will positively influence collaboration preferences as well. It is 
important to note here that we measure similarity at the individual level. Vissa 
(2011) for instance measured similarity in caste, language, and occupation. We 
construct a similarity measure using a combination of inspection 
characteristics that network members can easily find out about each other. It is 
our contention that interpersonal similarity creates assumed rapport between 
individuals which would make them more favorable towards collaboration. 
Within organizations, there is some support for this notion as Casciaro and 
Lobo (2008) found that interpersonal affect and trust affect partner choice.  
However, this positive effect is likely to be attenuated when organizations 
are aiming to develop R&D partnerships. Despite differences in institutional 
norms and associated culture clashes in university-industry collaborations, 
and the difficulties with combining knowledge across distant scientific domains 
(Bechky, 2003; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004), establishing ties between 
dissimilar organizations and individuals is likely to be beneficial when seeking 
to develop R&D partnerships. Inter-institutional knowledge flows have been 
found to be of great importance in emerging research fields (Heinze and 
Kuhlmann, 2008) and collaboration between partners with different knowledge 
bases has greater payoff potential (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; McFadyen 
and Cannella, 2004), and is more likely to generate high value innovations 
(Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Fleming, 2001).  
Moreover, it has been shown that performance of heterogeneous teams in 
scientific alliances is higher than that of homogenous teams and that initial 
heterogeneity can be overcome in due time, hence lowering barriers to 
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collaborate (Porac et al., 2004). Rothaermel and Hess (2007) suggested that 
more research should look at interactions between individual and 
organizational characteristics. They for instance found important interactions 
between individual quality measures of scientists and organizational alliances 
and R&D spending. Staying close to the data, our key contention is thus that 
while people have a preference to deal with similar others, when it comes to the 
generation of complex knowledge (R&D projects), they will be more willing to 
accept social dissimilarity than when it comes to other kinds of collaborations 
(operational, marketing, sales). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between similarity and 
collaboration preferences will be weakened when organizations are 
seeking to develop R&D partnerships.   
 
I - 4: Research Methods 
I - 4.1: Context and Sample  
We collected data2 from participants in a technology network serving the 
needs of the plastic electronics industry in the UK. At the time of the study, the 
network was one of approximately twenty Knowledge Transfer Networks (KTNs) 
funded by the UK Government. The KTNs’ objective is to improve the UK’s 
innovation performance by increasing the breadth and depth of technological 
knowledge, by facilitating knowledge flows between UK-based businesses and 
universities, and by accelerating the rate at which this process occurs 
(Technology Strategy Board, 2012). The KTN we studied supported 
organizations developing plastic electronics technology for displays and 
lighting, including small and medium-sized enterprises, original equipment 
                                       
2 Data collection and survey design were done by Professor Zella King from Reading University. 
All analysis and the construction and selection of variables were done by me.  
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manufacturers and universities. Between its inception in Spring 2005 and 
December 2008, the KTN organized 87 events, including seminars, partnering 
workshops, tutorials and dissemination events. Membership of the KTN was 
free so that barriers to join were low. In October 2008, the focal KTN had 
approximately 800 members from 500 organizations listed in its database, 
including a strong representation of senior executives from corporations. Its 
membership was comprised as follows: 64% from companies, 20% from 
universities, with the remainder made up of consultancies, government, and 
other business support organizations.  
While we could have opted to conduct this research in multiple KTNs, our 
theoretical framing is contingent on within-network dynamics. As these 
dynamics might be very different in other networks due to differences in mutual 
knowledge around collaboration (Bechky, 2003; Fleming, 2004; Kotha et al., 
2013), we chose to limit ourselves to one KTN within which we were able to get 
a high response rate. Besides, investigating multiple KTNs would cause 
problems of construct validity as we would have had to tailor survey designs to 
each individual KTN. 
 Invitations to fill in an electronic survey were issued to 667 members of the 
KTN (all members with valid email addresses) in November 2008. After two 
email reminders, responses were received from 201 members, a response rate 
of 30%, by the end of December 2008. In the beginning of the survey, 
respondents were asked to indicate their job roles to identify whether they were 
managers, scientists, or engineers who were in a position to exercise discretion 
over choice of collaboration partner. Of the 201 respondents, 50 were in 
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technology transfer or business development roles and 151 were in research-
related roles. Analysis of non-response using t-tests suggested that 
respondents were significantly more likely to have attended events organized by 
the network (69% of respondents had attended events, compared with 53% in 
the whole population p ≤ 0.001), were more likely to have prior experience of 
collaborative R&D (53% of respondents compared with 40%; p ≤ 0.001) and 
were more likely to work for universities than companies (32% worked for 
universities, as opposed to 22% in the population as a whole). This non-
response analysis suggests that the findings may reflect a bias toward those 
with a greater motivation for finding collaborative partners, which would 
decrease the variance in our data. However, the range and frequency of 
responses to the question regarding collaboration scenarios (cf. infra) did not 
reflect such an upward bias in any obvious way. Moreover, given that the 
purpose of the study is to identify characteristics affecting preferences amongst 
those who are actively seeking collaborations, this positive bias in the 
responses probably reflects an actual higher commitment to the opportunities 
offered by the network.   
I - 4.2: Conjoint Analysis 
To test the hypotheses, we needed an analytical approach that could 
extend beyond a simple ranking of preferences and help examine how 
preferences are weighted when they potentially compete with one another. We 
chose to use conjoint analysis a method that is fairly new to innovation studies 
(but see Riquelme and Rickards (1992) for an exception).  
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Conjoint analysis is a measurement technique that originated in the 
fields of mathematical psychology and psychometrics and can assist 
researchers in sorting out a product’s multidimensional attributes (Green and 
Wind, 1975). Typically, conjoint analysis is used in marketing research to 
expose preference structures underlying consumer buying decisions as it has 
great potential for measuring trade-offs between multi-attribute products and 
services (Green et al., 2001; Green and Srinivasan, 1990). The method is based 
on the premise that preferences can best be determined by asking consumers 
to judge products defined by combinations of attributes, rather than by judging 
single attributes one at a time. By systematically varying attributes of the 
product/collaboration and observing how respondents react to the resulting 
profiles/scenarios, researchers can deduce the importance of each individual 
attribute/element.  
Despite its prominence in marketing research, “conjoint measurement’s 
potential is not limited to consumer applications” (Green and Wind, 1975). The 
method is suitable in situations of multi-attribute decision-making and is 
especially useful for studying perceptions and judgements of respondents 
(Riquelme and Rickards, 1992). Conjoint analysis is suitable because 
respondents were not asked to rate or rank match characteristics explicitly; 
instead they were asked to rate scenarios that consisted of a bundle of 
characteristics, enabling us to examine how potential competition between 
match characteristics is resolved. Although tailored routines exist for analysing 
conjoint data (such as SPSS conjoint), conjoint analysis is a special case of 
GLM.  
38 
 
Common method variance might be a problem in this sample because all 
but one variable stem from the same survey. Although various methods exist to 
account for common method bias (Lindell and Whitney, 2001; Podsakoff and 
Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2003), a recent simulation study has shown that 
all these methods actually deliver less accurate results than those without 
corrections (Richardson, Simmering, and Sturman, 2009). Importantly, 
Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira (2010) reported that including more independent 
variables from the same survey reduces common method variance and that 
interaction effects are never artefacts of common method variance because they 
are always attenuated. Therefore, we followed the advice of Conway and Lance 
(2010) and refrained from using any statistical method to diminish common 
method variance.  
I - 4.3: Dependent Variable: Preference Score for Collaboration Scenario 
 
We examine differences between respondents’ preference scores of 
different scenarios for exploratory collaboration. Before being shown the 
scenarios, respondents worked through a series of questions about exploratory 
collaboration. After indicating their job role and their company’s expertise, they 
were asked to indicate what type of partnership would be most useful, and to 
identify the nature of expertise they would want a possible partner organization 
to contribute to such a project. Then, they were presented with the following 
introductory text:  
“Assume that you are looking for a partner to help with exploring future 
commercial opportunities and/or to help develop your research or 
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technology for the future. I will refer to these projects as exploratory 
projects.”  
 The scenarios were then introduced. Each scenario described a potential 
match for exploratory collaboration in terms of six attributes of the potential 
collaboration: partner seniority, whether they were known to the respondent, 
whether any ties were shared, their organizational affiliation (university or 
company), whether their knowledge was similar to that of the respondent, and 
the research funding for the collaboration. These six attributes provide an 
insight into respondents’ collaboration preferences. They are listed with their 
levels, which were varied across scenarios following an experimental design 
(described further below), in Table I-1. 
Table I-1: Scenario Characteristics and Number of Occurrences 
Scenario 
elements 
Level 
(prevalence)  
Description of factor and level given to 
respondent 
Seniority of 
partner 
Junior (480) Lecturer or research associate; junior scientist or 
engineer Middle (524) Senior lecturer or reader; group leader or senior 
scientist Senior (542) Professor; R&D or other director (e.g. CTO, CEO) 
Familiarity 
Distant (759) Someone you don’t know or only know distantly 
Close (787) Someone you know well and enjoy being with 
Shared 
Contacts 
Unknown (772) Unknown to people you collaborate/work with                 
Known (774) Known to people you collaborate/work with 
Knowledge  
Different (752) Partner’s work draws on different technology and 
science from yours Similar (794) Part er’s work draws on similar technology and 
science to yours 
Resource 
Provisioning 
No funding (379) Informal collaboration; no funding available 
Government 
funding (382) 
Government funding covers half of each party’s 
costs 
Partner funding 
(403) 
Partner organization covers your costs 
Self-funding 
(382) 
You cover the partner’s costs as well as your own 
Organizational 
affiliation 
University (751) Works for a university 
Company (759) Works for a company 
 
Four types of research funding were included: providing one’s own 
funding, having funding provided by the partner, receiving government funding, 
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and an informal arrangement where no funding was available. Of these, the 
highest level of control over the objectives of the collaborative project would be 
where the respondent’s organization funded the collaboration and the lowest 
where the partner funded it. Each respondent was presented with a set of eight 
scenarios, preceded by the following introductory text:  
“Now imagine that you’ve identified several different companies or 
universities who could provide you with the expertise you requested on the 
previous screens. I’d now like to ask you what type of person you would 
find worth collaborating with, in different types of funding arrangement. 
The ideal partner is not always available so it is often necessary to make 
compromises in choosing collaborators. On the following screen, I’m going 
to ask you to evaluate how worthwhile you would find it to collaborate in 
different scenarios”.  
Hence, every scenario provided a combination of one type of funding, three 
types of similarity (shared contacts, prior familiarity and knowledge) and two 
focal attributes (partner seniority and organizational affiliation). These last two 
were recoded as measures of similarity based on information provided by the 
respondents about their own seniority and organization. Scenarios were rated 
by 3 (due to incomplete responses) up to 8 different respondents (mean 7.7). 
This rating provided our dependent variable. Although some scenarios were 
only rated a few times, this is not a problem for the conjoint method. Hybrid 
forms such as the ones we used have been found to compare favourably with 
traditional full profile models (Riquelme and Rickards, 1992). As the goal of 
conjoint analysis is to compare the relative importance of each specific attribute 
in the context of variations of all other relevant attributes, what really matters 
to the explanatory power of the model is how many times each attribute was 
judged individually.  
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In our design, every attribute value appeared minimally 379 times. Given 
that there were 192 different scenarios (4 x 2 x 2 x 3 x 2 x 2), a full factorial 
design in which respondents were presented with all possible permutations of 
match characteristics and levels would require them to rate 192 scenarios. This 
would have vastly decreased response rate and would have placed excessive 
cognitive strain on the data-supplying capabilities of respondents (Green, 
Goldberg, and Montemayor, 1981). In our study, the 192 scenarios were 
divided into 24 blocks of eight scenarios (using a ‘confounded blocks’ design) 
and each respondent rated one block of eight, a number suggested by Green et 
al. (1981). 201 respondents rated a total of 1546 scenarios. The mean value 
across all 1546 scenarios was 4.78, with minimum 0 and maximum 10.   
I - 4.4: Independent Variables 
 
We use inspection-based measures that are observable at low cost 
(Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), because such measures can easily be used in the 
search for a potential partner.  
Resource Provisioning.  We enter 3 dummies for resource provisioning 
with partner as default option. This variable is derived straight from the 
scenario characteristics in which funding can be provided by the partner, the 
government, by the organization for whom the respondent works, or in which 
no funding is provided. 
Similarity. Similarity matters to collaboration and collaboration intention 
(Vissa, 2011) but similarity is not a simple construct as individuals who are 
very similar in one respect can be very dissimilar in others. However, if 
individuals indeed prefer similar others, it seems likely that different aspects of 
similarity will be implicitly weighed together resulting in some kind of similarity 
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score. We construct a similarity index (between 0 and 5) summing dummies for 
(1) similar knowledge, (2) same organizational affiliation3 (university or 
company), (3) shared contacts, (4) same seniority level, and (5) prior familiarity.  
Seeking R&D. Respondents were asked what expertise they would want a 
collaboration partner to contribute. They were given a choice of nine options, 
such as ‘researches/develops materials, technology or equipment for plastic 
electronics’ and ‘manufactures and uses displays and lighting products’. The 
list of options was derived from interviews with members of the KTN, developed 
in consultation with industry experts, and refined in response to a pilot test of 
the survey. Those who selected one of the first three options (seeking a partner 
who is researching and/or developing technology for plastic electronics, 
displays or lighting) were deemed to be seeking a research capability. 80 
respondents (39.80%) were classified as seeking R&D.  
Prior collaboration. A dataset from the UK Government’s Technology 
Strategy Board was used to determine whether each organization had 
previously participated or was currently participating in a government-funded 
collaborative R&D project in a technology area relevant to plastic electronics. 
We obtained data on all projects funded as a result of invitations issued 
between April 2004 and Spring 2007, within programs that addressed plastic 
electronics, advanced composite materials and structures, and other disruptive 
technologies in electronics and displays. Spring 2007 was an appropriate end 
point because there is typically a year’s lag between the call being issued and 
the project getting started. Of the projects funded in the Spring 2007 call, the 
                                       
3 Leaving organizational affiliation out (because it is not strictly an interpersonal measure) and 
adding it as a separate control did not significantly change the results. 
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earliest started in January 2008, and the latest in June 2008. These projects 
would have been running for less than a year before the questionnaire was 
issued in November 2008. Of the 201 respondents, 93 (46%) worked for 
organizations that had been (were) involved in government-funded collaborative 
R&D projects. 
On the individual level, I add controls for relative respondent seniority. 
Respondents were asked to self-classify their role using a range of options. 23 
respondents were working as lecturers, research associates and junior 
scientists in companies and were coded as Junior (11.44%). The 62 
respondents who were senior lecturers or readers in universities or group 
leaders in companies were coded as Middle (30.85%). 66 university professors 
and R&D or other Directors were coded as Senior (32.84%). For respondents 
with hybrid roles, spanning both universities and companies, background 
research was conducted to determine from public sources which category 
represented their primary role. 50 respondents were not in research-oriented 
roles. 26 (12.94%) of them were in technology development roles and 24 
(11.94%) were categorized as others. Using this information, I classified the 
relative seniority of the respondent vis-à-vis the seniority of the partner in the 
scenario.  
On the organizational level, I control for organization type (Fontana et al., 
2006; Laursen and Salter, 2004). Each organization was coded to indicate 
whether it was a university, a large company (with over $50m in sales and/or 
500 employees), or a small company (less than $50m in sales and less than 
500 employees). Of the 201 respondents, 115 (57.21%) worked in SMEs, 33 
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(16.42%) worked for large organizations and 53 (26.37%) worked for 
universities. Additionally, there are dummy controls for whether the 
organization has own R&D activities, and whether the organization has any 
international operations. These variables came directly from the survey.  
I - 4.5: Regression Methods 
 
As stated above, conjoint analysis is a special form of the general linear 
model (GLM). GLM regressions are considered robust and useful as they control 
for unobserved heterogeneity caused by the unique characteristics of the 
respondents that might influence the dependent variable. Furthermore, as the 
effect of these unique individual characteristics might be random, I use a 
random effects model. Using individual fixed effects did not change the essence 
of our findings although all individual control variables naturally disappeared 
from the model. The Hausman test resulted in a Chi2 score of 14.80 (p = 
0.2526) which means the null hypothesis of no systematic differences in the 
coefficients could not be rejected. In this case, the random effects betas are 
more efficient and hence I report those. 
As a prelude to the next section in which I analyse these data with 
specific attention to individual characteristics, it is important to note that the 
random nature of the individual effects suggests that there is indeed 
unexplained variance in the individuals that is not captured by the explanatory 
variables in this model. When using fixed or random effects, grouped around 
the scenarios rather than the individuals, the Hausman test is significant (Chi2 
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= 82.49; p ≤ 0.001) meaning that fixed effects models need be used because the 
betas in the random effects model are inconsistent. 
I use the XTREG (generalised least squares) command in Stata 12 to test 
the three hypotheses. I start with a baseline model of control variables (model 
1) and random effects grouped around the individual respondents. Then I test 
the three hypotheses consequentially in models 2, 3, and 4 after which I test all 
hypotheses together in model 5. Finally, model 6 splits the similarity construct 
up in three discrete variables (high, medium, and low) and tests for significance 
again. The results of this stepwise procedure are summarized in table I-2. 
I test six alternative specifications of the model as robustness checks. 
Firstly, I show the fixed effects regression results for the full model and I repeat 
the random effects regression but this time with clustering of the errors around 
scenarios. While the latter seems to be an obvious choice, there is some recent 
evidence on the Stata forum that there might actually be an error in the 
calculation of degrees of freedom when clustering errors4 especially when using 
fixed effects. Furthermore, I ran the full model also using a maximum 
likelihood estimator (Stata command: xtreg DV IVs, mle nolog), a restricted 
maximum likelihood estimator (Stata command: xtmixed DV IVs, vce(cluster 
id), and the specific Stata command for complex survey sampling designs 
(svyset, psu (clustervariable) /// svy: regress DV IVs) as well as for a tobit 
regression with clustering around respondents. Table I-3 shows these results. 
                                       
4 http://www.statalist.org/forums/forum/general-stata-discussion/general/5807-areg-and-
xtreg-fe-with-cluster-option-which-one-is-better  
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I - 5: Results and Discussion 
Table I-2 shows the results of random-effects GLS regression. Juniors and 
business developers exhibit higher preferences for collaborations. There is no 
significant difference between SMEs and large organizations, but university 
respondents are on average slightly more favourable towards collaboration. 
Additionally, there seems to be a clear preference for working together with a 
more experienced partner. Thus, juniors want to work with people who are 
further ahead on the career track and so do mediors. This can likely be 
explained by the associated learning benefits. Organizational and collaboration 
control variables are not significant in and of their own. For resource 
provisioning, the initial assumption that P > G > S > N, seems to hold. 
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Table I-2: Stepwise GLS Regression with Random Effects 
Category Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Respondent 
(medior 
default) 
Junior  1.04** (0.39)  1.02** (0.39)  1.05** (0.39)  0.91* (0.39)  0.90* (0.38)  0.92* (0.39) 
Senior  0.12 (0.27)  0.12 (0.27)  0.13 (0.27)  0.10 (0.27)  0.12 (0.27)  0.10 (0.27) 
Business Developer  0.62† (0.35)  0.61† (0.35)  0.62† (0.35)  0.76* (0.35)  0.75* (0.35)  0.75* (0.35) 
More experienced collaborator  0.45* (0.19)  0.45* (0.19)  0.46* (0.19)  0.69*** (0.19)  0.69*** (0.19)  0.66*** (0.19) 
Respondent's 
Organization 
(SME default) 
University  0.57† (0.3)  0.56† (0.3)  0.57† (0.3)  0.57† (0.3)  0.55† (0.29)  0.59* (0.3) 
Large Organizations  0.39 (0.32)  0.38 (0.32)  0.39 (0.32)  0.36 (0.32)  0.34 (0.32)  0.35 (0.32) 
Experience with collaboration  0.25 (0.27)  0.25 (0.27)  0.60† (0.33)  0.21 (0.26)  0.58† (0.33)  0.57† (0.33) 
R&D active -0.47 (0.29) -0.47 (0.29) -0.47 (0.29) -0.50† (0.29) -0.50† (0.29) -0.51† (0.29) 
Internationally Active  0.47 (0.38)  0.44 (0.38)  0.48 (0.38)  0.46 (0.38)  0.44 (0.38)  0.42 (0.38) 
Funding 
(partner 
default) 
Self -2.83*** (0.16) -3.47*** (0.21) -2.47*** (0.23) -2.84*** (0.16) -3.11*** (0.25) -3.13*** (0.25) 
None -1.97*** (0.17) -2.49*** (0.22) -1.74*** (0.23) -1.97*** (0.17) -2.22*** (0.26) -2.20*** (0.26) 
Government -1.13*** (0.17) -1.37*** (0.21) -1.07*** (0.23) -1.13*** (0.16) -1.32*** (0.26) -1.31*** (0.26) 
Collaboration 
objective  
Seeking R&D partner  0.09 (0.22) -0.73* (0.3)  0.09 (0.22)  0.59† (0.34) -0.23 (0.39) -0.68* (0.31) 
Seeking Marketing  0.07 (0.24)  0.07 (0.24)  0.06 (0.24)  0.05 (0.24)  0.05 (0.24)  0.06 (0.24) 
Funding 
interactions 
Self-funded * Seeking R&D    1.55*** (0.33)      1.58*** (0.33)  1.60*** (0.33) 
Not  funded * Seeking R&D    1.25*** (0.34)      1.25*** (0.34)  1.23*** (0.34) 
Gov funded * Seeking R&D    0.54 (0.34)      0.56† (0.33)  0.57† (0.33) 
Self-funded * Prior Collaboration     -0.78* (0.33)   -0.80* (0.32) -0.79* (0.32) 
Not funded * Prior Collaboration     -0.52 (0.34)   -0.57† (0.33) -0.56† (0.33) 
Gov funded * Prior Collaboration     -0.13 (0.33)   -0.13 (0.33) -0.15 (0.33) 
Similarity 
Similarity        0.48*** (0.07)  0.47*** (0.07)   
Seeking R&D * Similarity       -0.22* (0.11) -0.23* (0.11)   
High and Low 
Similarity 
High Similarity            1.27*** (0.23) 
Low Similarity           -0.52** (0.18) 
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(Medium 
Default) 
Seeking R&D * High Similarity           -0.89* (0.36) 
Seeking R&D * Low Similarity            0.17 (0.29) 
  Intercept  5.84*** (0.31)  6.18*** (0.32)  5.67*** (0.32)  4.76*** (0.34)  4.95*** (0.36)  5.99*** (0.33) 
Model Fit 
# Observations 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546 
# respondents  201 201 201 201 201 201 
Within R-squared 0.19 0.21 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.24 
Between R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 
Overall R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.21 
Wald chi2 349.64 381.32 357.17 416.71 458.45 454.72 
 
Table I-3: Robustness Checks 
Category Explanatory Variables GLS (FE) GLS (RE) ML REML Tobit Survey GLS 
Respondent 
(medior 
default) 
Junior dropped   0.90*** (0.27)   0.90* (0.37)   0.81** (0.26)   0.89** (0.29)   0.81** (0.26) 
Senior dropped   0.12 (0.28)   0.12 (0.26)   0.18 (0.28)   0.24 (0.31)   0.18 (0.28) 
Business Developer dropped   0.75* (0.38)   0.75* (0.34)   0.79* (0.38)   0.86† (0.45)   0.79* (0.38) 
More experienced collaborator   0.61** (0.19)   0.69*** (0.16)   0.69*** (0.19)   0.87*** (0.18)   0.93*** (0.2)   0.87*** (0.18) 
Respondent's 
Organization 
(SME default) 
University dropped   0.55† (0.29)   0.55† (0.29)   0.54† (0.29)   0.58† (0.32)   0.54† (0.29) 
Large Organizations dropped   0.34 (0.27)   0.34 (0.31)   0.33 (0.27)   0.4 (0.29)   0.33 (0.27) 
Experience with collaboration dropped   0.58 (0.36)   0.58† (0.32)   0.66† (0.36)   0.72† (0.41)   0.66† (0.36) 
R&D active dropped -0.5 (0.33)   -0.50† (0.28) -0.54 (0.33) -0.58 (0.39) -0.54 (0.33) 
Internationally Active dropped   0.44 (0.31)   0.44 (0.37)   0.41 (0.3)   0.44 (0.34)   0.41 (0.3) 
Funding 
(partner 
default) 
Self  -3.17*** (0.26)  -3.11*** (0.36)  -3.11*** (0.25)  -2.97*** (0.38)  -3.40*** (0.45)  -2.97*** (0.38) 
None  -2.25*** (0.26)  -2.22*** (0.32)  -2.22*** (0.25)  -2.16*** (0.34)  -2.37*** (0.38)  -2.16*** (0.34) 
Government  -1.34*** (0.26)  -1.32*** (0.28)  -1.32*** (0.26)  -1.28*** (0.3)  -1.52*** (0.34)   -1.28*** (0.3) 
Collaboration 
objective 
Seeking R&D partner dropped -0.23 (0.4) -0.23 (0.38) -0.16 (0.4) -0.32 (0.44) -0.16 (0.4) 
Seeking Marketing dropped   0.05 (0.23)   0.05 (0.23)   0.04 (0.23)   0.02 (0.26)   0.04 (0.23) 
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Funding 
interactions 
Self-funded * Seeking R&D   1.61*** (0.33)   1.58*** (0.48)   1.58*** (0.33)   1.50** (0.48)   1.79** (0.55)   1.50** (0.48) 
Not  funded * Seeking R&D   1.25*** (0.34)   1.25** (0.39)   1.25*** (0.34)   1.27** (0.39)   1.48*** (0.44)   1.27** (0.39) 
Gov funded * Seeking R&D   0.65† (0.34)   0.56 (0.34)   0.56† (0.33)   0.36 (0.36)   0.56 (0.39)   0.36 (0.36) 
Self-funded * Prior Collaboration   -0.73* (0.32)   -0.80† (0.47)   -0.80* (0.32)   -0.97* (0.48)   -1.02† (0.56)   -0.97* (0.48) 
Not funded * Prior Collaboration -0.49 (0.34) -0.57 (0.39)   -0.57† (0.33)   -0.75† (0.4)   -0.88† (0.45)   -0.75† (0.4) 
Gov funded * Prior Collaboration -0.14 (0.33) -0.13 (0.34) -0.13 (0.32) -0.1 (0.35) -0.08 (0.39) -0.1 (0.35) 
Similarity 
Similarity   0.46*** (0.07)   0.47*** (0.07)   0.47*** (0.07)   0.50*** (0.07)   0.54*** (0.07)   0.50*** (0.07) 
Seeking R&D * Similarity   -0.23* (0.11)   -0.23* (0.11)   -0.23* (0.11)   -0.23* (0.11)   -0.24* (0.12)   -0.23* (0.11) 
  Intercept   5.31*** (0.18)   4.95*** (0.39)   4.95*** (0.35)   4.82*** (0.38)   4.89*** (0.42)   4.82*** (0.38) 
Model Fit 
Parameters 
# Observations 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546 1546 
# respondents  201 201 201     201 
Clustering around id no yes no yes yes no  
Within R-square 0.24 0.24         
Between R-square 0.04 0.17         
Overall R-square 0.18 0.22       0.22 
Pseudo R-square     0.05   0.05   
Wald chi2    337.81   348.07     
Likelihood Ratio chi2     405.13       
Log Likelihood -3302.89   -3532.57 -3617.76 -3558.07   
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We know that large firms often engage in university-industry 
collaborations to share costs, which indicates that resource constraints on 
R&D are not unique to SMEs (Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005). We find 
support for hypothesis 1: when organizations are seeking to develop R&D 
partnerships the negative effects of resource provisioning (relative to 
partner) are attenuated, although the interaction effect with government 
funding is not always significant. Respondents are less averse to self-
funding collaborations when they aim to develop specific R&D capabilities or 
acquire technical knowledge. We can infer that when trying to develop R&D 
collaborations, organizations are more willing to cough up the necessary 
funds because that will allows them to maintain more control over the 
partnership, the direction the research takes, and the IP it produces.  
We also find partial support for the second hypothesis in model 3. We 
had argued that prior collaboration experience would strengthen the effects 
of resource provisioning. While the variable for prior collaboration itself is 
weakly positive and significant (b = 0.58, p ≤ 0.10), it is clear this effect is 
driven largely by the interaction terms as prior experience is not significant 
in model 1. The interaction effects with resource provisioning are negative, 
although always insignificant for government funding and in about 50% of 
the cases insignificant for no funding as well (see table I-3). This provides 
some support for the status-appropriation argumentation as respondents 
from organizations with collaboration experience seem to believe they can 
extract value from collaborations and are hence less inclined to provision 
financial resources. However, their preference for engaging in collaborations 
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that are supported by others is somewhat increased as they can still create 
and appropriate value without running the risk of losing scarce financial 
resources.  
While we did not hypothesize it explicitly, we suggested that similarity 
would have a positive effect on respondents’ preferences to collaborate and 
we indeed find a significant effect of similarity in model 4 (b = 0.48, p ≤ 
0.001). Hypothesis 3 proposed that this effect would be attenuated for 
organizations seeking to develop R&D partnerships, which is supported in 
model 4 (b = -0.22, p ≤ 0.05). The effect is not strong enough to overthrow 
the positive effect of similarity though, which indicates the difficult balance 
of optimizing levels of similarity when engaging in partnerships. Figure I-1 
below shows the marginal effects for different levels of similarity and seeking 
R&D versus seeking no R&D. At low levels of similarity, those seeking R&D 
have a higher collaboration preference but as similarity increases, the 
enthusiasm for engaging in an R&D project falls. Respondents who are 
seeking marketing or operational collaborations are more willing to work 
with very similar others.   
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Figure I-1: Marginal Effect of Seeking R&D on Collaboration Preferences 
 
To test for local significance we split the similarity measure into three 
constituent parts and find that high similarity is significant and positive (b= 
1.27, p ≤ 0.001) while low similarity is negative and significant (b= -0.52, p ≤ 
0.01), further supporting hypothesis 3. Model 6 also shows that the 
interaction between seeking R&D and high similarity has a significant 
negative effect (b = -0.89, p ≤ 0.05) while the interaction with low similarity 
is positive but insignificant (b = 0.17, p > 0.10), which suggests that the 
overall effect we find in model 5 (b = -0.23, p ≤ 0.05) is largely driven by a 
preference for small to modest dissimilarity when seeking R&D. An 
alternative model in which high and moderate similarity are included (with 
low similarity as default) shows that both effects are independently preferred 
over low similarity and the interaction between seeking R&D and moderate 
similarity is once again insignificant.  
These results suggest that although high similarity facilitates the 
establishment of common ground (Bechky, 2003), and common knowledge 
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facilitates coordination and knowledge transfer (Grant, 1996), respondents 
see clear advantages in some social dissimilarity in the production of ideas.  
With regards to knowledge specifically, we know that very dissimilar 
knowledge can be counterproductive in collaboration (Gilsing et al., 2008; 
Wuyts et al., 2005). The conclusion seems to be that even when it comes to 
interpersonal characteristics, high social similarity is not ideal for 
innovativeness. Respondents appear to realise that people who are too 
similar to each other are unlikely to be helpful in the generation of new 
ideas.  
I - 5.1: Link to the Second Study 
In the 4th season of the popular TV series House MD, the lead 
character Dr. House organizes a competition to determine who will join his 
diagnostics team. One older candidate excels in finishing House’s sentences 
and thinking along the same lines as House does. Eventually, House decides 
to fire him because the team would not benefit from someone else who 
thinks too much like House himself. This simple example of popular culture 
exemplifies that individual differences in focal knowledge and ways of 
thinking contribute to innovative thinking, which is required in House’s 
department of diagnostic medicine. However, who eventually makes the 
team is not strictly a result of knowledge and divergent, lateral, or analogical 
thinking. Besides hospital politics, there is a clear element of social, 
interpersonal fit as well. Our findings regarding interpersonal similarity 
indicate that soft aspects of potential partnerships are important 
determinants of preferences. While this may not come as a surprise, what 
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does come as a surprise is that the existing literature on collaborative 
knowledge creation has remained largely silent on these topics. The implicit 
assumption seems to have been that we can either not say anything about 
individual differences and how they influence decision-making, or that it is 
pointless to talk about differences because people behave rationally when it 
comes to business decisions and thus do not let their idiosyncratic 
preferences guide them. However, this study suggests that belief is perhaps 
unfounded.  
Given the critical role played by individuals in collaboration decisions, 
we use a subsample of the previous data to study how individual attributes 
shape preferences to form organizational partnerships, above and beyond 
scenario characteristics. Taking account of individual preferences shifts the 
dialog to the behavioral roots of strategy. To our knowledge, only one recent 
study has investigated tie formation intentions or preferences and that 
study found that existing ties form a poor proxy for tie formation intention 
(Vissa, 2011). This topic has largely escaped scholarly attention, an 
omission rooted in the implicit assumption that individuals are 
homogeneous, malleable beings that are randomly distributed into 
organizations, thus suppressing “questions regarding [individuals’] 
motivation, preferences, [and] abilities” (Felin and Foss, 2005, p.450 - italics 
added).  
Existing literature on individual antecedents to collaboration has 
acknowledged that economic relations are often “embedded in social 
relations of friendship and trust between people” (Kilduff and Brass, 2010, 
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p. 324). As such, research has focused on dyadic characteristics of 
collaborations such as individual homophily (Vissa, 2011) or interpersonal 
trust and affect (Bierly and Gallagher, 2007; Casciaro and Lobo, 2008). 
Additionally, researchers investigated how to access domain knowledge 
through high profile partners, for instance through alliances with star 
scientists (Hess and Rothaermel, 2011). Within the broader literature on 
inter-organizational relations, there is some consensus that firm, partner, 
task, institutional, dyadic-relational, and network characteristics all matter 
(Bierly and Gallagher, 2007; Geringer, 1991; Hitt et al., 2000; Li et al., 
2008). However, if existing ties are indeed the successful results of matching 
processes (Gale and Shapley, 1962), deriving antecedents of tie formation ex 
post (i.e. from a biased sample) can only partially illuminate the actual 
motives and preferences to establish collaborations.  
In order to understand the origins of tie formation and hence the 
origins of inter-organizational knowledge generation, we investigate how 
individuals’ professional aspirations drive collaboration preferences. Our 
exploration of the micro-foundations of strategy, helps “to better understand 
the origins and the level of intentionality of aspirations in organizational 
practice” (Shinkle, 2012, p. 442). We study how individual characteristics 
shape collaboration preferences using a subsample of the same respondents 
as before for which we have additional information. Using the conjoint 
analysis data as controls, we analyze how individual aspirations shape 
collaboration propensities with cumulative link models. We operationalize 
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the dependent variable slightly differently to increase the model accuracy 
which in turn warrants the new methodology.  
Our findings suggest that when aspirations are moderate, 
interpersonal and focal knowledge characteristics are the main drivers of 
collaboration. However, when the aspirational gap is positive or negative, 
relational capability (networking skills, openness, and network knowledge) 
significantly moderates the aspiration-preference relationship.  
I - 6: Theory and Hypotheses: Aspirations and Collaborations 
 
Decision-makers typically evaluate outcomes with reference to 
aspirations determined by historical or peer results (Greve, 2002; Shinkle, 
2012). Facing an aspiration gap (above or below the reference point) 
influences the intensity and choice of behaviors (Ansoff, 1979; Cyert and 
March, 1963). The behavioral theory of the firm argues that when people (or 
organizations) fall below an aspiration level they take more risks and engage 
in problemistic search in order to catch-up, while those that are ahead 
become either risk-averse in order to maintain their position or use their 
resource excess to engage in risky, and often wasteful, slack search (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal and March, 1981; March 
and Shapira, 1987), although behavior likely changes at positive (cushioning 
effect) or negative (threat-rigidity) extremes (Hu, Blettner, and Bettis, 2011; 
Jeffrey, Onay, and Larrick, 2010; Miller and Chen, 2004). Gaba and 
Bhattacharya (2012) for instance found that firms are more (less) likely to 
launch a corporate venture capital unit when innovation performance is 
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below (above) social aspirations. At the interorganizational level, Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven (1996) argued that the logic of alliance formation is based 
on both social opportunities, such as experienced management teams, and 
strategic needs, such as vulnerable strategic positions. Because 
organizational theory “frequently discusses organizational aspirations as a 
managerial-level construct” (Shinkle, 2012, p. 424), this logic likely 
resonates at the individual level as well.  
We follow social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) in understanding 
an aspiration level as an evaluation of one’s own ability at a moment in time. 
Festinger (1954) suggests that the existence of a discrepancy in abilities will 
instigate action to reduce this discrepancy so that those who are behind 
catch up while those who are ahead are likely “to devote considerable time 
and effort to trying to improve the performance of the others in the group to 
a point where at least some of them are close, but not equal to, [them]” (p. 
127). Additionally, the theory posits that people who are doing worse than 
their peers are likely to be more persistent than those who are doing better. 
In organizational jargon, it means that problemistic search is more intense 
than slack search. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: Divergence from social aspirations will increase an 
individual’s propensity to collaborate. This effect will be stronger when 
the aspiration gap is negative than when it is positive. 
I - 6.1: Relational Capability as Moderator 
 
In his review of the aspirations literature, Shinkle (2012) stated that 
“the moderators of the aspiration-consequence relationship are 
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understudied” (p. 418). When an ability’s relevance to immediate behavior 
increases, pressure toward reducing discrepancy with relevant others 
augments (Festinger, 1954). Thus, individuals will use relevant capabilities 
to close an aspirational gap. Siegel (1957) argued that individuals are 
concerned with the subjective likelihood of failure when they aim to 
maximize expected utility. Similar constructs regarding success probability 
are found in goal-setting theory (Locke and Latham, 2002, 2006), valence-
instrumentality-expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), and social cognitive 
theory (Bandura, 2012). Self-efficacy (i.e. task-specific confidence) for 
instance has been found to stimulate entrepreneurial intentions (Boyd and 
Vozikis, 1994). Thus, capabilities that can affect the subjective likelihood of 
collaborative success are likely to moderate the aspiration-preference 
relationship. Moving beyond previously studied 1-to-1 relational aspects like 
interpersonal trust and affect (Casciaro and Lobo, 2008), we posit that an 
individual’s generic one-to-many relational capability will affect collaboration 
preferences. This echoes recent findings in network research that claim that 
an actor’s network position is likely to be endogenous, and driven by 
performance (Lee, 2010) – e.g. networks seem to be formed around high 
performing scientists (Zucker and Darby, 2006) – or by aspects of  
personality such as self-monitoring (Oh and Kilduff, 2008). We test whether 
this one-to-many relational capability, consisting of networking skills, 
networking openness, and network information, indeed affects collaboration 
preferences.   
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I - 6.1.1: Networking Skills and Networking Openness 
Positive moderation of the aspiration-preference relation occurs when 
a capability increases the probability of a successful outcome (Siegel, 1957) 
or enhances the perceived behavioral control over the success of the 
outcome (Ajzen, 1991).  
In the popular sitcom ‘The Big Bang Theory’, four researchers are 
depicted as socially awkward, furthering the stereotype that (many) 
scientists are inept at human interaction and networking. There is an 
element of truth to this stereotype as evidenced by studies that show that 
people in the natural sciences, mathematics, and engineering score on 
average higher on the autism-spectrum quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
While networking skills may thus be rather rare amongst researchers, those 
who possess good networking skills are likely to believe this capability will 
enhance their chances of successful collaborations (see e.g. Gulati (1999) for 
support at the organizational level). 
 In general, working with familiar people is preferred over working 
with strangers, as prior experience in collaborating allows the development 
of interorganizational routines and builds trust and mutual knowledge (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995). This is especially important when 
collaborating across organizational and knowledge boundaries where 
common ground is often missing (Bechky, 2003; Dasgupta and David, 
1994). However, this reliance on the familiar is not always the optimal 
choice because firms with a high propensity to enter into repeated 
relationships have lower performance, especially under technical 
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uncertainty (Goerzen, 2007). Familiarity among interorganizational 
collaborators also creates shared mind-maps, reducing the creation of real 
novelty. In association with a reduction in information asymmetry, shared 
mind-maps potentially facilitate unwanted knowledge transfer so that 
collaborating with strangers is often preferred when the goal is 
breakthrough innovations (Li et al., 2008). Networking openness or the 
willingness to work with strangers and networking skills can then be 
assumed to improve perceived behavioral control over the collaboration 
outcome.  
Individuals who are trailing behind their peers are likely to be more 
willing to engage in collaborations which are inherently uncertain (Baum et 
al., 2005). Networking openness and skills will amplify this proclivity 
because they lower perceived risk. On the flip side, individuals who are 
ahead of their peers are generally risk averse (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
but want to help their distant peers come closer to them, much like a 
supervisor does with a PhD student (Festinger, 1954). This suggests that 
‘leaders’ will want to collaborate when they perceive collaboration as safe, 
i.e. when they are open and skillful, but be averse to collaboration when 
they lack the needed capabilities. So while the effects for ‘slackers and 
leaders’ point in the same direction, they are likely to be less pronounced for 
leaders due to their risk-averseness. This leads to the following hypotheses 
Hypothesis 5: Networking skill positively reinforces the effect of an 
aspiration gap on general collaboration propensity  
Hypothesis 6: Networking openness positively reinforces the effect of an 
aspiration gap on general collaboration propensity 
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I - 6.1.2: Network Information 
Negative moderation of the aspiration-preference relationship will 
occur when the perceived behavioral control over the outcome decreases 
(Ajzen, 1991). We refer to network information broadly as how aware an 
individual is about other participants in the network. Individuals with high 
network information are probably well-connected (centrality) and might have 
a lower propensity to engage in collaborations because of (1) the dark side of 
social capital (Gargiulo and Benassi, 1999); (2) the higher likelihood of 
repeat ties (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999); and (3) the possibility of network 
extension via partner referrals (Gulati, 1999). For instance, against the 
authors’ hypotheses, firms do not extend their network when facing firm-
specific uncertainty (Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips, 2004). At the risk 
of mental downscaling, it seems likely that these effects are most important 
when network information is high, because individuals then have – in theory 
- access to alternatives.  
At the individual level, we know that centrality in an awareness 
network improves performance (Cross and Cummings, 2004). Hence, 
individuals with high network information might have access to other ways 
than collaborations to further their career, which could also reduce their 
proclivity to collaborate. Especially leaders that have a lot of information 
about network members are likely to be very selective in their partner 
choice. When network awareness allows them to differentiate between high 
and low quality partners, their collaboration preferences are likely to be 
more tailored than those with less knowledge about other actors. 
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Additionally, the perceived opportunity costs for selecting an unknown 
partner are on average greater when you have a lot of information about the 
potential partners in the pool. While having more information will make 
slackers pickier as well, their position of strategic need does not afford them 
the same selectivity as leaders. In other words, slackers’ risk-taking 
tendency will force them to favor collaborations more than leaders but 
network information will attenuate this main effect. This leads to the final 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: Network information negatively moderates the effect of 
aspiration gap on general collaboration propensity.  
I - 7: Methods and Measures 
We are using a subsample of the original dataset for which we have 
extra information about the respondents. The subsample consists of a total 
of 947 observations from 120 respondents. We rescale the initial preference 
score (which ranked between 0 and 10) to a narrower range between 0 and 4 
as follows: 0 (0,1); 1 (2,3); 2 (4,5) ; 3 (6,7) ; and 4 (8,9,10). We chose this 
partitioning because it provided the most equitable distribution but other 
ways to partition did not alter the findings. Using a narrower range 
improved the model fit but the results were not drastically different for the 
original ratings.  
For the analysis of the data we use a cumulative link model (CLM), 
also known as an ordered logit/probit model with flexible thresholds 
(Christensen, 2013). The core reasons for using this estimation method are: 
(1) it does not assume normal distribution of the response variable 
(collaboration preference) which otherwise biases the standard errors; (2) all 
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predicted values will be discrete and within the permissible range (unlike 
GLS); and (3) the cardinal distance between the ordered ratings is not 
necessarily the same. This is appropriate when one does not want to assume 
for instance that the “mathematical” difference between “completely 
disagree” and “disagree” is necessarily the same as the one between 
“neutral” and “agree”. The rescaling we did provides additional support for 
using cumulative logit models because the mean difference between our new 
0 and 1 (distance = 2) is indeed mathematically different from the mean 
distance between 3 and 4 (distance = 2.5). 
The results of cumulative link models need to be interpreted with 
care. In essence, the CLM regression with flexible thresholds assigns 
threshold values that serve as ‘inflection points’. Below the inflection point, 
the model assigns the observation (i.e. the row in a matrix) to one discrete 
value of the response and above the inflection point to the next. With flexible 
thresholds, it is possible that the distance between the consecutive inflection 
points is not the same. For example, the CLM could assign the following 4 
threshold values -0.5, 0.2, 1.5, and 2.3 which would mean that below the -
0.5 value, the model predicts the response to be 0 (minimal collaboration 
preference). Between -0.5 and 0.2, the model assigns observation to 
response 1 and so on until all values above 2.3 will be assigned to response 
4. In this way, the CLM makes discrete predictions for the response variable 
(collaboration preference), given the values of the explanatory variables. In 
doing so, it avoids the pitfalls of GLS regressions that potentially create 
negative fitted values.  
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We used the probit link which is recommended when “the model is 
interpreted with reference to a latent variable” (Christensen, 2013, p. 9), in 
our case collaboration preference. Because CLM covariates are signal-to-
noise ratios, adding an extra explanatory variable can inflate the betas of all 
parameters, which makes these models particularly susceptible to 
overfitting. We had to balance this risk of coefficient inflation with the 
benefits additional controls generate regarding the reduction of common 
method variance. As robustness checks, we used simple OLS as this is less 
susceptible to coefficient inflation as well as GLS and CLM with scenario-
fixed effects and spherical errors around individuals and organizations. This 
did not change the results’ significance. As discussed below, for the 
construction of the graphs we use the results from the OLS regression. 
I - 7.1: Explanatory Variables and Controls 
 Aspiration gap. We coded aspiration gap based on the following 
question: “Compared with people you consider peers in your chosen field, 
how successful has your career been? Would you say that you are ahead / 
level / behind your peers?” We coded this respectively as 1 (ahead - positive 
gap), 2 (level - no gap), 3 (behind - negative gap). While this coding imposes 
equidistance between the aspiration levels, it is important to note that the 
results are comparable when using dummies for low/medium/high 
aspirations as well as for a 1, 0, -1 coding.  
Networking skills. We used the mean of six items measuring self-
perceptions of networking skills. The item responses range from -3 (strongly 
disagree) to +3 (strongly agree) Likert-type scale. Sample questions are “I 
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very often see opportunities for collaboration between people”, and “I always 
try to forge connections between people dealing with similar issues”, etc. The 
factor analysis with promax rotation of these six items revealed a single 
factor. The reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of this scale was 0.82.  
Network information and Networking openness. A subset of 
respondents (131/201) with stated knowledge domain preferences was 
presented with six different names of network members with expertise in 
their chosen domain. Respondents were asked how well they knew the 
person (between 0 and 10) and whether they would want to collaborate with 
that person (hovering the mouse over the name showed a short bio of the 
person in question). We define network information as the sum of the 
responses to how well respondents knew the six members. Then, we coded 
every response on knowledge/preference that was above (below) the 
respective mean as 1 (0) and summed the number of times the actor 
preference was above the mean while the actor knowledge was below the 
mean. We call this networking openness (between 0 and 6 theoretically, but 
0 to 5 in the data). The correlation between these variables is -0.32 
Control variables. At the individual level, we control for job experience 
(number of years in current organization) and the number of years worked 
before current job. We also construct a factor that captures the relative 
seniority between the person in the scenario (junior, medior, or senior) and 
the respondent, which results in a down/same/up match (respondent is 
more/as/less senior respectively) as well as an unknown category for ties 
with non-research oriented respondents. We further include the five other 
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scenario variables, whether the respondent’s organization is R&D active, 
internationally active, and has previous experience with government-funded 
projects. Finally, we control for respondent organization type, and the kind 
of collaboration the respondent’s organization is interested in (marketing, 
operational, technological, none) and include (non-reported) dummies for 
the knowledge domain the respondent reported to be seeking to insulate 
knowledge domain specific effects (e.g. different number of individuals 
within a specific domain affecting the likelihood knowing the members).  
I - 8: Discussion of Results  
 
Hypothesis 4, finds support in Model 1 (b1 = -0.94, b2 = 0.29, both p 
≤ 0.01), however the difference between positive and no aspiration gap is 
insignificant (t-test = -0.33, p = 0.74) suggesting that leaders and those level 
with peers do not differ significantly with regards to collaboration 
preferences. A negative aspiration gap however clearly increases an 
individual’s propensity to collaborate. Figure I-2a thus depicts a ‘falling L-
shape’ rather than a V-shape.  
Figures I-2:a-d represent the percentage change in collaboration 
propensity relative to no aspiration gap at the mean of the focal variable 
with all non-focal variables except the intercept set to zero. Importantly, 
these figures are based on the betas from the simple OLS regression rather 
than the betas from the CLM regressions. Because the CLM regression 
results in a discrete prediction (e.g. assign observation 352 to category y = 2) 
based on the use of threshold values (e.g. when the predicted value is below 
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-2.3 then assign to category y = 1, when the value is below -1.5, then assign 
to category y = 2, and so on), using the CLM betas in graphical 
representation can be confusing, especially when the threshold values 
between different stepwise models differ drastically. However, the betas are 
very similar and we will discuss the differences under section I-8.1. 
Figure I-2, a-d: - The Influence of Aspirations and Relational Capability on 
Collaboration Preferences 
  
  
 
For figures I-2:b-d we depict mean and mean +/- two standard 
deviations or the maximum value the focal variable takes, whichever is 
lower. All values are drawn from the non-reported and more conservative 
OLS betas because they can be converted more sensibly to percentage 
changes. Following suggestions from Robinson, Tomek, and Schumacker 
(2013), we perform simple slope tests to check the statistical significance of 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
 - gap no gap  + gap
Aspirations and Collaboration 
Preference 
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
 - gap no gap  + gap
Moderation effect of skills 
low
mean
high
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
 - gap no gap  + gap
Moderation effect of openness 
low
mean
high
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
 - gap no gap  + gap
Moderation effect of information 
low
mean
high
68 
 
the slopes and found significant t-tests for all 3 interaction effects (p ≤ 
0.001).  
Hypothesis 5 suggested networking skills positively moderate the 
aspiration-gap - preference relationship. Model 2 shows significant 
interaction terms (b1 = -1.09 and b2 = 0.27 and p ≤ 0.01 for both). Figure I-
2b shows that at mean skills, the falling L shape is maintained, whereas at 
high skills we see a V-shape emerge. The preference gap is slightly bigger for 
a positive aspiration gap, suggesting leaders are more sensitive to the 
moderation effect of networking skills. Their general risk-averseness makes 
leaders thus averse to collaborations when they have low networking skills, 
and favorable otherwise. Importantly, networking skills do not predetermine 
the aspiration gap as the means for being behind, level, or ahead of peers 
are 1.59/1.63/1.61, and the difference between them is statistically 
insignificant. Hypothesis 5 cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis 6 proposed a positive interaction between networking 
openness and aspiration gap. Model 3 shows support for this hypothesis (b1 
= -1.22 and b2 = 0.32, both p ≤ 0.05) so that individuals with high openness 
who face an aspiration gap have higher collaboration preferences. Figure I-
2c shows the effects are very similar to the skills moderation but more 
pronounced. The moderation effect is stronger with a negative aspiration 
gap: A highly open slacker is about 75% more favorable toward collaboration 
than a closed leader. 
Finally, hypothesis 7 posited that network information would 
negatively moderate the aspiration-gap - performance relationship and the 
69 
 
results in Model 4 confirm the hypothesis (b1 = 0.26 and b2 = -0.07, both p 
≤ 0.05). Slackers know, on average, more people in the network with 
statistically significant differences in the mean (9.66 > 8.78 > 7.61). Figure I-
2d exhibits the familiar falling L-shape for mean information but the V-
shape is now found for low information. The figure also shows that slackers 
remain more positively predisposed toward collaboration such that a high 
information slacker is about as favorable to collaboration as a low 
information leader. Hypothesis 7 cannot be rejected.   
We followed social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) in arguing that 
those who are ahead of their peers will help others catch-up a little, but not 
enough to become competitors. Our data give some credence to this 
mechanism: senior leaders are more willing to work with junior (but not 
medior) partners than senior respondents who consider themselves to be 
level with their peers (one-sided Welch test, p = 0.04864). We do not find 
this difference for medior respondents. Thus, senior leaders are more willing 
to help juniors catch up than both medior leaders and other seniors who are 
level with peers.  
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Table I-4: Cumulative Probit Model: Stepwise Analysis 
  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Moderation effects 
      
Networking skills x 
Aspirations   
-1.09** (0.36) 
  
-1.06** (0.37) 
Networking skills x 
Aspirations2   
0.27** (0.10) 
  
0.25* (0.10) 
Openness x Aspirations 
   
-1.22* (0.49) 
 
-0.94† (0.50) 
Openness x Aspirations2 
   
0.32* (0.16) 
 
0.24 (0.16) 
Information x Aspirations 
    
0.26* (0.11) 0.22† (0.12) 
Information x Aspirations2 
    
-0.07* (0.03) -0.06† (0.03) 
Focal effects 
      
Aspirations  
 
-0.94** (0.36) 0.81 (0.68) 0.56 (0.55) -3.21** (1.05) 0.01 (1.31) 
Aspirations ^ 2 
 
0.29** (0.10) -0.15 (0.19) -0.09 (0.15) 0.88** (0.30) 0.10 (0.37) 
Networking Skills 
 
0.07 (0.05) 1.05*** (0.31) 0.07 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05) 1.06*** (0.32) 
Networking Openness 
 
0.14*** (0.03) 0.14*** (0.03) 1.21*** (0.36) 0.14*** (0.03) 0.99** (0.37) 
Network Information 
 
0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.22* (0.09) -0.20* (0.10) 
Respondent 
      
Experience on the job -0.01** (0.00) -0.01* (0.01) -0.01* (0.01) -0.01* (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) -0.01* (0.01) 
Experience prior to job 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 
More senior than partner -0.25** (0.09) -0.25** (0.09) -0.24* (0.09) -0.24* (0.09) -0.25** (0.09) -0.23* (0.09) 
Less senior than partner 0.25* (0.10) 0.25* (0.10) 0.25* (0.10) 0.21* (0.10) 0.25* (0.10) 0.22* (0.10) 
Not a researcher -0.18 (0.11) -0.25* (0.12) -0.23* (0.12) -0.26* (0.12) -0.24* (0.12) -0.23† (0.12) 
Respondent Organization (1 = yes) 
     
R&D active  -0.21* (0.10) -0.04 (0.11) -0.05 (0.11) -0.09 (0.11) -0.06 (0.11) -0.12 (0.11) 
Internationally active   0.18 (0.14) 0.15 (0.14) 0.19 (0.14) 0.17 (0.14) 0.16 (0.14) 0.21 (0.14) 
Collaboration experience   0.16† (0.09) 0.14 (0.10) 0.16 (0.10) 0.11 (0.10) 0.11 (0.10) 0.11 (0.10) 
Collaboration goal = 
operational 
-0.35** (0.13) -0.35* (0.14) -0.29* (0.14) -0.39** (0.14) -0.34* (0.14) -0.32* (0.14) 
Collaboration goal = none -0.09 (0.27) 0.17 (0.28) 0.01 (0.29) 0.08 (0.29) 0.02 (0.30) -0.22 (0.31) 
Collaboration goal = tech -0.12 (0.08) -0.13 (0.09) -0.13 (0.09) -0.16† (0.09) -0.12 (0.09) -0.14 (0.09) 
Governmental Organization   0.01 (0.20) 0.15 (0.21) 0.21 (0.21) 0.03 (0.21) 0.18 (0.21) 0.13 (0.21) 
Organization is Firm 
(University is default) 
-0.31** (0.10) -0.28** (0.11) -0.23* (0.11) -0.35** (0.11) -0.27* (0.11) -0.28* (0.11) 
Scenario Variables 
      
Partner organization is 
university 
-0.18** (0.07) -0.19** (0.07) -0.19** (0.07) -0.19** (0.07) -0.19** (0.07) -0.19** (0.07) 
Partner funding 0.40*** (0.10) 0.40*** (0.10) 0.40*** (0.10) 0.41*** (0.10) 0.39*** (0.10) 0.41*** (0.10) 
No funding -0.18† (0.10) -0.17† (0.10) -0.17† (0.10) -0.16 (0.10) -0.17† (0.10) -0.17† (0.10) 
Self-funding  -0.54*** (0.10) -0.53*** (0.10) -0.54*** (0.10) -0.53*** (0.10) -0.54*** (0.10) -0.55*** (0.10) 
Shared ties with potential 
partner 
0.20** (0.07) 0.19** (0.07) 0.20** (0.07) 0.19** (0.07) 0.19** (0.07) 0.19** (0.07) 
Not a close friend of 
respondent 
-0.34*** (0.07) -0.35*** (0.07) -0.35*** (0.07) -0.34*** (0.07) -0.35*** (0.07) -0.34*** (0.07) 
Similar knowledge to 
respondent’s 
-0.05 (0.07) -0.05 (0.07) -0.05 (0.07) -0.04 (0.07) -0.05 (0.07) -0.05 (0.07) 
Knowledge domain 
dummies 
v v v v v v 
Number of observations  979   947   947   947   947   947  
Log Likelihood -1458.58  -1400.01  -1394.6  -1390.93  -1397.01  -1384.47  
LR test (relative to model 1)   10.82, p ≤ 0.01 18.16, p ≤ 
0.001  
6, p ≤ 0.05 31.1, p ≤ 
0.001 
AIC  2985.15   2878.02   2871.2   2863.86   2876.02   2858.94  
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I - 8.1: An Empirical Investigation of Model Fit 
 
 Cumulative link models are particularly useful when trying to assign a 
group of observations to particular ordinal categories and you do not want 
to assume that the difference between the different ordered categories is 
necessarily equivalent. This could be for instance categories of income, of 
disease gravity, of insurance premiums and so on (Agresti, 2002; 
Christensen, 2013). Clearly, the value of such model needs to be assessed 
by the number of correct assignments and the number of wrong 
assignments. Additionally, gaining insight in how wrongly some 
observations get assigned is relevant.  
 Because most goodness of fit measures in the commonly used 
software packages assume continuous data, I devised a simple method to 
compare the actual model fit between different model specifications, that 
would only allow to compare the CLM predictions (which are based on 
maximum likelihood in R) in a sensible way but also allow to compare those 
predictions with the results of OLS and other regressions. I present three 
very simple measures to better understand model fit for CLM regressions.  
1) Model estimation bias (MEB) is a measure for the model’s general 
tendency to either overestimate or underestimate the ordered category 
to which the observation need be assigned. It is calculated as the sum 
of the difference between the model’s predicted response values and 
the actual values divided by the number of observations. It thus 
represents the average error on the prediction. MEB takes a positive 
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value when the model on average overestimates and a negative value 
otherwise: 
a. MEB = ∑ (ŷ - y) / N 
2) Maximum and Average Quadratic Error (MQE and AQE) compare the 
sum of squared errors to the maximum (average) error. The MQE is 
always between 0 and 1. The closer to 1, the better the model predicts 
against the maximum error. The AQE takes the average of the 
quadratic errors without taking into account the sample probability of 
error occurrence. So if the discrete quadratic error can be either 
0,1,4,9, or 16 as is the case in the second part of this chapter, then 
the uniform error is eu = (0 + 1 + 4 + 9 + 16)/5 = 6. If the AQE takes 
negative values the model fit is extremely poor as the average error of 
the predicted value exceeds the uniform error. The closer the statistic 
gets to 1, the better the model fit. For out-of-sample prediction the 
uniform error should be replaced with the within sample error taking 
into account the probability of occurrence. As within sample error 
should be smaller than the out-of-sample errors, the statistic will 
generally be negative and the higher (closer to zero) the statistic, the 
better the model fit 
a. MQE = 1 – (∑ (y – ŷ)2 / max[∑ (y – ŷ)2] * N) 
b. AQE = 1 – (∑ (y – ŷ)2 / eu * N)  
3) Variability is calculated simply as the probability of a specific discrete 
gap between observation and prediction which can be graphically 
represented to both show normality of errors as well as to provide a 
sensible way of visually assessing model fit.  
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As an example I compare the basic model with only control variables 
that are present for all observations, to the models depicted in table I-4. The 
base model is the same as model 0 but does not include the (non-reported) 
dummies for different knowledge domains. 
Table I-5: Empirical Investigation of Model Fit 
  N Log Lik AIC MEB MQE AQE 
Base  1559 -2,316.46 4,680.93 10.1% 84.99% 59.98% 
Model 0 979 -1,459 2,985 7.76% 87.61% 66.97% 
Model 1 947 -1,400.01 2,878.02 6.65% 87.78% 67.42% 
Model 2a 947 -1,394.6 2,871.2 5.17% 87.95% 67.88% 
Model 2b 947 -1,390.93 2,863.86 3.59% 88.42% 69.13% 
Model 2c 947 -1,397.01 2,876.02 5.59% 87.86% 67.63% 
Model 3 947 -1,384.47 2,858.94 2.74% 88.73% 69.94% 
  
The three measures correspond to a great degree with the log-
likelihood and the AIC measures. The variation in the MQE is notably 
smaller because of the denominator being an extreme value. The AQE 
suggests that the full model performs almost 70% better than a random 
prediction would do, which is a nice indication of the explanatory power. 
The most detail however is found in the figure below which provides an 
overview of the prediction error of all models, except the base model. While 
all models are relatively close to each other, it is notable that different 
models have different strengths. Model 2b, which includes only the 
interaction between aspirations and network openness, has the highest 
accuracy (33.05% correct predictions versus 31.57% for model 3). Models 3, 
4, and 5 all have 1.37% of extreme errors (-4 or +4). The full model 5 is the 
best model mainly because it has by far the lowest percentage of average 
errors (18.9% of errors with absolute value 2, versus 21.33% for model 2). 
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Model 3 however pays the price in terms of small errors (absolute value 1), 
where it does worse than any other model.  
Figure I-3: Variability of Predictions of Aspiration Models 
 
 I also present a simple comparison of the fit of model 5 to the fit of the 
same model analysed with OLS. Because the linear model does not make 
discrete predictions I simple round the fitted values to the nearest integer. 
This simple procedure allows me to derive discrete predictions from an OLS 
regression. Most notable finding is that OLS does not make extreme errors 
(+ or -4). This might be explained because of the normality assumption in 
which extreme values are less likely (CLM does not assume normality). The 
adjusted R-square for the OLS model is 0.204. As a measure of comparison, 
the table below shows the MEB, MQF, and AQE. It is remarkable that the 
OLS regression scores better on all three measures, which gives a clear 
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indication of the power of OLS regressions, even when the underlying 
assumptions are not met. 
Figure I-4: Model Fit for Cumulative Link Models and Ordinary Least Squares 
  
Table I-6: MEB, MQE and AQE for Alternative Regression Models 
Goodness of Fit  Model 3 CLM Model 3 OLS 
Model estimation bias 2.74% 0.32% 
Maximum quadratic error 88.73% 91.07% 
Average quadratic error 69.94% 76.18% 
 
I - 9: Discussion 
This chapter contributes to the literature on partnerships and 
collaborations and extends understanding about the origins of tie formation 
by focusing on inspection criteria for partner selection as well as on 
individual characteristics. Such an effort alleviates concerns of biased 
estimates and skewed conclusions associated with alliance studies that 
regress an innovation output on various covariates without taking into 
account the fundamentally strategic (and thus endogenous) nature of 
matching decisions on the results (Li et al., 2008; Mindruta, 2013). Our 
findings suggest that both academic and industry respondents follow an 
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economic rationale when it comes to partner selection. Ceteris paribus, 
respondents prefer others to pay for collaboration. But this preference is not 
independent of experience or the purpose of the collaboration. 
Hence, the value of funding in collaborative research is contingent on 
the perceived strings that are attached to it. Despite significant interaction 
effects with prior collaboration experience and the purpose of the 
collaboration, the strength of the preference for partner funding (main effect) 
indicates that the source of funding is the key determinant in collaboration 
attractiveness. These findings are theoretically relevant because they 
challenge the notion that prior collaboration experience can readily be 
interpreted as conducive to future collaboration. Our data suggest that the 
importance of prior experience is contingent on where the funding comes 
from.  
When organizations had prior experience in government-funded 
projects, this strengthened the effects of resource provisioning, which 
supports the idea that within networks, experience allows organizations to 
better extract value from all types of collaboration (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; 
Uzzi, 1997), reinforcing the economic rationale. In our context, in which 
prior collaboration is defined as “having been engaged in a government-
funded project before”, we also find that prior experience with working in a 
government-funded project does not make organizations significantly more 
likely to step into another government-funded project. It however makes 
organizations more likely to engage in a partner-funded project. This 
suggests that there are partnership skills, developed in previous 
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collaborations, that are transferable to other projects without the 
government, and potentially that the experience with government-funded 
projects is not that positive. 
When seeking R&D capabilities, willingness to fund increased 
significantly. This indicates that the origin of resource flow is of importance 
to organizations, which suggests that resources (e.g. funding) are not simply 
objectively compared based on their primary function (i.e. providing money 
for collaboration) but that respondents take into account associated 
resource externalities associated with the resource source in the formation 
of preferences. The attenuating influence is stronger for partner funding 
than for government funding, which supports the importance of exerting 
control over R&D collaborations. When partners are funding an exploratory 
research project, they are more likely to maintain control over the resources 
so that it becomes harder for the focal organization to develop or access the 
desired technological capabilities. When governments fund projects, this 
effect is weaker. Unfortunately, the nature of our data does not allow us to 
delve deeply into the exact mechanism at play. A sensible explanation could 
be related to the bureaucracy associated with government funding or even 
simply the increasing coordination and communication costs (Zander and 
Kogut, 1995) when a third player (focal organization, partner, and 
government) gets involved. Alternatively, respondents could expect that 
government funding would be lower or that it involves a lower commitment 
of the partnering organization. 
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This begs larger theoretical questions about drivers and 
characteristics of resource exchange (Chi, 1994). For example, is resource 
complementarity a strictly objective matter of resource fit or is there a 
subjective, interpretative component that is rooted in preferences or 
differences in quality of resource management (Castanias and Helfat, 2001; 
Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007)?  
Our findings also suggest that social similarity is an important factor 
in the formation of preferences. Importantly, the significance of our 
composite measure for similarity that combined organizational type, shared 
ties, prior familiarity, similar knowledge, and same level of seniority implies 
that respondents might implicitly balance various kinds of similarity to 
assess how valuable partnerships could be. We find that high similarity is 
less preferred when aiming to set up an R&D partnership which suggests 
that despite the difficulties of straddling organizational and individual 
differences in collaboration, being too similar is perceived to reduce the 
likelihood of exploratory success.  
While previous research has found that SMEs in general suffer from 
liabilities of size in the establishment of ties (Fontana et al., 2006; Narula, 
2004), this seems to be driven more by two-sided matching problems than 
by collaboration preferences. However, a more granular test of similarity 
measures (not reported) showed that SMEs have a distinct preference for 
collaboration with other companies (and hence not with universities) which 
does limit their collaboration opportunity space. This contributes to 
research that typically focuses only on university-industry collaborations 
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(Hanel and St-Pierre, 2006; Santoro and Gopalakrishnan, 2001) without 
taking into account the choice between academic and commercial partners. 
For SMEs, this finding also confirms, despite common beliefs, that SMEs do 
not join KTNs to work with universities (Woolgar et al., 1998).  
The second part of this chapter focused on individual aspiration, 
determined by relative career position, and the moderating effects of 
networking skills, openness, and information. Our findings suggest that 
individual characteristics matter in the formation of collaboration 
preferences and are thus likely to affect actual tie formation as well. We find 
that individuals with high networking skills and high openness are more 
prone to collaboration when they face a positive or negative aspiration gap, 
but that these capabilities were a lot less important in the absence of an 
aspiration gap. Clearly motivation to achieve (either catching up or staying 
ahead) is instrumental in understanding strategic decisions. Our findings in 
this way provide support for recent contributions from psychology to the 
networking literature that argue that structural positions cannot explain 
everything about tie formation because brokerage needs to be understood 
both as a position within a network and as a process (Kilduff and Brass, 
2010; Oh and Kilduff, 2008). 
Broadly speaking, our findings on the relation between aspiration-gap 
and performance echo psychological theories (Festinger, 1954; Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; Lewin et al., 1944; Vroom, 1964). Collaboration 
preference is higher when facing a negative aspiration gap, suggesting that 
individuals who are trailing behind their peers are more willing to engage in, 
80 
 
inherently risky, collaborations than those who are level or ahead of their 
peers. This finding has broader relevance in the literature on antecedents of 
collaboration and partner selection (Hitt et al., 2004; Hitt et al., 2000; Li et 
al., 2008). It suggests that controlling for organizational needs (Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven, 1996) and thus aspirations is perhaps more important 
than we have assumed so far. Additionally, we provide more evidence that 
talking about partner selection as a one-sided process denies the logical fact 
that partners are also selecting you (Mindruta, 2013).  
More research on explaining the gap between partnering intention and 
tie formation, like the work of Vissa (2011), can be especially useful for 
managers. While it is rather self-evident that some potential partners will 
lack the necessary knowledge or skills to be suitable matches in an 
organization’s search for knowledge, the notion that complementary 
relational capabilities (both at the individual and the organizational level) 
can influence partnering intentions and perhaps partnering likelihood is 
important. This fits in the broader stream of research that looks at how 
individuals (Gale and Shapley, 1962) or organizations (Graebner and 
Eisenhardt, 2004) can court others into relationships. 
Taken together, our findings about the effects on seeking technological 
capability, prior collaborative experience, social similarity, and aspirations 
on network members’ collaboration preference make a contribution to the 
literature on how partners are selected for collaboration, addressing Hitt et 
al.’s (2000) call for research on the contingent nature of selection criteria. 
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II – CHAPTER TWO:  
OLD TECHNOLOGIES AS TEMPLATES FOR NEW 
INVENTIONS 
 
II - 1: Abstract 
In this study, we explore how old technologies can be recombined to 
generate new inventions. We consider four ways by which old technologies 
can serve as templates: subtraction, reconfiguration, addition, and 
replacement. Subtraction removes at least one component from a previous 
combination while reconfiguration preserves a previously used combination 
of components. Addition introduces new components to a familiar 
combination and replacement captures those inventions in which some 
components are added while others are removed. The study’s findings 
suggest that re-using previous combinations results in superior inventions. 
However, not all prior technologies are equally useful. Inventions that 
recombine components from recently developed technologies were found to 
have a higher impact. We also show that these inventions are more valuable 
when a firm is aware of, and is able to absorb external knowledge. We test 
these ideas using patent data from the US semiconductor industry. 
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II - 2: Introduction 
Ever since March’s (1991) seminal work on exploitation and 
exploration, an impressive amount of research has investigated the 
influence of, and the tensions between the two concepts (Andriopoulos and 
Lewis, 2009; He and Wong, 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 2004). If we define inventing as finding a valid solution to a 
current problem through the combination of existing components 
(Schumpeter, 1934), then exploration, in this context, occurs when 
inventors combine components that they have not used before or which 
have not been previously combined together (Fleming, 2001; March, 1991). 
Exploitation is the opposite scenario, and occurs when previously combined 
components are re-used. Although there are a number of different ways that 
internal resources can be re-used, most studies group all exploitative 
activities into a single category, and theorize that, in tandem, these result in 
the same outcome (one exception is Katila and Ahuja, 2002). Our first 
contribution lies in differentiating between the ways in which firms can 
exploit their own prior technologies, and then in comparing the benefits and 
drawbacks of each of these different types of recombinations.  
Novel inventions can emerge when a firm re-uses an existing 
combination of technological components in two ways: by recycling or by 
renewing the combination. Recycling a prior invention is when only 
components from that invention are re-used, and this can occur through 
subtraction or reconfiguration. Invention by subtraction refers to the 
removal of a component from an original invention – a process that can lead 
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to a number of different products (Boyd and Goldenberg, 2013a, 2013b). 
One example is Sony’s Walkman. Sony’s initial objective was to create a 
recording device with a stereo function. However, by the time the stereo 
function was included, there was not enough space for the recording 
function and the experiment was deemed a failure. This soon changed, 
because Sony’s chairman realized that the device, after the removal of the 
recording functionality, could serve a new purpose for mobile music 
listening (Boyd and Goldenberg, 2013b; Koruna, 2004). Reconfiguration 
differs in that the same components which appear in an old technology also 
appear in the new one, but where the new technology functions differently. 
As with subtraction, reconfiguration can also lead to new inventions 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). Consider, as an example, the history of razors 
and shaving. In 1903, King C. Gillette received a patent for a safe razor with 
a single disposable blade. Single-blade razors rapidly penetrated the market, 
and remained popular for decades since the invention. Much later, in 1971, 
Gillette introduced the double-blade razor (TRAC II). The components in the 
new technology resembled those in the predecessor, with the main difference 
being that one of the components appears twice (Boyd and Goldenberg, 
2013b). In this example of reconfiguration, the same components were 
configured differently in order to generate a superior invention. 
Unlike recycling which only relies upon the original components, 
renewal refers to the case when a new component is introduced, which can 
lead to the generation of substantially different technologies. Renewal can 
occur by addition, which is when an invention is generated by adding new 
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component(s) to existing combinations. Improvements in word processing 
software illustrate how new products arise through addition. In the past, 
including mathematical equations to texts prepared in a word processor 
required a number of cumbersome steps, such as leaving white space for the 
equation, printing the document, and then manually including the equation. 
Later, code for typing equations became available, and its addition to older 
word processing software has extended the functionality of these 
technologies. Another technique in which new components are introduced to 
a combination that has been used before is replacement. As the name 
suggests, replacement refers to substituting existing components with 
different ones, and this too is a viable technique for generating new 
inventions. A case in point is the improvement in efficiency of the transistor 
when semiconductor devices were developed by replacing tap water with 
distilled water. 
The above examples of inventions demonstrate how a firm’s old 
technologies can serve as templates for the generation of new technologies. 
Building on previous studies that have explored similar questions (Fleming, 
2001; Fleming, 2002; Henderson and Clark, 1990), we will begin by showing 
that recycled and renewed inventions are, on average, more valuable than 
inventions in which new components are combined for the first time. This 
result, which is driven in part by the knowledge that becomes available 
when similar tasks are repeated, is more pronounced for renewed 
inventions. This finding is surprising because although experiential learning 
enhances the exploitation of prior inventions, we theorize and find that 
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renewed inventions, which are less familiar than recycled inventions to their 
owners, typically have a higher impact. 
Next we examine how two distinctive factors influence the outcome of 
re-using old technologies; namely, the amount of time that elapses until a 
firm re-uses a technology and the scope of external search. The former, 
coined temporal exploration (Nerkar, 2003), has a negative impact on 
recombining, as organizations can only recall – and hence, can only benefit 
from – more recent experiences. Next, by examining the influence of external 
search, we show why it is important for firms to be able to monitor 
developments that occur in their environments and, when necessary, absorb 
external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
The contributions of this study are as follows. We extend the literature 
on exploitation and exploration, by describing the four different ways which 
facilitate the generation of new inventions from old ones. We also contribute 
to the literature on organizational learning by simultaneously considering 
the effect of time. Specifically, our study highlights the importance of prior 
experiences (in combining technological components), but also shows how 
these experiences are not persistent, but rather diminish over time. Finally, 
we also contribute to the extensive literature on search (Cyert and March, 
1963) by demonstrating how external search complements exploitation 
efforts.  
II - 3: Theory and Hypotheses 
Product innovation requires complex coupling between the sometimes 
divergent needs of markets and technologies (Freeman, 1982 in Dougherty, 
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1992). Therefore, firms that attempt to innovate must make design choices, 
many of which fail. For the select group of products that make it to market, 
some persist and are later remembered as great successes while others 
come and go without a trace. As theories of innovation take the 
epistemological stance that knowledge recombination is a critical driver of 
invention and innovation (Galunic and Rodan, 1998), we wonder what types 
of recombinations result in inventions with a higher impact?  
We develop our theory along three central ideas. Firstly, the 
knowledge-based view has argued that firms exploit their combinative 
capabilities to create and respond to market and technological opportunities 
(Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996; Zander and Kogut, 1995). New 
knowledge is created by recombining existing components (Basalla, 1988; 
Schumpeter, 1939), and it is this recombination of “conceptual and physical 
materials” that creates novelty (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Secondly, 
although breakthrough innovations are the result of distant search, the 
outcome of these activities is often highly variable and uncertain (Fleming, 
2004). Therefore, even though it is rare for inventions in which search is 
constrained to be as valuable as breakthroughs, the impact of the majority 
of these is more consistent. Thirdly, firms exhibit considerable variation as 
to how they exploit internal knowledge repositories (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; 
March, 1991). We discuss four different types of recombination techniques 
which involve the exploitation of familiar knowledge, and then go on to 
investigate the influence of both time and external search. 
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II - 3.1: Subtraction, Reconfiguration, Addition, and Replacement 
Previous literature has defined an invention as the outcome of one of 
two processes: one in which new components are combined or where 
previously combined components interact with one another in a new way 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990; Schumpeter, 1939). Following this dichotomy, 
we describe invention as either the outcome of re-using old combinations, 
which we define as recombination, or as combining components that have 
not been combined before.      
We propose three theoretical arguments for why recombinations will 
have a stronger impact than completely novel configurations of resources. 
First, a firm is more familiar with the processes of re-using and refining 
components that it combined before. Past combinative experience presents 
firms with vital information regarding which combinations have failed 
previously, allowing them to avoid similar errors (Fleming, 2001). By 
contrast, this insight is unavailable when entirely new combinations are 
being developed, leading the firm to experiment. Inevitably, the outcome of 
experimentation is risky and uncertain, and this can hurt the output of 
innovation (March, 1991).  
A second line of reasoning is the expense that is associated with 
assimilating knowledge (Hitt et al., 1996), which is typically high for 
inventions, as these rely on tacit and sticky knowledge (Szulanski, 1996). 
When a firm is combining new components for the first time, it would need 
to experiment with various combinations, only some of which would be 
successful. This process, which is both costly and time-consuming, places 
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the firm at a comparative disadvantage in the race to invention because of 
time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Although 
recombining components is also time-consuming (Koruna, 2004), this 
process is relatively more efficient. Recombinative inventions build on a 
firm’s experience; and this reduces the coordination and communication 
costs of transmitting the knowledge that is necessary for generating the new 
invention (Kotha, George, and Srikanth, 2013).  
Adding to the second point, the firm does not operate in isolation from 
its competitors. While the firm is combining novel resources for the first 
time, it is possible that these resources have already been exploited to some 
degree by the competition. Because knowledge is non-entropic, in that it 
grows through repeated use, the firm that attempts to combine resources for 
the first time would be rather lucky if it manages to find a combination that 
is superior to those found by competitors, ceteris paribus. While ‘beginner’s 
luck’ is not impossible – Biogen’s blockbuster drug interferon beta-la for 
instance built on no internal patents (George, Kotha, and Zheng, 2008) – 
such stories are a consequence of positive selection bias. In general, “chance 
favours the connected mind” (Johnson, 2011) and these ‘connections’ are a 
consequence of experience and hard work. Therefore, firms that are more 
familiar with specific resources bear lower knowledge assimilation costs, and 
are more likely to find a useful solution while experiencing fewer problems. 
For these reasons, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: The impact of a firm’s invention that re-uses a 
combination from a previous invention (i.e., inventions by subtraction, 
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reconfiguration, addition or replacement) is higher than the impact of 
inventions that strictly combine new components. 
II - 3.2: Renewed versus Recycled Inventions 
Recombinations include both recycled inventions which are generated 
through subtraction and reconfiguration, and renewed inventions which are 
generated by addition and replacement. In arriving at hypothesis 1, we 
argued that as a result of familiarity, recombinations have a higher impact 
than inventions comprising of entirely new combinations. A firm will have at 
least some experience and familiarity with the knowledge embedded in 
recycled and renewed inventions. However, the extent of familiarity is 
naturally less for renewed inventions, as these involve the introduction of 
new components. Whereas this may suggest that renewed inventions will 
attain a lower impact, there are at least three arguments which lead us to 
believe that this is not the case.  
Firstly, the number of possible combinations is more limited when a 
firm re-uses the same components (reconfiguration) or subsets of the same 
components (subtraction). Of course, innovations that arise from 
reconfiguration and subtraction can have “great competitive consequences” 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990), but over time, a firm will exhaust all useful 
combinations (Fleming, 2001).  Tied to this argument, the focal firm is not 
the only one innovating in the same technological domain. As an industry 
approaches the technological frontier, the intrinsic potential for new 
recombinations along the same trajectory becomes increasingly constrained 
(Dosi, 1982, 1988). In such a situation, the probability of detecting novel 
90 
 
combinations diminishes (Galunic and Rodan, 1998), simply because there 
is less novelty to detect.  
Thirdly, if the firm constrains itself to recycled inventions, it would 
need to search deeply in order to discover new opportunities, but depth is 
limited by the latent technological potential as argued above. In comparison, 
the ability to replace or add new components permits one to conduct a 
broader search. Previous studies have found that there is an inverted-U 
relationship between search depth and the outcome of inventive efforts. As 
search depth increases to moderate levels, the ability to exploit familiar 
combinations adds certainty to the outcome of the inventive process (George 
et al., 2008). Additionally, Katila and Ahuja (2002) found a positive 
interaction effect between search depth and scope with regards to new 
product introductions in the market for robotics. This suggests that 
combining both depth and scope enhances innovation. Since the inclusion 
of new components broadens the search scope without compromising the 
firm’s familiarity with the previously used (sub) combination, it enhances 
the probability of detecting novel combinations. Taken together, these 
arguments suggest that: 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of recycled inventions (i.e., those generated 
through subtraction or reconfiguration) is lower than the impact of 
renewed inventions (i.e., those generated by addition or replacement).  
II - 3.3: The Effect of Temporal Lapse 
The literature exhibits an interesting debate as to whether old 
knowledge can still be valuable for invention and innovation. Katila (2002) 
showed that this question does not have a simple answer. Rather, her 
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findings suggested that the usefulness of old knowledge depends on its 
source. Where a firm exploits internal knowledge, the age of such knowledge 
was found to have a curvilinear (inverted-U) relationship with the number of 
new innovations that are introduced. The results of this study were 
supplemented shortly after, in a study by Nerkar (2003). Whereas Katila’s 
(2002) work was concerned with the effect of search time on the quantity of 
innovations, Nerkar (2003) explored its effect on the quality of innovations. 
The results showed that recent knowledge improves the impact of the 
resulting inventions; but the study did not distinguish between internal and 
external knowledge. Building on these studies, we will argue that immediacy 
in re-using a combination improves the impact of the resulting inventions.       
In the course of a firm’s existence, it accumulates a large body of 
knowledge, information and insights surrounding its inventive activities. For 
instance, the information could be about the equipment needed to combine 
certain components, or even a record of the failed experiments that an 
inventive team faced before arriving at a useful invention. When it comes to 
creating a new invention, having access to this body of prior knowledge is 
vital. It allows inventors to repeat techniques that have proved successful, 
and avoid combinations that have previously failed; thus making the current 
inventive process more efficient and less risky. The caveat is that 
organizations forget. In other words, important knowledge relating to a firm’s 
inventive activities depletes over time (Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 1990). 
Since firms forget older knowledge, inventors that build on more 
recent experience are better able to avoid failure, and thus, generate new 
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combinations more efficiently (Nerkar, 2003). While all firms are prone to 
forgetting vital knowledge, their accumulated knowledge does not deplete at 
the same rate. Firms which invest in sophisticated knowledge management 
systems are better able to store and retrieve prior knowledge, and do so with 
higher fidelity than when these systems are absent. There are two popular 
approaches to managing knowledge within an organization: the knowledge 
can be codified and saved in databases, or the firm can ensure that there 
are channels in place that allow the individuals that have generated the 
knowledge to directly communicate with those who want to use it (Hansen, 
Nohria, and Tierney, 1999). The latter method, defined as personalization, is 
often more important for inventive knowledge, as this type of knowledge is 
challenging to codify (Ahuja, Lampert, and Novelli, 2013). However, 
individuals are only employed by a firm for a limited amount of time. Once 
they leave, it is not always possible to maintain channels that are conducive 
to the flow of tacit knowledge. Thus, even with personalization-intensive 
techniques, older knowledge dissipates over time.  
Apart from organizational memory, another factor that is influenced 
by time, and which influences the impact of the resulting inventions, is the 
ability to generate a useful combination. The entire premise of this paper is 
that old combinations can be re-used to generate new inventions. However, 
if one were to only rely on a limited number of components then, over time, 
the potential for generating valuable combinations decreases (Kim and 
Kogut, 1996). Fleming explains (2001): “If semiconductor inventors restricted 
their usage to their original materials of aluminum and bipolar transistors, 
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progress in the field would have halted long ago.”  Thus, when an inventor or 
a firm is constrained in terms of the availability of components, the most 
valuable combinations are likely to be developed early on (Fleming, 2001). At 
a later stage, the potential to do is exhausted because of developments made 
within the firm, as well as by competitors outside it.  
Hypothesis 3a: Increasing the amount of time it takes to re-use a 
combination from a previous invention (i.e., inventions by subtraction, 
reconfiguration, addition or replacement) lowers the impact of these 
inventions.  
Following immediately from the discussion that lead up to Hypothesis 
3a, we argue that recombinations in which new components are introduced 
(renewed inventions) suffer more when the amount of time it takes to re-use 
the necessary combination increases. We argued previously that inventors 
are less familiar with combinations in which new components are included. 
The lack of familiarity increases inventive risk and consequently, it also 
increases the chances of producing knowledge with more problems (Fleming, 
2001). By contrast, because inventors are more familiar with the 
combination of components in recycled inventions, the inventive uncertainty 
in these processes are lowered. If the intention is to refine a combination 
that has been last used in the more distant past, the likelihood of obtaining 
useful information is lower than if the combination was just recently used. 
In other words, utilizing older knowledge increases inventive uncertainty; 
which would be more detrimental for renewed inventions, which are innately 
more uncertain.  Our hypothesis follows logically: 
Hypothesis 3b: Increasing the amount of time it takes to re-use a 
combination lowers the impact of renewed inventions (i.e. addition or 
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replacement) more than recycled inventions (i.e., subtraction and 
reconfiguration).  
II - 3.4: The Effect of External Search 
External knowledge resources are a priori not idiosyncratic to the 
firm. Because firm-idiosyncratic resources are instrumental in creating 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991), turning external knowledge into a 
valuable resource requires absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
As argued by Henderson and Clark (1990) in the context of architectural 
innovation, the existing knowledge base of the firm creates filters on the 
interpretation of the environment (see also Daft and Weick, 1984). Thus, 
information that is available in the environment becomes valuable only if 
firms have the resources to assimilate this information in such a way that it 
creates new idiosyncratic resources for the firm. Once absorbed, a firm can 
benefit from a superior ability to generate impactful innovations (e.g. 
Amabile, 1988; George et al., 2008). Therefore, even when a firm is 
recombining components, it can still draw on technological knowledge from 
the environment in which it operates as “inventors can draw on others’ 
knowledge and experience in addition to their own” (Fleming, 2001). 
In the context of recombinative inventions, we expect that the extent 
to which a firm assimilates knowledge from its external environment would 
positively relate to the impact of these inventions. A firm that focuses only 
on re-using internal knowledge risks missing out on opportunities to learn 
from external technological developments. The resulting innovations would 
not incorporate what is considered to be “cutting edge” technologies. A direct 
outcome of bringing such products to market is that customers will not view 
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these firms as innovators, which will ultimately reduce the perceived value 
of these products, as well as subsequent inventive endeavours (Nerkar, 
2003).   
In addition, the geographical scope of search is also richer for firms 
which are aware of, and attempt to absorb knowledge from their 
environment (Phene, Fladmoe‐Lindquist, and Marsh, 2006). Previous work 
has shown that search scope has a positive linear effect on product 
innovation (Katila and Ahuja, 2002). In other words, even when a firm’s new 
invention entails re-using components, there is an advantage to scanning 
the external environment, and absorbing relevant knowledge. This is 
because external knowledge increases not only the number of problems that 
can be solved (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004), but also the number of 
solutions to each of these problems (March, 1991). Inevitably, having a 
variety of solutions increases the chances of finding one that is superior. As 
such, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 4a: The extent of external search that is conducted to re-use 
a combination from a previous invention (i.e., inventions by subtraction, 
reconfiguration, addition or replacement) increases the impact of these 
inventions. 
A different advantage of external search is that it introduces novelty to 
the firm’s knowledge base, and thus enhances its diversity. Inclusion of 
external knowledge sources and technologies reduces the influence of 
competency traps and core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal and 
March, 1993). Recall that these risks are heightened with excessive search 
depth, as it leads to diminishing returns to recombination efforts. Since 
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recycled inventions are associated with deeper searches, we suggested that 
the risk of falling into competency traps would be higher for these types of 
inventions. However, because this risk is mitigated as the scope of external 
search increases, we expect that external search would have a higher 
positive effect on recycled inventions than on renewed inventions. Stated 
differently, the difference in impact between recycled inventions and 
renewed inventions diminishes as the scope of external search increases.     
Hypothesis 4b: Increasing the extent of external search increases the 
impact of recycled inventions (i.e. subtraction, reconfiguration) more 
than renewed inventions (i.e. addition or replacement). 
II - 4: Data and Methods 
We use patent and patent citation data to examine the different 
techniques that lead to generating inventions, and how these techniques 
could lead to inventions that vary in their technological importance. We 
envisage invention as the end result of finding a solution to a predetermined 
problem. Since patented inventions are essentially solutions to problems 
that differ from those that have been solved before (Katila, 2002; Walker, 
1995), they are suitable for answering research questions that relate to how 
individuals and organizations invent and innovate. Furthermore, patent 
documents provide detailed information on a number of aspects pertaining 
to the invention and the inventive process, one of which is especially 
important for our study.  
Patent documents list technological classes and subclasses, the latter 
of which constitute a much finer identification of the technologies used in 
inventions. A number of prior studies have used patent subclasses as a 
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proxy for the technological components in an invention to measure 
mechanisms such as the recombination of technological components and 
the relationship between components (Fleming, 2001; Fleming and 
Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Sorenson, Rivkin, and Fleming, 2006). Similarly, we 
use technological subclasses to examine if a firm generates new inventions 
using components that are present in its older technologies. A final 
important feature of this data source is the availability of patent citation 
data.  
Citations capture the flow of knowledge, or technological information, 
between patents (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001, 2005; Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993). Previous studies have divided citations 
into internal citations and external citations, and these have been used as a 
proxy for the geographic scope of search (e.g., Katila, 2002; Katila and 
Ahuja, 2002; Phene, Fladmoe-Lindquist and Marsh, 2006; Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001). Analogously, we use citation data to capture the extent to 
which a firm searches for knowledge outside its boundaries during the 
invention process.  
The empirical setting for this study is the US semiconductor industry. 
We chose a single industry context because dominant paradigms of things 
that work are likely to exist within the same industry but differ across 
industries (Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003). To minimize the 
variations that would be invoked by considering different industry 
paradigms, a single industry setting is most appropriate for our research 
question. Furthermore, in comparison to firms in other industries, US 
semiconductor firms have been noted to have exceptionally high invention 
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rates, as well has high propensities to patent most of these inventions, 
especially since the 1980s (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Stuart, 2000). 
Therefore, patents serve as an appropriate proxy for invention in this 
specific context. In addition, R&D is central to the day-to-day activities of 
many semiconductor firms (Lahiri, 2010; Mathews and Cho, 1999; Park, 
Chen, and Gallagher, 2002), during which these firms rely on both internal 
and external sources of knowledge (Appleyard, 1996; West, 2002). The 
diversity of knowledge sources that feeds into subsequent inventive efforts is 
likely to facilitate the generation of inventions that are derived from 
combinations of components that are available internally, combinations of 
only external components, and yet other combinations which bring together 
both internal and external components. Thus, we expected to observe a wide 
variety of ways in which components could be arranged to generate new 
inventions. 
II - 4.1: Data Sources 
To test our hypotheses, we utilized a dataset which comprises of 83,786 
patents assigned to 159 firms. These patents spanned the time period 1990-
2004. This period is sensible because it excludes exogenous variation 
following a number of important institutional changes in the 1980s (Hall 
and Ziedonis, 2001; Mody and Wheeler, 1986). The final data sample was 
compiled in the following steps. We began by combining the list of US 
semiconductor firms used in Hall and Ziedonis (2001) with all other US 
semiconductor firms that are available on COMPUSTAT (SIC code = 3674). 
This additional source was required since Hall and Ziedonis (2001) only 
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consider firms which were active between 1975 and 1995, whereas our data 
extends to 2004. To ensure that no major semiconductor firm was left out of 
our dataset, we supplemented that list with those firms listed on the annual 
publication by iSuppli Corporation which ranks semiconductor firms. 
Following these methods, we compiled a list of 171 US semiconductor firms, 
all of which have a COMPUSTAT record. We limited ourselves to US firms to 
avoid variation from different institutional contexts and patenting behaviour 
that would have been hard to control for in a meaningful way (e.g. Cohen et 
al., 2002; Mathews and Cho, 1999)  
  Next, we retrieved the patents assigned to these firms by comparing 
our list of 171 firms to the 247,309 assignees that were granted a USPTO 
patent during the time-period 1975-2008. A simple name-matching 
algorithm would have not been accurate because of the various ways in 
which many firms are named on a patent document. For example, the firm’s 
name may appear in full (International Business Machines), or as an 
acronym (IBM), or may refer to one of the subsidiaries (IBM India). The 
following two steps were implemented to ensure that each firm’s patents 
were aggregated as accurately as possible. Firstly, we used the unique 
numerical identifiers5 available from the NBER patent project which groups 
unique firms. Secondly, we used the Directory of American Firms Operating 
in Foreign Countries, which lists each variation in the names of the 
subsidiaries associated with US firms. These variations were compared 
                                       
5 This data is available from two sources: 
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home and http://www.nber.org/patents/. 
The first source is used for the purpose of this research as it is a more up to date version. 
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against the 247,309 assignees that were granted a USPTO patent during the 
time period spanning 1975 and 2008.  
Following the aforementioned steps we identified the firms that had 
been granted at least one USPTO patent between 1975 and 2008. We then 
excluded patents that were applied for prior to 1990; which provides us with 
a window that can be used to derive some of our key variables which rely on 
the patenting histories of firms. In addition, we also excluded patents that 
were applied for after 2004 to avoid right censoring of the data. Thus, our 
main sample spanned the time period 1990 and 2004, and contained 
patents assigned to 159 firms.  
II - 4.2: Variables 
II - 4.2.1: Dependent Variable 
Impact. The number of forward citations that a patent receives was used to 
construct our main dependent variable, impact. Forward citations reflect the 
number of times that subsequent patented inventions build on the 
knowledge and/or technical information that is present in the focal patent. 
In this study, we use the number of citations to capture the impact, or the 
value, of the invention. This is in line with a large number of management 
studies, as the number of patent citations has been shown to be correlated 
with the economic importance of inventions and expert evaluation of their 
value (Albert et al., 1991; Hall et al., 2005; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Romer, 
2002). 
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II - 4.2.2: Independent Variables 
Recombination. Our first hypothesis examines the difference in 
impact of inventions that recombine components that have appeared 
together in one of the firm’s previous inventions versus those that don’t. 
Thus, recombination takes a value of 1 if a patent contains at least two 
components that appeared together in at least one of the firm’s previous 
inventions, and a value of 0 otherwise. We measure recombination using the 
following steps. First, we identify the patents whose components have the 
largest degree of overlap with the focal patent. Overlap is simply measured 
as the number of components that appear in both the focal patent and the 
prior patents from the firm’s patent portfolio. In cases where more the one of 
the previous patents have the same degree of overlap, we choose the most 
recent one of these, as this would represent the patent that a firm is most 
familiar with (Fleming, 2001). 
Recycled inventions. Our definition for recombination is broad, and 
includes different types of combinations. We narrow it down by defining four 
different ways in which new inventions can use sets or subsets of 
components that have appeared together in previous technologies.  Recycled 
inventions comprise the first two of these, namely subtraction and 
replacement. Subtraction refers to inventions that are generated by 
removing components from a previous combination. Reconfiguration, on the 
other hand, refers to the cases when the exact same combination of 
components has been used before. We group these because in both cases, 
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the firm is familiar with all the components in the invention (Fleming, 2001). 
Both of these variables are binary variables. 
Renewed inventions. The second two variables that fall under the 
category of recombination are addition and replacement. Addition is a binary 
variable that takes a value of 1 when a new component is added to a 
combination of components that has been used before, and 0 otherwise. 
Replacement refers to an invention in which some of the components in the 
original combination have been replaced by different components. 
Collectively, we refer to these as renewed inventions because in both cases a 
new component is introduced, and this makes the process of arriving at the 
invention less familiar (Fleming, 2001). 
Temporal lapse. This refers to the amount of time (in number of 
years) that has elapsed between the last time that a combination was used 
and the current invention. We measure this lapse in two steps. Where an 
invention recombines components that have been used together before 
(Recombination = 1), we identify the most recent invention made by the focal 
firm from which the components were recombined. Temporal lapse is then 
measured as the number of years between the application dates of the focal 
patent and its predecessor. For patents which do not recombine previously 
used components, we repeat the same methods using the entire sample of 
semiconductor patents. Thus, absent recombination, temporal lapse 
measures the number of years it takes a firm to re-create a combination that 
was developed in a competing firm. In 2,422 cases (=2.89%), we found that a 
combination was never used before. To account for this, temporal lapse took 
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a value of 0, but we included a dummy variable (entirely new invention) to 
capture these cases in our empirical models. 
External search. Even when generating new inventions involves 
reusing components from previous inventions, a firm may still rely on ideas 
and technological advances made outside its boundaries. External search 
captures this phenomenon by specifically measuring the extent to which a 
firm utilizes external knowledge in the focal patent. Following other studies 
(Almeida and Phene, 2004; Katila, 2002), this variable is constructed by 
counting the number of times that a focal patent cites prior patents that are 
assigned to other (i.e., external) firms. 401 of the patents in our database (= 
0.48%) contained no references. Naturally, external search takes a value of 0 
in these cases, but this differs from when a patent cites prior art but makes 
no references to external firms. To distinguish between the two, we included 
a dummy variable (no references) in all our regression models. 
II - 4.2.3: Control Variables 
Team size. Patents developed by teams composed of a larger number 
of inventors have been shown to receive more forward citations (Singh and 
Fleming, 2010). This variable can also influence the dependent variable, as 
larger teams may possibly be able to retrieve more knowledge. Therefore, the 
influence of team size is controlled for by constructing a variable that counts 
the number of inventors that are listed on each focal patent. 
Technological maturity is calculated as the ratio of backward 
citations the focal patent makes to prior art to the number of claims that it 
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makes (Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2003). 
Mature technologies are typically easier to understand (Sørensen and 
Stuart, 2000), which makes retrieval more straightforward from the 
perspective of the originating firm. However, mature technologies may also 
be less desirable in the marketplace when compared to emerging 
technologies (Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007), thereby making the original firm 
less inclined to retrieve the knowledge used to leverage that technology by 
an external party. 
Range of technologies combined. Innovations that combine a wider 
range of technologies can have an impact that differs from that of 
innovations that do not (e.g. Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Jaffe et al., 2002; 
Singh, 2008). Prior studies have also indicated that international teams are 
likely to assimilate knowledge that is more technologically diverse than if the 
team was composed of inventors from a single geographic location (e.g. 
Boschma, 2005; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Technological diversity is 
calculated by first computing the proportion, pi, of a patent’s backward 
citations that are in the technological class i. Technological diversity is then 
calculated as follows:  
21 i
i
p
 
The minimum value of Technological diversity is 0, and occurs if all 
backward citations belong to the same technological class. The maximum 
value is contingent on the number of unique classes, and occurs when the 
backward citations are uniformly distributed across the unique classes. It 
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follows that as a patent draws from a larger number of technological classes, 
the value of technological diversity will also increase. 
Number of patents. Firms with richer patent portfolios, particularly if 
these patents are diverse, would naturally have more opportunities to 
recombine previously used technologies to generate new inventions. This 
variable, which counts the number of patents that a firm applied for in the 
five years preceding the focal invention, is therefore included in our models. 
Geographic dispersion. We have referred to geographic dispersion as 
the extent to which the development of certain technologies occurs in 
distant locations rather than in a single location. This can be measured 
using the information on patent data about the geographic location of 
inventors. We calculate this variable by first considering all of the 
originating firm’s patents that were applied for in the same year as the focal 
patent. Using this selection, geographic dispersion is measured as 1 minus 
the Herfindahl index of regional concentration, where a region is defined as 
a state in the US and a country elsewhere (e.g. Lahiri, 2010; Singh, 2008). 
The equation is as follows, where ci is the proportion of these patents that 
were developed by inventors from region i. In the cases when inventors from 
multiple regions appeared on a patent, each of these was considered as a 
separate observation.  
21 i
i
c  
The minimum value of geographic dispersion is 0, and occurs if all 
patents were developed by inventors from the same location. The maximum 
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value is contingent on the number of distinct locations, and the patents are 
uniformly distributed across all regions. Specifically, if the number of 
locations is equal to N, then the maximum value for geographic dispersion = 
1-1/N. 
Firm age.  This variable is calculated as the number of years between 
the application date of the firm’s very first patent with the USPTO and the 
application year of the focal patent. It is included as a control variable to 
account for the possibility that older firms have richer patent stocks from 
which components can be recombined, as well as more experience at 
recombining these components. 
Firm Size. Larger firms, which employ more R&D personnel, are 
likely to have superior capabilities in terms of recombining previously used 
technologies. We account for this counting the number of unique inventors 
which have applied for a patent during the year in which the focal patent 
was applied for. We used the inventor database, which identifies unique 
USPTO inventors and matches them to their respective patents (Lai et al., 
2011), to retrieve this variable. 
Year dummies. As a final control variable, we include year dummies, 
which reflect the application date of the focal patent. Year dummy variables 
are included to account for the differences in the number of citations that 
patents from different years are expected to receive (Hall et al., 2001). 
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II - 5: Analysis 
Statistical analysis. The unit of analysis is the patent, and our 
dependent variable of impact is a count variable. Poisson regressions are 
often used to analyse count data. However, an assumption of the Poisson 
distribution is that the mean and the standard deviation equate, which is 
typically violated in analyses which consider patent citations, as these are 
often overdispersed. Therefore, we use negative binomial regressions, which 
relax the assumption that the mean and the standard of the dependent 
variable are equal to one another; making them better suited for our 
analyses. To determine whether to use a random effects or fixed effects 
model, we implemented a Hausman (1978) specification test. The result of 
the test was insignificant (p > 0.05); meaning that a random effects model is 
consistent and efficient.     
Data analysis.  The descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix 
for the variables used in this study are displayed in Table II-1. The 
correlation coefficients between the variables are low enough so that it does 
not raise issues of multicollinearity. 
The statistics relating to the processes by which components are 
recombined reveal an interesting description of the process of invention. The 
mean value of the variable recombination is 0.69, which means that the 
majority of firm’s patents (69%) recombine components that have been 
previously used together. Of these patents, approximately 28%, 4%, 5% and 
63% result from subtraction, reconfiguration, addition and replacement. 
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Thus, the bulk of inventions which re-use previous components are 
generated through replacement and subtraction. 
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Table II-1: Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Impact 1 
                2 Team size 0.02 1 
               3 Technological maturity 0.00 0.03 1 
              4 Range of tech. combined 0.01 0.02 0.15 1 
             5 Number of patents -0.08 -0.05 0.04 0.12 1 
            6 Technological diversity -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.31 1 
           7 Geographic spread -0.18 0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.16 0.39 1 
          8 Firm age -0.18 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.56 0.24 0.24 1 
         9 Firm size -0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.79 0.45 0.45 0.53 1 
        10 Recombination -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.29 0.10 0.05 0.29 0.22 1 
       11 Recycled -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.14 0.36 1 
      12 Subtraction -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.16 0.33 0.91 1 
     13 Reconfiguration -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.12 0.33 -0.09 1 
    14 Addition -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.12 -0.10 -0.09 -0.03 1 
   15 Replacement 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.58 -0.48 -0.43 -0.16 -0.16 1 
  16 Temporal lapse -0.12 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.31 0.18 0.04 0.10 0.13 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 1 
 17 External search -0.03 0.06 0.51 0.20 0.07 -0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 1 
 
Mean 11.30 2.25 1.11 0.46 712.07 0.87 0.49 17.44 612.10 0.69 0.23 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.43 4.68 10.21 
 
S.D. 21.49 1.47 2.68 0.27 643.04 0.12 0.21 5.39 569.50 0.46 0.42 0.40 0.17 0.17 0.50 2.93 22.46 
Notes: N=83,786 , Values that are greater than |0.009 | are significant at the alpha level of 0.01  
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II - 6: Results 
We test the first of our hypotheses in Table II-2, which presents the 
results of the regression for the full sample of patents. Column 1 presents 
the baseline model, which includes the control variables. Next, column 2 
introduces two of the explanatory variables: temporal lapse and external 
search. Column 3 tests hypothesis 1 by introducing the variable: 
recombination. Recall that recombination is the broader category which 
distinguishes between all inventions that are generated by re-using existing 
components and those that do not. In later models, narrower subcategories 
will be introduced. The coefficient on recombination is positive and 
significant (b = 0.085, p < 0.001), meaning that the expected impact of 
patents that use any of the four recombination types is 8.9% higher than 
those which do not. This result corroborates hypothesis 1.   
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Table II-2: Negative Binomial Regressions Examining the Relationship between 
Recombinations and Impact 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
Team size 0.040*** 
(0.002) 
0.038*** 
(0.002) 
0.037*** 
(0.002) 
0.037*** 
(0.002) 
0.037*** 
(0.002) 
Technological 
maturity 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
Range of 
technologies 
combined 
0.038** 
(0.012) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.027* 
(0.012) 
0.021 
(0.012) 
0.022 
(0.012) 
Number of patents -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.185*** 
(0.013) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Technological 
diversity 
-0.296*** 
(0.038) 
-0.279*** 
(0.038) 
-0.284*** 
(0.038) 
-0.289*** 
(0.038) 
-0.288*** 
(0.038) 
Geographic 
dispersion 
0.086** 
(0.026) 
0.069** 
(0.026) 
0.075** 
(0.026) 
0.077** 
(0.026) 
0.077** 
(0.026) 
Firm age -0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
Firm size -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.075*** 
(0.015) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Recombination  
 
 
 
0.085*** 
(0.007) 
  
 
Recycled inventions  
 
 
 
 
 
0.025** 
(0.010) 
 
 
subtraction  
 
 
 
 
 
 0.020* 
(0.010) 
reconfiguration  
 
 
 
 
 
 0.060** 
(0.020) 
Renewed 
inventions 
   0.110*** 
(0.008) 
 
addition  
 
 
 
 
 
 0.074*** 
(0.019) 
replacement  
 
 
 
 
 
 0.113*** 
(0.008) 
Temporal lapse  
 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
External search  
 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 0.741*** 
(0.037) 
0.751*** 
(0.037) 
0.727*** 
(0.038) 
0.723*** 
(0.038) 
0.723*** 
(0.038) 
Observations 83786 83786 83786 83786 83786 
Firms 159 159 159 159 159 
Log-likelihood -265348.53 -265219.08 -265152.05 -265102.21 -265098.11 
LR test  258.90*** 134.06*** 233.74*** 241.94*** 
Comparison  1 2 2 2 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The dummy 
variables entirely new inventions and no references are included, but not reported. Year 
dummies are also included in all models.  
 
Column 4 separates recombinations into the first-level subcategories: 
recycled inventions and renewed inventions. Note that the third category 
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which accounts for inventions which do not re-use previous combinations of 
components is omitted from the analysis, because only two of the three 
dummy variables can be included in the regression models due to 
multicollinearity. Thus, the excluded variable forms the baseline against 
which the other two variables can be compared. The coefficients on both 
recycled inventions and renewed inventions are positive and significant, 
implying that both modes of reusing components yield higher impact 
inventions than virgin combinations. 
The final column in this table, column 5, examines even finer 
subcategories of recombination. Specifically, we separate recycled inventions 
into its two subcategories: subtraction and reconfiguration. Likewise, we 
separate renewed inventions into addition and replacement. As with the 
previous model, the baseline variable that is excluded represents inventions 
that do not reuse old combinations. The coefficients on all four variables are 
positive and significant, which is in line with our theorizing. An important 
reason for separating the categories is that it allows us to examine the 
outcome of each of the processes independently. For instance, column 5 
reveals that the coefficients on the two variables that represent renewed 
inventions (i.e., addition and replacement) are both higher than the 
coefficients of the two variables that represent recycled inventions 
(subtraction and reconfiguration). A second point that is noteworthy is that 
using these finer subcategories enhances the explanatory power of the 
regression model. 
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Table II-3: Negative Binomial Regressions Comparing the Impact of Inventions that 
Rely only on the Original Components (Recycled Inventions) versus Inventions that 
Introduce New Components (Renewed Inventions). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Team size 0.033*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.003) 
Technological maturity -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
Range of technologies 
combined 
0.054*** 
(0.015) 
0.034* 
(0.015) 
0.035* 
(0.015) 
0.034* 
(0.015) 
Number of patents -0.171*** 
(0.014) 
-0.191*** 
(0.014) 
-0.190*** 
(0.014) 
-0.190*** 
(0.014) 
Technological diversity -0.401*** 
(0.055) 
-0.350*** 
(0.055) 
-0.351*** 
(0.055) 
-0.353*** 
(0.055) 
Geographic dispersion 0.151*** 
(0.036) 
0.129*** 
(0.036) 
0.129*** 
(0.036) 
0.130*** 
(0.036) 
Firm age -0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Firm size -0.088*** 
(0.018) 
-0.074*** 
(0.018) 
-0.075*** 
(0.018) 
-0.075*** 
(0.018) 
Recycled -0.093*** 
(0.009) 
-0.088*** 
(0.009) 
-0.142*** 
(0.017) 
-0.150*** 
(0.017) 
Temporal lapse  
 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
Temporal lapse x Recycled  
 
 
 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
External search  
 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
External search x Recycled  
 
 
 
 
 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Constant 0.916*** 
(0.055) 
0.895*** 
(0.055) 
0.911*** 
(0.055) 
0.916*** 
(0.055) 
Observations 58011 58011 58011 58011 
Firms 137 137 137 137 
Log-likelihood -182319.328 -182229.502 -182281.025 -182218.754 
LR test  179.65*** 14.49 *** 7.00** 
Comparison  1 2 3 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The dummy variable no references is 
included, but not reported. Year dummies are also included in all models. 
 
The empirical analysis in Table II-3 only considers inventions which 
reuse existing combinations (i.e., recombination = 1). Therefore, 58,011 
patents belonging to 137 firms are retained in this analysis. We drop all 
other patents in order to test the remaining hypotheses, as these compare 
the impact of inventions that are recycled to those which are renewed. The 
results in the previous table (Table II-2) showed us that there was a 
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substantial difference in the magnitude of the coefficients of recycled and 
renewed variables (Column 4). While the previous result allows us to infer 
that there is indeed a difference in impact between recycling inventions and 
renewing inventions, it does not represent an accurate test for the second 
hypothesis, which compares the outcome of the two variables directly. 
Hypothesis 2 is formally tested in table II-3. The results in column 1 show a 
negative and significant coefficient on the recycled variable (b = -0.093, p 
<0.001), suggesting that these inventions generate 8.88% fewer citations 
than renewed inventions; which fully supports Hypothesis 2. 
Column 2 in table II-3 includes the variables temporal lapse and 
external search. The coefficients of these variables are respectively negative 
and significant (b = -0.012, p < 0.001) and positive and significant (b = 
0.002, p < 0.001). We hypothesized (Hypothesis 3a), that the time-lag 
between an invention and its predecessor would reduce the impact of 
recombinative inventions. This hypothesis is supported, as our results show 
that a 1 standard deviation increase in the number of years elapsed reduces 
the impact by approximately 3.5%. Furthermore, the positive and significant 
coefficient on external search suggests that for inventions which re-use old 
combinations, increasing the scope of external search by one standard 
deviation enhances the impact of the resulting inventions by 4.6%. 
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Figure II-1: The Effect of Temporal Lapse 
 
Figure II-2: The Effect of External Search 
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The interaction terms of recycled inventions with temporal lapse and 
with external search appear in columns 3 and 4, respectively. Both 
interactions are positive and significant, which is in line with hypotheses 3b 
and 4b. Figures II-1 and II-2 are plots that depict these interaction effects 
based on the results in column 4. Note that the y-axis in both figures 
represents percentage change in impact. Thus, the figures illustrate the 
extent to which increases in temporal lapse (Figure 1) and external search 
(Figure 2) from values of zero alter the expected impact of recycled and 
renewed inventions. What these figures do not represent is the difference in 
magnitude of impact between recycled and renewed inventions at different 
levels of temporal lapse and external search.  
The two slopes in Figure II-1 are negative, indicating that for both 
recycled and renewed inventions, temporal lapse reduces the impact. The 
figure also shows that the slope of the line representing renewed inventions 
is more negative, meaning that the same increase in temporal lapse has a 
stronger negative effect on the impact of renewed inventions in comparison 
to recycled inventions. Figure II-2 can be interpreted in a similar way. In this 
figure, both slopes are positive, but the line associated with recycled 
inventions is more positive. What this means is that external search has a 
larger positive effect on recycled inventions than on renewed inventions. 
These results support hypotheses 3b and 4b.  
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Table II-4: Negative Binomial Regressions Comparing the Impact of the Four 
Processes (Subtraction, Reconfiguration, Addition and Replacement) of Recombining 
Inventions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Team size 0.034*** 
(0.003) 
0.033*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.003) 
Technological maturity -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
Range of technologies 
combined 
0.064*** 
(0.015) 
0.054*** 
(0.015) 
0.034* 
(0.015) 
0.035* 
(0.015) 
0.033* 
(0.015) 
Number of patents -0.175*** 
(0.014) 
-0.173*** 
(0.014) 
-0.192*** 
(0.014) 
-0.191*** 
(0.014) 
-0.191*** 
(0.014) 
Technological diversity -0.392*** 
(0.055) 
-0.399*** 
(0.055) 
-0.350*** 
(0.055) 
-0.349*** 
(0.055) 
-0.352*** 
(0.055) 
Geographic dispersion 0.148*** 
(0.036) 
0.152*** 
(0.036) 
0.130*** 
(0.036) 
0.130*** 
(0.036) 
0.131*** 
(0.036) 
Firm age -0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Firm size -0.089*** 
(0.018) 
-0.086*** 
(0.018) 
-0.073*** 
(0.018) 
-0.074*** 
(0.018) 
-0.074*** 
(0.018) 
Subtraction  
 
-0.103*** 
(0.009) 
-0.096*** 
(0.009) 
-0.160*** 
(0.018) 
-0.166*** 
(0.018) 
Reconfiguration  
 
-0.046* 
(0.020) 
-0.055** 
(0.020) 
-0.107* 
(0.042) 
-0.127** 
(0.043) 
Addition  
 
-0.031 
(0.019) 
-0.036 
(0.019) 
-0.065 
(0.035) 
-0.070 
(0.036) 
Temporal lapse    
 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
Temporal lapse x 
Subtraction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
Temporal lapse x 
Reconfiguration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
Temporal lapse x Addition  
 
 
 
 
 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
External search   
 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
External search x 
Subtraction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
External search x 
Reconfiguration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
External search x Addition  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Constant 0.876*** 
(0.055) 
0.915*** 
(0.055) 
0.896*** 
(0.055) 
0.915*** 
(0.055) 
0.920*** 
(0.055) 
Observations 58011 58011.00
0 
58011 58011 58011 
Firms 137 137.000 137 137 137 
Log-likelihood -
182379.1
43 
-
182314.1
51 
-
182225.5
88 
-
182216.2
98 
-
182212.0
01 
LR test  129.98*** 177.13*** 18.58*** 8.59* 
Comparison  1 2 3 4 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The dummy variable no references is 
included, but not reported. Year dummies are also included in all models. 
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The analysis in Table II-4 is similar to what we presented in Table II-3, 
with the biggest difference being that we include the subcategories of 
recycled and renewed inventions, instead of using the higher-level variables. 
Since an invention that reuses components (Recombination = 1) can only fall 
in one of the following categories - subtraction, reconfiguration, addition, 
and replacement - one of these variables is automatically dropped. As shown 
in the table, replacement is dropped from the models, and thus forms the 
baseline against which the other variables are compared. Column 1 is the 
base-line model which only includes the control variables. Next, column 2 
includes the three variables that represent the ways in which components 
can be re-used. As shown, the coefficients on subtraction (b = -0.103, p < 
0.001) and reconfiguration (b = -0.046, p < 0.05) are both negative and 
significant, indicating that inventions resulting from both of these processes 
yield a lower impact than inventions that are generated through 
replacement. The insignificant coefficient (p > 0.05) on addition suggests 
that the impact of inventions that are generated in this way do not 
statistically differ from those developed through replacement. 
Column 3 includes the temporal lapse and external search. Next, in 
column 4, the interaction terms of temporal lapse with subtraction, 
reconfiguration, and addition are included. Two terms are significant. The 
coefficient of temporal lapse is negative and significant (b = -0.016, p < 
0.001), meaning that increasing temporal lapse by one standard deviation 
reduces the impact of inventions generated through replacement by 
approximately 4.6%. The coefficient on the interaction of temporal lapse with 
subtraction is positive and significant (b = 0.013, p < 0.001), but not large 
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enough to overturn the negative sign on temporal lapse. The effect is such 
that a one standard deviation increase in temporal lapse reduces the impact 
of patents by 0.87%. Finally, the insignificant interaction terms between 
temporal lapse and both reconfiguration and addition indicate that the 
negative effect of temporal lapse in these cases does not statistically differ 
from its effect on inventions generated through replacement. 
Finally, column 5 introduces the interaction term of external search 
with subtraction, reconfiguration, and addition. For the two subcategories of 
recycled inventions, the results suggest the following. A one standard 
deviation increase in external search increases the impact of inventions 
generated through subtraction and reconfiguration by 7.0% and 9.4% 
respectively. The effect is lower for the subcategories of renewed inventions. 
Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in external search increases 
the impact of renewed inventions generated through both addition and 
replacement by 4.6%. We can however not differentiate between them. 
Collectively, the findings presented in table 4 are in line with our previous 
results. 
II - 6.1: Limitations 
This study is not without its limitations. While patent forward 
citations have been shown to be correlated with the impact of inventions 
(Albert et al., 1991; Hall et al., 2005; Jaffe et al., 2002), it is admittedly not a 
perfect proxy. Future research may wish to replace our measure with other 
correlates of the market value of inventions, and explore how the results of 
this study may vary. Another drawback of using patent data is that not all 
 120 
inventions are patented. We chose the semiconductor industry specifically 
because of the high invention and patenting rates. Still, a number of useful 
inventions are not patented. While this does not affect our theory, it does 
have implications for our empirical findings. 
We did not differentiate between the sources of components for 
renewed inventions, although previous research has indicated that this 
could be important (Katila, 2002; Katila and Chen, 2008). It is possible that 
familiar components used for addition or replacement would differ from 
new-to-the-firm components used for the same types of recombinations. As 
integrating familiar components might be easier than integrating new-to-
the-firm components for either addition or replacement, it is possible that 
such differences would translate into different impacts as well. In addition, 
we define our four key recombination types as binary measures. Whether a 
new invention subtracts 1 or 10 components, for instance, does not matter 
in our operationalization of the explanatory variable. It could be that a more 
granular approach would generate additional insights into optimal 
recombination strategies. These limitations open interesting avenues for 
future research. 
Finally, older and more experienced firms are likely to be more 
capable of recognizing the limits of various recombination mechanisms. 
Though we control for firm age and size, we do not control for the breadth of 
the external knowledge space. As it is likely that older firms have branched 
off into more technological domains than younger firms (George et al., 2008), 
the external knowledge space that older firms could venture into is therefore 
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likely to be more constrained. Incorporating the relative size of the external 
knowledge space could provide additional insights.  
II - 7: Discussion  
In this study, we examined how firms can generate novel and 
impactful innovations with the aid of combinations of components that they 
have already used in the past. Previous research has highlighted the 
importance of reusing and refining existing combinations of components 
(e.g. Fleming, 2001), and how these activities yield important inventions 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). What has not been enunciated in previous 
work is a detailed account of the different ways in which existing 
components can be recombined, and the effect of each of these processes on 
the market value of the resulting inventions. We targeted this gap in existing 
literature by describing four different recombination processes. 
 We argued that recombination can be split into two categories. The 
first is recombination through recycling. Recycling, which includes both 
subtraction and reconfiguration, describes processes that do not add any 
new components to previously used combinations. Instead, the same 
(reconfiguration) or a subset (substitution) of an original combination is 
used. The second category is recombination through renewal, which 
includes inventions in which new components are added to an existing 
combination or in which some of the original components are replaced. We 
found that both forms of recombination, namely recycling and renewing, 
yield higher impact inventions when compared to inventions in which 
components are combined for the first time. We also compared the impact of 
 122 
recycled inventions to renewed inventions, and found that the impact of 
inventions resulting from the former process is on average lower.  
 Next, we examined how two factors can deter or enhance a firm’s 
recombination efforts. The first of these is the temporal lapse between the 
current combination and the last time that combination was used in the 
firm. We found that the impact of invention suffers as the amount of time 
elapsed between an invention and its predecessor increases; an effect which 
is more pronounced for renewed inventions. The second factor we 
considered was the extent of external search, which was found to have a 
positive effect on the impact of recombinative inventions. We also compared 
the effect across the different recombination categories, and found that 
external search has a larger positive effect on recycled inventions than on 
renewed ones. 
 Overall, our findings indicate that firms recombine technological 
knowledge components in different ways and with different likelihood of 
success. Yet, as is often the case when peeking into a black box, what you 
find raises more questions than it provides answers. Like most previous 
quantitative research, we have implicitly assumed that the recombination 
process has zero duration. The invention occurs simply at the moment (even 
year) of the patent application. The entire process of search that happens 
before that date has been condensed into a single moment in time. 
Moreover, while our findings on external search are significant and 
defensible, one could argue that external search is either antecedent to or 
concurrent with the recombination process and that it could both shape the 
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combination of knowledge components as well as affect how they are 
integrated. Once again, this suggests that while we somewhat opened up the 
black box of recombination by looking at various types of recombinations 
and their innovative impact, we have at best lifted the lid of the underlying 
processes that drive the production of knowledge and the creation of 
successful new ideas, embodied in products or patents.     
The final chapter in this dissertation looks to theoretically address 
some of these shortcomings of quantitative empirical research. In it, I 
develop a model of invention as a process of escalating recombinant search. 
It tackles some of the shortcomings of both the first and second chapter by 
acknowledging both collaboration and component recombination as integral 
aspects of the process of invention. The final chapter however is conceptual 
and theoretical and the emerging ideas developed in this chapter have not 
been submitted to empirical testing. It is my hope that it will lay the 
foundations for future research on recombination and collaboration in 
invention. 
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III – CHAPTER THREE:  
INVENTION AS A PROCESS OF ESCALATING RECOMBINANT 
SEARCH 
 
Every act is a source of knowledge to others (Lachman, 1956, p. 32) 
III - 1: Introduction 
Invention is fundamentally a process of knowledge integration and 
recombination that, if successful, results in the production of new knowledge 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). While some have argued that invention cannot be 
modelled at all, Magee opined that the “theoretical study of creativity and 
invention is possible because what it aims to model is the process, not the fruit, 
of idea generation” (2005, p. 31). In this chapter, I propose an evolutionary 
perspective of knowledge recombination in which individuals exploit early stage 
ideas or “half-hunches” (Johnson, 2011), by recombining them with other ideas 
extracted from a socially-constructed and technologically constrained 
knowledge structure through both object search (search for information out 
there) as well as holder search (search for knowledge holders who become 
integrated in the inventive unit). I explicate these two forms of search because I 
contend both engender different challenges and because their distinction has 
been subsumed in the literature. I posit that object and holder search are 
mutually reinforcing, complementary, and iterative processes, and that the 
search for knowledge holders is an integral yet often neglected part of the 
search for information.   
Because valuable knowledge is often controlled by individuals and 
because that knowledge is not perfectly appropriable (in that an individual 
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loses her monopolistic power over the use of the information when it is 
communicated or articulated), information holders often need to be integrated 
within the organization or the inventive unit in order to access the desired 
information (Arrow, 1962; Grant, 1996). This inclusion of the information 
holder in the inventive team is necessary because of the indivisibility of the 
information and the person holding it. As argued by Arrow (1962, p. 615): “No 
amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity of 
something so intangible as information”. Thus the combination of increasingly 
specialized individuals and indivisible and imperfectly appropriable knowledge 
provide the building blocks of an evolutionary process in which the unit of 
invention escalates over time through search. This evolutionary escalation 
process is accompanied by the emergence of recombination problems 
associated with knowledge articulation, flow, and absorption.  
This escalation process forces us to reconsider some commonly held 
implicit assumptions in the literature. Following in the footsteps of the multi-
level study conducted by Rothaermel and Hess (2007), I contend that the focal 
level of analysis is not independent of other potential levels of analysis and that 
not all the variance of outcomes is attributable to a single focal level (with the 
other levels assumed to be largely homogenous). Thus, the escalation process 
forces us to recognise that the unit of invention evolves over time. Rothaermel 
and Hess “not only demonstrate heterogeneity across levels of analysis, but also 
interdependence with alternate levels of analysis” (2007, p. 914). Because I 
start at the individual level, the evolutionary perspective offered here follows 
calls towards more attention to micro-foundations of dynamic capabilities and 
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of strategy research in general (Abell, Felin, and Foss, 2008; Barney and Felin, 
2013; Coff and Kryscynski, 2011; Felin and Foss, 2005; Felin et al., 2012). The 
second part of chapter one also responded to this call.  
This chapter is split into five sections. I first unpack the search construct 
focusing on three problematic assumptions that are implicit in much of the 
search literature, namely the stability of the searching unit, the equivalence of 
what is found with what is searched, and the lack of agency attributed to the 
objects of search. I conclude that invention should be understood as a process 
of escalating recombinant search in which the evolution of the inventive unit is 
determined by search for both information and knowledge holders in a 
recursive manner. This section ends with an overview of the argumentation of 
the next three sections and depicts a model representation of the process of 
escalating recombinant search. I then go on to discuss some frequent problems 
associated with recombination and the inventive process more generally, 
focusing on knowledge articulation, flow, and absorption. 
In the next part, I tie these three recombination problems to different 
units of analysis. I postulate that articulation, flow, and absorption will create 
higher or lower barriers to invention depending on the unit of analysis, and 
review some recent findings regarding barriers to individual, team, department, 
firm, alliance, and open invention. Then, I integrate the previous three parts 
into a framework on inventive search. I propose that both the knowledge 
structure (i.e. the multidimensional landscape that reflects the socially 
constructed knowledge architecture) and idiosyncratic ingression costs (the 
costs faced by the evolving unit of invention to navigate the knowledge 
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structure and access specific pieces of information) will define how, where, and 
when an inventive unit searches and how it evolves throughout the search 
process. I summarize those aspects that make the knowledge structure 
intrinsically more or less complex and pay attention to the relationship between 
knowledge flow, knowledge absorption, and ingression costs. 
The overarching proposition is that those facing low ingression costs, 
relative to others who aim to solve similar problems, are more likely to come up 
with high quality solutions, will be able to move faster, and will create more 
consistent inventions (lower outcome variability). However, to achieve 
breakthroughs, inventive units will need the audacity to navigate the complex 
knowledge structure and overcome high ingression costs, and combine these 
efforts with knowledge they can access at lower ingression costs.  
III - 2: Deconstructing Search  
Invention requires the recombination of familiar knowledge to create new 
products or processes that sometimes make current capabilities and skills 
obsolete; something known as creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942). Thus, 
in the course of economic progress, “new knowledge is acquired gradually… 
often painfully, and always at some cost” (Lachman, 1956, p. 28). However, 
before knowledge can be integrated and recombined it must be located, which 
explains why behavioural theorists and evolutionary economists have described 
R&D projects and other inventive efforts as search processes (Cyert and March, 
1963; Nelson and Winter, 1977; Nelson and Winter, 1982). In general, “the 
thrust of much of the literature is that organizations will initiate focused search 
when (1) a problem is recognized and (2) some heuristic assessment of the 
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costs, benefits, and probabilities involved suggests that a search-justifying 
threshold value has been reached or exceeded” (Huber, 1991, p. 98). An 
alternative to this problemistic or distress search is slack search where 
organizations engage in search activities because they possess unproductive 
resources that need to be put to work (Knight, 1967); if not these resources will 
turn into idle capital (Lachmann, 1956; Lewin, 2012).  
III-a: Assumption 1: Sufficient Condition for Search6 
 Assumption 1: Search occurs when the focal actor faces a (knowledge) 
problem and their subjective assessment of the value of the imagined 
solution and the likelihood of finding that solution exceed the search costs 
 Formula 1:  Search    P[EV(Solution)]  > EC(Search) 
  EC  =  Expected Costs 
  EV   =  Expected Value 
  P  =  Probability to find 
 Corollaries: Expected search costs will be lower for slack search than for 
distress search, because of the difference in opportunity costs. The 
expected value of the solution will be much less clearly understood for 
slack search than for distress search. 
 
Much of the empirical work in line with the combinatorial approach is 
characterized by a double-edged sword: The tension view on recombination 
suggests that deep knowledge in one domain dampens creativity, such that 
breakthrough inventions require breaking out of these established 
combinations, while the foundational view of creativity suggests that local 
search will identify anomalies in current combinations and exploit these to 
                                       
6 In order to keep track of the theoretical reasoning in this chapter, I will summarize key 
assumptions and propositions in boxes such as this one. Occasionally, I will use formulas 
which are meant to facilitate interpretation of the contributions to theory made in this chapter. 
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produce breakthroughs (Kaplan and Vakili, 2014; Weisberg, 1999). A purely 
combinatorial approach however downplays the inherent innovativeness of 
reusing old ideas in different ways as it fails to identify a mechanism of how old 
knowledge components get recycled into new ideas that can be fitted to other 
components (Magee, 2005).  
In this light, Katila and Ahuja (2002) find that moderate search depth 
increases new product introductions because on the one hand, deep search 
increases predictability, reduces the likelihood of errors, facilitates routine 
development, and boosts the ability to identify valuable knowledge while on the 
other hand, excessive depth can let the firm run against the technological 
frontier and generates rigidity and competency traps. The debate as to whether 
local (deep) or distant (broad / scope) search is more conducive to innovation 
as well as how the age of sought knowledge affects innovation impact and 
under which contingencies, is still open (e.g. Katila, 2002; Nerkar, 2003). In a 
similar vein, in the second chapter, I found that inventions that build on 
knowledge recombinations (familiar components) do better than those that 
build on new-to-the-firm combinations and that those inventions that add new 
components to familiar combinations have even higher impact. I also found 
that building on old combinations negatively affects impact. 
Besides the combinatorial perspective, the bounded rationality approach 
propagated by most researchers interested in search depends on a poorly 
understood search process that is assumed to be local, stochastic, and based 
on routines (Magee, 2005). Nelson & Winter (1982) for instance argue that 
“success in receiving and building on complex knowledge depends crucially on 
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access to the original recipe, which serves as a template” (p. 119 – 120). Some 
argue scientific research (i.e. original recipe) serves as a map in the 
combinatorial search process of inventors, because it eliminates fruitless paths 
of research and exposes promising technological trajectories (Fleming and 
Sorenson, 2004). Alternatively, having access to diverse problem-solving 
techniques is argued to be an important source of coming up with new 
solutions as well (Amabile, 1988). However, exactly how organizations or 
individuals go about this search for knowledge components, templates, or 
recipes remains rather poorly understood. 
Although more research into the mechanisms that inspire creativity is 
undoubtedly needed, I leave that to those on the cross-section of psychology 
and management (e.g. Csikszentmihalyi and his concept of ‘flow’). My focus is 
on three reasons why our understanding of inventive search is still partial at 
best, despite many decades of research: our focus on search as an outcome, 
rather than as a process; our attention to search for information, rather than 
search for knowledge holders; and our implicit assumption that the searcher or 
searching unit does not evolve as a direct consequence of the search process. 
III - 2.1: How? Search as Process 
Within the managerial literature, the process of recombinant search for 
invention remains understudied. Despite some recent empirical contributions 
(Anand, Gardner, and Morris, 2007; MacAulay, Steen, and Kastelle, 2014), 
most of what we know about search processes stems either from the 
foundational works (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982), from 
work on information seeking (e.g. Kuhlthau, 1991), or from historical accounts 
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of individual inventors (Gorman and Carlson, 1990; Maggitti, Smith, and 
Katila, 2013). Gorman and Carlson (1990) for instance described invention as a 
process in which mental models are combined with mechanical representations 
that serve as tangible artefacts of (a part of) the inventor’s mental model. These 
mental models can both constrain or enable invention as the cases of Reis, Bell, 
and Edison regarding the invention of the telephone show (Gorman and 
Carlson, 1990). Maggitti et al. (2013) state that “while research in the 
organizations literature has focused on the search terrain, search context, and 
the importance of search at the organizational level, there has been less 
attention to the actual search processes and the underlying routines that 
organizations or individual organization members use to search” (p. 91, italics 
added).   
The scarcity of work on search as a process is overshadowed by the 
abundance of work in which search is used and operationalized as an outcome 
of an undisclosed (assumed) process. Quantitative research that uses patent or 
network data as proxies for search falls within this outcome-oriented branch, 
as does chapter two (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Fleming, 2001; Fleming and 
Sorenson, 2001, 2004; George et al., 2008; Katila, 2002; Katila and Ahuja, 
2002). Not only are citations often added by USPTO or EPO officials, so that it 
is hard to imply active knowledge search on behalf of the focal organization 
(Giuri et al., 2007), but even if all cited patents are indeed within the knowledge 
base of the organization, they clearly represent a found body of knowledge. 
More generally, while the common meaning of the word search is ‘try to 
find something by looking or otherwise seeking carefully and thoroughly’ 
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(Google definitions), what most empirical research on search focuses on is not 
search per se but what has been found. Whereas to find is likely to require 
antecedent search (or to be open to serendipitous discovery (Denrell, Fang, and 
Winter, 2003)), it is likely that much search behaviour (e.g. search for 
information embodied in patents, phone calls made to knowledge holders, 
informal conversations in the hallway that might lead you to take a new look at 
something, or suggestions received by colleagues over lunch) is not necessarily 
seen as direct contributions to the invention.  
Consider the process of writing an academic paper. No matter how much 
we try to acknowledge ideas from those upon whose work we build, we can 
hardly say that our extensive academic referencing is in any way a complete 
reflection of the search process we engage in to bring a manuscript into 
existence. Many things we searched for did not pan out, some citations are 
added pro forma, and other information sources are forgotten or omitted. Thus, 
talking about ‘search’ when using only what is found, denies the existence of 
failed efforts, inefficient search processes, or erroneous findings that get 
reconsidered over time. The literature on search thus has a clear success bias.    
III - 2.2: What/Who am I Looking for? Object Search or Holder Search 
For as far as I know, the search literature has not clearly differentiated 
between what I will call object search7 and holder search. Object search is any 
form of search directed towards information or other resources that can be 
extracted from a knowledge repository without direct consent from or prolonged 
                                       
7 Object search is more commonly known as information search but I chose to avoid that 
denominator because of the ambiguity around the meaning of the word information in the 
context of the knowledge-based view. 
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involvement with a knowledge owner. Thus, information that is publicly 
available or can be accessed via the internet, libraries, or via patenting agencies 
in codified form stems from object search. Kuhlthau (1990, p. 361) defines the 
process of object search as “the user’s constructive activity of finding meaning 
from information in order to extend his or her state of knowledge on a 
particular problem or topic” and as a form of “sense-making within a personal 
frame of reference”. Importantly, object search does not change the searching 
entity.  
Holder search on the other hand is the search for a partner (be it an 
individual within the firm, an independent researcher, or another organization) 
who might join the invention process or who at least has discretion with 
regards to her willingness to share information. This type of search often leads 
to escalation in that the entity involved in the invention process evolves: from 
an individual, to a team, to a firm, to an alliance, and potentially to a form of 
open innovation. In most cases, holder search is inevitable: “the specificity of 
the individual knowledge structure compels inter-personal interactions” 
(Ancori, Bureth, and Cohendet, 2000, p. 275), and because of the 
appropriability concerns, both within and between firms, this interaction often 
results in some form of integration (Arrow, 1962; Grant, 1996). Thus, object 
search is about enlarging the information and knowledge available to the unit 
of invention, while holder search is about interacting with others who have 
agency, and about enlarging the unit itself.  
In the context of entrepreneurship, attention has been paid to holder 
search. Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter (2003) found that homophily and strong 
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network ties are predictors of entrepreneurial team formation and Aldrich and 
Kim (2007) underlined the importance of familiarity and local clusters in 
finding entrepreneurial team members. Clarysse and Moray (2004) discuss how 
the required qualities of a CEO for an entrepreneurial team evolve over time so 
that changes in strategic needs drive turnover in nascent entrepreneurial 
teams.  
While these examples are indicative of local search tendencies and 
exhibit the importance of team fit, they also exemplify two fundamental 
differences between object and holder search: Firstly, holder search is always 
susceptible to the agency of the holder because not everyone I want to work 
with wants to work with me (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Jovanovic, 1979; 
Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009). Holder search is thus a multi-agent assignment 
game in which collaborations are explicitly negotiated between partners that 
bring complementary resources and skills to the table (Mindruta, 2013). 
Secondly, while both object and holder search can result in the need for 
unlearning (Hedberg, 1981 in Huber, 1991) or in the creative destruction of 
capabilities and skills that are no longer useful (Schumpeter, 1942), only holder 
search inherently includes ‘baggage’. By this I mean that the integration of a 
specific knowledge holder in an entrepreneurial team or inventive unit is a 
more challenging exercise than fitting a new piece of knowledge into an existing 
puzzle. The integration of a new individual changes the puzzle as the person 
comes with additional, potentially undesirable, knowledge, habits, skills, 
routines, and mental maps that can cause frictions.  
 135 
Thus, while object search is an acquisition process where you get the 
knowledge you want or less (e.g. if the knowledge is poorly coded, very tacit, or 
if you lack absorptive capacity to understand it), holder search is a negotiation 
process in which you almost always get more than you bargained for. Hence, 
object search is strictly about knowledge domain fit, while holder search is 
about total fit, including soft aspects that are outside the focal knowledge 
domain. Holder search will thus relate to problems commonly studied in the 
invention/innovation literature and in the theory of the firm around mutual 
knowledge (Kotha et al., 2013), opportunism and goal alignment (Williamson, 
1975) and resource access (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996).  
In the behavioural theory of the firm, it is acknowledged that boundedly 
rational individuals search for knowledge to “move the bounds of their 
rationality” (Foss, 2009, p. 16). However, if Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) are 
correct that due to the increasing marginal costs of knowledge integration, 
alliancing is less about knowledge acquisition than about knowledge access, we 
must acknowledge that search can be about both adding brain power 
(acquiring knowledge) as well as adding brains (accessing knowledge). Both 
processes are fundamental to invention.  
Moreover, invention is inherently a risky endeavour with uncertain 
outcomes for increasingly specialised organizations and individuals (Arrow, 
1962; Cyert and March, 1963; March and Shapira, 1987). It is thus not 
surprising that when it comes to new product development or other inventive 
effort, many firms are not able to keep up with the ever increasing complexity, 
speed of technological progress and high dispersion of knowledge, so that they 
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“depend on external innovation partners to build products within acceptable 
budgets, timelines, and financial risk” (Kotha and Srikanth, 2013, p. 41).  
Increasing the knowledge stock by integrating new members is known in 
the learning literature as grafting (Huber, 1991). This grafting is most 
commonly studied from an organizational perspective with reference to the 
establishment of mergers, joint ventures, or other types of interorganizational 
relationships. Somewhat surprisingly, the organizational literature on partner 
selection has rarely explicated that selection requires antecedent search but 
has focused on (static) focal firm, interfirm, partner firm, institutional, and 
network characteristics (Hitt et al., 2004; Hitt et al., 2000; Li et al., 2008; 
Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011; Shah and Swaminathan, 2008). Only 
recently the management literature has begun to acknowledge that some kind 
of matching (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Mindruta, 2013) needs to occur 
because the partner has agency (unless perhaps in the case of hostile 
takeovers). Rothaermel and Boeker (2008) for instance find that both 
complementarities and similarities increase the probability of alliance formation 
between pharmaceutical and biotech firms. Such findings lead Sorenson and 
Stuart (2007) to argue that much research on partner choice antecedents 
suffers from selection bias because partner selection requires the partner’s 
approval. Thus, holder search requires different skills than object search 
because the potential partner needs to be convinced, or courted (Graebner and 
Eisenhardt, 2004).   
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III-b, Assumption 2: Costs for Object and Holder Search 
The previous discussion implies that object and holder search are both crucial 
in the search for knowledge not controlled by the inventive unit. Because both 
processes require different skills, the costs associated with them are different. 
Therefore: 
 Assumption 2: The costs associated with object search (the search for 
information out there) are determined by the required search effort, 
whereas the costs associated with search for knowledge holders are more 
complex  
 Formula 2: EC(Search)    =  EC(Object Search) + EC(Holder Search) 
When a knowledge holder gets included in the inventing unit (escalation), part 
of the value of a successful invention will be appropriated by that holder, either 
in the form of direct monetary rewards that need to be split within the team, or 
in the form of appreciation and career prospects, or according to negotiated 
agreements in the case of a multi-organizational team.  
Thus, the expected costs of holder search do include 1) the effort of finding her, 
2) the potential difficulties of matching with her, 3) the coordination difficulties 
associated with escalation (see III – 3.2 and III – 4), and 4) the appropriation of 
part of the value of the future solution by the holder. 
 
III - 2.3: Who am I? Defining the Searcher 
Most of what we know about search is rooted in either organizational 
learning theory or behavioural theory of the firm and therefore it is chiefly 
related to organizational search. Cyert and March (1963) and Knight (1967) 
discussed search as a consequence of either slack or distress. Later research 
has complemented these organizational perspectives by investigating 
organizational aspirations and learning from failure (Baum and Dahlin, 2007), 
and how aspirations influence risk taking in partner selection (Baum et al., 
2005). The general idea behind these studies is that organizations will adapt 
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their search behaviour (e.g. the balance between exploitation and exploration 
(March, 1991)), when performance deviates from socially or historically 
determined aspirations. Much of these aspiration studies are rooted in 
individual psychology constructs that are attributed to the organization. 
Mathematical models of managerial (i.e. individual) perspectives on risk-taking 
behaviour in relation to aspirations have for instance been used to discuss 
organizational behaviour  (March and Shapira, 1987; Miller and Chen, 2004). 
When it comes to environmental scanning (another form of search), both 
macro (organizational) and micro (individual) studies have been conducted. The 
former focus chiefly on “enhancing strategic management effectiveness”, 
whereas micro studies are mainly interested in “boundary-spanning personnel 
as sensors of the organization’s environment” (Huber, 1991, p. 97 – 98). In 
general however, there is a dearth of attention to studies that explicate how 
individual search unfolds (Maggitti et al., 2013). This omission has hardly been 
addressed over the last 25 years. While alliances have been construed as a 
means to overcome organizational tendencies to search locally (Rosenkopf and 
Almeida, 2003), studies of how alliances or other interorganizational 
relationships search and whether their search behaviour differs from 
organizations are to my knowledge absent from the literature.  
The same goes for teams. Despite increasing recognition that teams form 
the core inventive unit in the knowledge economy (Jones, 2009; Wuchty, Jones, 
and Uzzi, 2007) and despite recent experimental findings that team formation 
of scientists in the same institutional environment is still subject to 
considerable frictions (Boudreau et al., 2014), how teams search and how 
 139 
individuals form inventive teams remains poorly understood. Boudreau et al. 
(2014) even suggested that the “formation and execution of collaborations may 
be considered as representing altogether different kinds of coordination 
problems – one of joint production and the other of matching” (p. 4-5). I will 
further develop and extend this notion under section III-3.2 
The lack of attention paid to individual, team, and alliance search and 
the even scarcer attention paid to search processes at different levels of 
analysis is surprising. More than 50 years ago, Arrow already argued that 
“there is really no need for the firm to be the fundamental unit of organization 
in invention” (Arrow, 1962, p. 624). Never has that statement rung more true 
than now that the costs of executing collaborations have been lowered 
significantly by technological progress (Agrawal and Goldfarb, 2008; Ding et al., 
2010). While this is undoubtedly so, tie formation remains subject to 
considerable individual, cultural, and institutional barriers (Boudreau et al., 
2014; Vissa, 2011). Importantly, most research on the search process has 
assumed a stable searching unit. I however submit that the searching unit 
escalates as a direct consequence of the search process. 
III - 2.4: The Recombinant Search Process in Time 
The previous three subsections can be summarized as follows: while 
significant attention has been paid to the concept of search ever since the 
seminal work of Cyert and March (1963), we still know rather little about 1) the 
evolution of the searching unit over time8, 2) the actual process of search 
                                       
8 An exception is the process study of practice embedding in consulting firms, which will be 
discussed later in some detail (Anand et al., 2007) 
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conducted by different units of analysis9, and 3) the complicated relationship 
between search for knowledge that is “out there for the taking” versus search 
for knowledge holders who need to be integrated in the inventive unit to some 
degree. Given that search for knowledge requires both accessing of information 
and matching with other individuals, invention can understood as a search 
process in which the inventive unit escalates over time through internal and 
potentially external grafting.  
For instance, Raymond Kurzweil, inventor of the synthesizer, stated that 
“projects very quickly get complex enough that different people’s expertise is 
required” (in Maggitti et al., 2013, p95). It is interesting to note that Maggitti et 
al. (2013) did not include the escalation of the inventive unit, from the 
individual to a team or even to an entire organization, as an essential element 
of the invention process. While ideas indeed “occur first in the minds of 
individuals” (Magee, 2005, p. 31), often for an idea to materialize it needs to 
enter spaces where ideas can mingle and interact with half-hunches of other 
people so that something truly novel can be created (Johnson, 2011). When 
talking about the conceptual difference between search for solutions and 
search for information about existing solutions, Huber (1991, p. 99) recognised 
that “various forms of search might have different antecedents or might be 
carried out by different types of organizational units or with different types of 
search processes”. While this falls short of saying that the searching inventive 
unit is likely to evolve over time, it does add weight to the idea that how and 
                                       
9 See MacAulay et al. (2014) who make this point in their discussion on search behaviour when 
the local environment is not benign 
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where an inventing unit searches is dependent on the type of knowledge one 
wants to acquire and some idiosyncratic aspects of the inventing unit.  
In his influential contribution on theory-building, Whetten (1989) 
suggested that good theory contains an explanation of what (the focal 
variables), how (the relations and causality between the factors), why 
(underlying dynamics), and who, where, and when (boundaries to the theory’s 
generalizability). It is however not self-evident that when merely provides 
boundary conditions to the theoretical development: time may be a crucial part 
of the theoretical explanation (George and Jones, 2000). My deconstruction of 
search as a construct cannot be complete as long as the time-component is 
neglected. Consider patent data based studies such as the one presented in 
chapter two. Causality in such research is based on rather simplistic time 
dynamics: the invention occurs at time t = 0 and the impact of the invention is 
measured across a future time period, controlling for year effects. Moderation 
and mediation can be included if the variable happens before, simultaneous 
with, or after the invention but before the response variable ends. Yet, the 
alleged moment of  invention is dependent on many firm-specific factors (see 
e.g. Criscuelo, Sharapov, and Alexy (2014)). Additionally, that time-stamp does 
not capture what happened before, it provides merely a successful end-point. 
Thus, the implicit assumption that invention happens at a specific instant in 
time downplays the importance of the antecedent process. Mitchell and James 
(2001) suggest in this regard that most empirical research fails to appropriately 
acknowledge that independent and response variables have durations and 
might change over time.  
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III-c, Propositions 1 to 4: Deviating from search-as-outcome (SOA) assumptions 
As argued before, most research that uses the search construct has 
operationalized search as an outcome, thus ignoring its process 
characteristics (Maggitti et al., 2013). This omission is inextricably linked to 
(implicit) assumptions that are, when exposed, hard to support. I state the 
assumptions and proffer counterfactuals in the form of testable - albeit 
perhaps surprisingly self-evident - propositions: 
 SOA Assumption 1: The determination of the inventive unit is instant, 
static, and stable over time and thus independent of the search process 
 Proposition 1: Search has a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relation to 
escalation such that after a certain escalation threshold (i.e. team 
constellation), the likelihood of further escalation decreases 
 SOA Assumption 2: The search process is homogenous among 
organizations and does not affect the eventual success or failure of the 
invention10 
 Proposition 2: The relationship between search and invention success is 
moderated by organization-specific characteristics 
o This has an important consequence for the recombination 
literature: Not every firm integrates components in the same way. 
 SOA Assumption 3: The search process is independent of the 
environmental context and does not affect the eventual success or 
failure of the invention 
 Proposition 3: The relationship between search and invention success is 
moderated by environmental characteristics 
 SOA Assumption 4: Search knowledge can be measured by found 
knowledge, thus search has a 100% success rate 
 Proposition 4: Search has a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship 
with successful component integration such that after a certain search 
threshold, there are decreasing marginal returns to search 
 
                                       
10 Including firm fixed effects in a regression does not capture the specific relationships 
between the firm and its idiosyncratic search process. 
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When discussing the net value of collaborations, Singh and Fleming 
(2010, p. 53) ask themselves “would a particular set of inventors be more likely 
to invent a breakthrough if they collaborated from the start or if they worked 
alone and then pooled their efforts at the end”? The authors emphasize that 
“this question strikes as particularly important for future work, both from a 
theoretical and a normative perspective” (p. 53) and suggest that for instance 
administrative costs of collaboration could influence the optimal timing of 
starting to work together. The process model I propose aims to shed some light 
on this important question. 
Mitchell and James (2001) argue that ignoring time becomes more 
problematic when the underlying dynamics reflect “cyclical recursive causation” 
(p. 534) and that more difficult dynamics including mediation and moderation 
can easily be conceived of but are rarely tested. Imagine the following scenario: 
a single inventor attempts to recombine some components to create an 
invention but fails. After his failure, he invites his colleague to help him. He 
discusses with her his previous attempts and together they revisit the evidence. 
Eventually, both manage to create the new invention. Hence, from an outcome 
perspective, one could look at the result and argue that team size contributes 
to innovation (Singh and Fleming, 2010). A step further would be to 
acknowledge that team size will be mediated by the combined absorptive 
capacity of the individuals (and some other dynamics that facilitate their 
internal coordination). Yet, ignoring the process and the time the initial 
inventor spent trying to recombine various components paints an erroneous 
picture. Invention does not happen at a discrete moment in time! 
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A similar case can be made for moderation. Mitchell and James (2001) 
suggest that when testing the hypothesis “X leads to Y moderated by Z”, X 
should happen at time t0 while Y happens later at time t2. The moderator Z can 
either be assumed to be relatively time-invariant and different for different 
organizations, or to occur at time t0 or at any moment between t0 and t2. It is 
even conceivable that the moderator itself ‘takes time’ or that the time at which 
the moderator became time-invariant matters. Exactly when (and how long) Z 
‘happens’ potentially affects the strength of the moderation. Consider a 
moderation effect explored by George et al. (2008). These authors argue and 
find that breadth of technological capabilities (“the sum of technical classes in 
which a firm had applied for patents” (p. 1460)) moderates the effect of 
insularity (“the degree to which prior innovations within the same technological 
domain help generate new innovation” (p. 1458)) on the innovation impact of 
the firm. While they do not explore it, it is conceivable that the timing at which 
the firm patented different inventions in different technical classes would 
influence the moderation. Take an extreme example in which three firms score 
exactly the same on the moderator, but one firm patented all those inventions 
at least 10 years, ago, another one has consistently patented in many of those 
classes over the last 10 years, and the third one has patented in all those 
classes exactly one year ago. I would expect different results depending on the 
timing of the moderator.   
In order to develop my process model, I simplistically stylize the final 
objective of the invention process as inventive success (an invention has been 
made) or inventive failure (the search process is halted before an invention is 
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made). Notice that this makes no assumptions about the quality of invention 
although additional propositions could be derived that take quality into 
account. I present the figure here to explain the logical flow of the 
argumentation, aiming to paint a map of the path I am taking in this chapter. 
All the constructs involved will be explained in much more detail in the rest of 
the chapter. It is important to remember that this iterative process is time-
consuming and that (quantitative) research in general assumes this time is 
condensed into a single point (but see Singh and Fleming, 2010 for an 
exception), and that such research (like in the second chapter) generally only 
witnesses the final success (the invention that goes to market, or gets patented 
for instance), not the iterative failures, and often not even the final failure (but 
see Criscuelo et al., 2014). Table III-1 provides a synoptic overview of the focal 
variables in the model. 
Table III-1: Focal Variables in Escalating Recombinant Search Process 
Variable Definition 
Knowledge 
Articulation 
Capability to change the knowledge properties in such a way to 
enhance transferability (via teaching or codification). Articulation is 
not free and can lead to spillovers and rigidities. 
Knowledge 
Flow 
Capability of knowing where to look for a knowledge holder and how 
to set-up and coordinate interaction. Flow can be costly when 
partners are not aligned or do not understand each other very well. 
Knowledge 
Absorption 
Capability to accumulate, understand, assimilate, extend, and 
deploy source-, domain-, and code-specific knowledge. 
Search The process of looking for knowledge (objects or holders) in the 
search space, which is determined by the knowledge structure. 
Ingression 
Costs 
Costs associated with knowledge flow (tie formation and 
coordination) and knowledge absorption (time, learning) 
Knowledge 
Structure 
Socially constructed global knowledge base which includes all 
human knowledge (codified and tacit), socially complex or not. 
Component 
Integration 
Iterative process of adding or removing new knowledge components 
following object or holder search. 
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I propose the process unfolds as follows, (see figure III-1): The knowledge 
base of the inventing unit (IU) consists of three capabilities: knowledge 
articulation, knowledge flow, and knowledge absorption. These three capabilities 
evolve with every escalation of the unit of invention and can turn into rigidities 
or obstacles if the escalation is not managed properly. If a gap in the knowledge 
base is uncovered (or if the IU has slack resources) the IU initiates a search 
process (1). This search process has three potential outcomes. The IU finds an 
object that contains the desired knowledge (2a), a knowledge holder (2b), or 
does not find any useful answer and gets lost in the knowledge structure (2c). 
The knowledge structure is the socially constructed knowledge base that 
contains all knowledge that is embodied in objects (artefacts, components, 
data, information, tools, capital) or holders (individuals who hold more or less 
tacit information); see III-5.1.  
If search is successful and the desired knowledge component is found, 
the process evolves towards an iteration of component integration. This can be 
the consequence of a found object that gets deployed (3a – the learning 
trajectory) or of a knowledge holder who gets integrated with the inventing unit 
and assists in the component integration (3b – escalation path). Which path 
will be chosen will be discussed later. The quality with which the object is 
deployed is determined by the IU’s capacity to absorb knowledge so that the 
relationship between a found object and an integrated component is moderated 
by knowledge absorption (4a). On the flip side, the quality of integration of a 
new knowledge holder will be chiefly determined by the costs associated with 
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knowledge flow. These costs will thus moderate the relationship between a 
found knowledge holder and component integration (4b). 
The learning cycle will then contribute to the knowledge base by 
increasing the brainpower of the existing IU (5a) whereas the escalation process 
will lead to a new individual (or team/firm) joining the inventive search process 
hence adding brains to the knowledge base. The model does not presume that 
the entire knowledge base of the newly added holder gets neatly integrated with 
the former IU. Information can be withheld or the new member can be 
unfamiliar with the IU’s shared mental maps, so that limitations in mutual 
knowledge or deliberate secrecy will limit the free transfer of knowledge (e.g. 
Ahuja et al., 2008), hence the dotted line. Eventually, the iterative knowledge 
component integration can result in either a failure or a success (6) which will 
add new knowledge to the IU’s knowledge base (7). 
The ingression costs are the idiosyncratic costs incurred by the escalating 
inventing unit to be able to deploy a knowledge component; these can be the 
consequence of learning (knowledge absorption) or escalation (knowledge flow) 
(Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004) – see III-5.2]. These two constructs are linked 
to the unit of invention’s initial knowledge base. The reason why they are joined 
here under one name is because they can basically serve as substitutes. 
Knowledge about where to find knowledge holders presumes some awareness of 
their knowledge and hence constitutes an element of what Postrel (2002, p. 
305) calls trans-specialist understanding, whereas the knowledge absorption is 
similar to Postrel’s concept of specialist capability. Both forms of knowledge can 
serve as substitutes in the invention process (Postrel, 2002). 
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Figure III-1: Invention as a Process of Escalating Recombinant Search 
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In proposing an evolutionary process of how an inventive unit escalates 
over time through search, I follow the call from Foss (2009) to investigate 
individual-centric thinking in knowledge management while stimulating multi-
level research that combines top-down and bottom-up processes to improve our 
mereological understanding of the search process at the foundation of 
invention.  
Much research has focused on the barriers to recombination and the 
difficulties associated with knowledge integration that can block progress. 
Because these barriers are likely to evolve with the escalating unit of invention, 
I now turn my attention to barriers to recombination. 
III-d, Assumption 3a: Key Driver of Escalation 
This leads us to understand the key driver of escalation.  
 Assumption 3a: Escalation of the inventive unit (IU) will occur when the 
costs associated with such escalation are lower than the costs associated 
with engaging in object search. 
 Formula 3a: Escalation  EC(Holder Search) < EC(Object Search) 
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III-e, Assumption 3b and Propositions 5-7 regarding Marginal Value of Components 
Yet, if we aim to understand the process of escalating recombinant search, we 
need to acknowledge that decisions are not necessarily made based on a 
holistic perspective of the outcome of the search process. Because search can 
be erroneous and because recombination requires the complex integration of 
various components, it may be more sensible to think in terms of adding new 
knowledge components one by one. This then leads to the following assumption 
and associated proposition: 
 Assumption 3b: The inventive unit will aim to minimize the marginal cost 
of including a new knowledge component 
 Formula 3b: MV(component) > min(MC(object search), MC(holder search)) 
 Proposition 5: Knowledge components will be added to an invention as 
long as the marginal value of adding a new component exceeds the 
marginal cost of object search or the marginal cost of holder search, 
whichever is lower  
When cycling back to the earlier mentioned distinction between slack and 
distress search (Knight, 1967), it has been argued that for rather small and 
negative deviations from aspiration levels, risk-taking tends to increase, while 
for positive deviations the evidence is less clear-cut, especially around the 
extremes (Hu et al., 2011; Leonard-Barton, 1992). If these findings around 
deviations from historical and social aspirations are true, it seems likely that 
risk-prone inventions will be those in which MV(component) is the determinant 
of choice, while risk-averse inventions are those where the net marginal value is 
minimal. Building on proposition 2, I propose: 
 Proposition 6: Inventive units engaging in risk-prone search will first add 
the knowledge component with the highest marginal value or will add 
many components at once, temporarily ignoring marginal costs 
 Proposition 7: Inventive units engaging in risk-averse search will first add 
the knowledge component with the lowest net marginal value 
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III - 3: Knowledge-Based Theory and Barriers to Recombination 
"The path of economic progress is strewn with the wreckage of failures. 
Every business man knows this, but few economists" (Lachman, 1956, p. 
46) 
Knowledge-based theory (KBT) as advanced by Grant (1996) states that 
the fundamental organizational task is knowledge application, whereas 
knowledge creation is perceived to be more an individual task. The task of 
management is essentially the facilitation of coordination that enables 
knowledge integration. This task extends beyond organizational boundaries as 
both organizational economics and organization theory recognize that 
interorganizational relationships can be used to access valuable resources such 
as knowledge through co-exploration and co-exploitation activities (Parmigiani 
and Rivera-Santos, 2011).  
There are three reasons why knowledge often needs to be integrated 
within organizational boundaries (Grant, 1996). First, the transferability of 
knowledge is impeded when knowledge is tacit rather than explicit or codified. 
In the former case, teaching knowledge to others is significantly harder, which 
is why knowledge might dissipate over time or vanish with employee turnover. 
Thus codification decreases a firm’s dependence on unique knowledge holders 
and facilitates the diffusion of knowledge within the organizational boundaries. 
Second, the receipt of knowledge depends on the absorptive capacity of 
the receiver (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002). Even if 
knowledge is not tacit, whether or not some other entity (individual, team, 
division, or competitor) will be able to acquire the knowledge is subject to how 
much the other already knows and how much more knowledge he/she is able 
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to digest and at which speed. In the alliance literature for instance it has been 
argued that the faster learning partner can control and dominate the 
relationship (Hamel, 1991).  
Third, the appropriability of knowledge is problematic. If knowledge is 
unique, its objective value can only be assessed once the knowledge has been 
communicated which undermines the negotiation power of the knowledge 
holder (Arrow, 1962; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). The non-rivalrous and public 
good nature of knowledge assures that everyone can resell it without losing it 
after having been exposed to it (Grant, 1996). Thus, individuals have an 
incentive to hold on to their knowledge to ensure or enhance their position 
within the organization and to influence the allocation of knowledge rents in 
their favour. This creates uncertainty under which resource value is subjective 
(Kraaijenbrink, Spencer, and Groen, 2010; Schmidt and Keil, 2013), as 
managers may be unable to form accurate expectations (Foss et al., 2008) or 
are unable to adequately estimate the future value of a combination (Koruna, 
2004). Such expectations or estimates are essentially driven by proprietary 
information about the value creation potential of a resource. The more tacit the 
knowledge, the more this proprietary information belongs to the knowledge 
holder.   
In a study of knowledge-based innovation, Anand et al. (2007) for 
instance find that “owning” a new practice is a crucial determinant of career 
potential in consulting firms. This is likely to negatively impact an 
organization’s innovative performance and its capacity to extract value from 
knowledge. The organization will only gain sustainable advantage from valuable 
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knowledge held by an individual if the organization possesses complementary 
resources that increase the value of that individual’s knowledge (Coff, 1999). 
Else, the individual will appropriate most of the rents. This absence of 
knowledge flow is not necessarily in the best interest of the individual either, 
especially when she is not able to fully exploit that knowledge.  
Thus, Grant (1996) concludes that knowledge often needs to be 
integrated within firm boundaries to facilitate transferability, augment 
absorptive capacity, and solve the appropriability problem but at the same time 
he admits that the firm does not provide a perfect solution either. The 
organization does not eliminate coordination problems. It merely attenuates 
them. Koruna (2004) for instance lists at least nine barriers to recombination 
that cause frictions and coordination costs within the organization: knowledge 
dispersion, diverging frames of reference, intra-organizational boundaries, 
status of disciplines, engineer syndrome, not-invented-here syndrome, 
knowledge tacitness, language, and cognitive limits. Also, industry 
characteristics such as speed of knowledge development (Appleyard, 1996) as 
well as context-dependent resource interdependencies and strategic 
considerations (Almeida and Phene, 2004) will influence the probability of 
cross-organizational knowledge sharing. 
Most of these barriers exist because humans are boundedly rational and 
have limited cognitive capacity (Simon, 1978) so that omniscience is out of 
reach and specialization is our de facto reality. Because invention increasingly 
requires bridging different scientific domains (Jones, 2009), the specialized 
knowledge structure ‘imposes’ collaboration and thus various forms of 
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integration. This need for specialization brings about challenges associated with 
invention as a process of escalating recombinant search as suggested before 
(e.g. Grant, 1996; Koruna, 2004).  
Grant’s (1996) reasoning exhibits two distinct trade-offs: From the 
perspective of the firm (Grant’s focal unit of analysis) the benefits of escalation 
[lower dependence on unique knowledge holders, easier and faster knowledge 
flow by making messages digestible and by stimulating absorptive capacity], 
need to be weighed against the costs of escalation [frictions and coordination 
costs, risks of negative spillovers]. However, from the perspective of the 
inventor/decision-maker who needs to make the choice whether or not to 
escalate the unit of invention his/her downsides [e.g. loss of bargaining 
position because knowledge will need to be shared (Arrow, 1962), codification 
and coordination efforts], need to be compared to their upsides [e.g. higher 
absorptive capacity, better chance of finding a successful outcome, aligning 
with firm incentives…]. My evolutionary perspective suggests that the 
escalation process will be determined by the trade-off faced by the inventing 
unit, not the one faced by the firm.  
I will summarize the key challenges under three interrelated headings: 
knowledge articulation (How do I make clear what I need?), knowledge flow 
(How does knowledge transfer between entities?), and knowledge absorption 
(Can I absorb the knowledge I find or that is shared with me?). These three 
problems entail opportunities for invention, but bear within them risks and 
inherent difficulties. Although the lines between them are very malleable and 
somewhat artificial to draw, I will discuss them as separate items in the 
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following paragraphs. Table I-1 provides a synoptic overview of the three 
problems associated with recombinant search. 
Table III-2: Overview Knowledge Articulation, Flow, and Absorption 
 Dimensions Definition Exemplary 
Papers 
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
A
rt
ic
u
la
ti
o
n
 Articulated 
Knowledge 
(outcome) 
The degree of ambiguity or tacitness in 
the knowledge base of the inventive 
unit 
Prencipe & Tell 
(2001); Kogut & 
Zander (1992); 
Ancori et al. (2000) 
Articulating 
knowledge 
(process) 
Strategically reducing the ambiguity of 
knowledge to facilitate mainly internal 
flow, and associated investments  
Cowan et al. (2000); 
Ancori et al. (2000); 
Zack (1999) 
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 F
lo
w
 
Collaboration 
Formation 
Costs (CFCs) 
Costs faced before escalation. They 
depend on knowing where to look, goal 
alignment, opportunism, network 
resources, complementarities and 
anticipated CECs and ISCs 
Boudreau et al. 
(2014); Williamson 
(1989); Mindruta 
(2013) 
Collaboration 
Execution 
Costs (CECs) 
Costs associated with coordinating 
collaboration between individuals, 
bridging mental models, and 
establishing common ground 
Boudreau et al. 
(2014); Grant 
(1996); Kotha et al. 
(2013); Srikanth & 
Puranam (2013) 
Institutional 
Support 
Costs (ISCs) 
The costs associated with getting 
institutional support, as determined by 
politics, the institutional environment, 
defensible turf, training and resource 
provisioning  
Aldrich & Fiol 
(2004); Katila & 
Mang (2003); Anand 
et al. (2007) 
Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois III (1988) 
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 A
b
s
o
rp
ti
o
n
 Experience 
Accumu-
lation 
Learning by using or learning by doing 
facilitates development of operating 
routines and articulation skills 
Zollo and Winter 
(2002); Huber 
(1991) 
Absorptive 
Capacity 
The capability to learn, assimilate, 
transform, and exploit external 
knowledge, s.t. time compression 
diseconomies 
Cohen & Levinthal 
(1990); Zahra & 
George (2002); 
Dierickx & Cool (1989) 
Common 
ground 
creation 
Shared understandings created within 
a group, s.t. uniformity of cognitive 
maps, framing, info load, unlearning, & 
articulation 
Daft & Weick (1984) 
Huber (1991) 
 
III - 3.1: Knowledge Articulation 
The articulation of knowledge is intrinsically dialectical because for every 
advantage, there is an inevitable disadvantage that can overwhelm the 
other.  
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Articulated knowledge relates to the degree of ambiguity of knowledge 
and articulating knowledge is the combination of processes by which 
individuals and organizations attempt to manage the balance between 
codification and tacitness. Both are relevant to the definition of problemistic 
search as well as to the knowledge available to the articulator.  
III - 3.1.1: Articulated Knowledge 
There are both advantages and disadvantages to codified knowledge. On 
the one hand, codified knowledge is easier to store and retrieve as well as more 
reliable, which makes it easier to transfer (Kogut and Zander, 1992). In 
particular, codification can transform knowledge into a commodity that can be 
traded in markets, which can substitute for internally developed knowledge11 
(Prencipe and Tell, 2001). Also, codified knowledge can more easily be 
maintained in organizational memory and reduces organizational dependence 
on key individual knowledge holders (Prencipe and Tell, 2001). Additionally, 
specific forms of codification have additional benefits such as protection from 
imitation in the case of patenting but this comes at the price of disclosure.  
On the other hand, clearly articulated knowledge is more susceptible to 
leakage and spillovers. Deng (2008) for instance estimated the value of 
knowledge spillovers in the semiconductor sector at between 0.6 and 1.2 
million dollar per citation. Kogut and Zander (1992, p. 384) describe the fact 
the codification also induces imitation as a “fundamental paradox”. While in 
                                       
11 Codification and commodification are however not the same thing. Codified internal operating 
procedures have no value outside the firm so are not a commodity; alternatively after-sales 
services for complex goods are often not codified, but still commodified, and driver schools 
teach both codified knowledge (procedures) and tacit knowledge (practice and experience 
acquisition) (Ancori et al., 2001, p. 258). 
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some cases knowledge can be deliberatively revealed as a strategic choice 
(Alexy, George, and Salter, 2013), in many other cases the cost of IP theft and 
unwanted knowledge dissipation are staggering (Friel, 2006). Whereas the 
resource-based view suggests that valuable, rare, hard-to-imitate, and non-
substitutable resources are sources of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991), 
when it comes to tacitly held knowledge, these characteristics can also drive a 
wedge between competitive advantage and superior rents because the 
knowledge holder can bargain away the rents (Coff, 1999). Whether or not the 
knowledge is socially complex (i.e. embedded in interpersonal relations), path-
dependent (due to the unique historical conditions under which the firm came 
to own the knowledge), and/or susceptible to time compression diseconomies, 
will determine to which entity (the firm or the knowledge owner) the rents will 
accrue (Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
Additionally, some authors question the value of codified knowledge more 
generally, suggesting that the most important aspects of knowledge cannot be 
explicitly codified. Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 73) wrote that the “knowledge 
that underlies skilful performance is in large measure tacit knowledge, in the 
sense that the performer is not fully aware of the details of the performance and 
finds it difficult or impossible to articulate a full account of those details”. Thus 
whether or not all knowledge is codifiable and whether such codification makes 
economic sense depends on the epistemological stance of the author (Ancori et 
al., 2000).   
Finally, besides codification, organizations can articulate knowledge in 
other ways. Little attention has however been paid to how organizations teach 
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their employees about existing procedures and routines (but think about 
McDonalds University) or to how employees learn by observing behaviour.  
Jensen et al. (2007, p. 682) for instance talked about how training and 
education systems also embody knowledge in people and perhaps in artefacts. 
Using a questionnaire, Zander and Kogut (1995) found that both teachability 
and codifiability (correlation = 0.02) of manufacturing capabilities in Swedish 
firms contribute independently to internal knowledge transfers but not to 
imitation by other firms which confirms the importance of teaching as a form of 
articulation and provides support for the notion of stickiness (Szulanski, 1996; 
von Hippel, 1994). From an outcome perspective, the benefits of articulation are 
thus contingent on the likelihood of expropriation of the codified knowledge by 
competitors. 
III - 3.1.2: Articulating Knowledge 
Rather “little research has addressed how firms achieve the desired level 
of knowledge ambiguity that enables them to prevent unwanted leakage and 
promotes purposeful transfer processes” (Van Wijk, Jansen, and Lyles, 2008, p. 
844, italics added). The literature on knowledge management argues that 
organizations increasingly try to (and need to) make their knowledge more 
explicit and codified internally so that it can flow faster and more accurately 
within organizational boundaries. However, “appropriately explicating tacit 
knowledge so it can be efficiently and meaningfully shared and reapplied, 
especially outside the originating community, is one of the least understood 
aspects of knowledge management” (Zack, 1999).  
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Our scarce understanding of how organizations articulate or enable the 
articulation of knowledge is important because Zollo and Winter (2002) argue 
there is intrinsic value in the process itself because articulation improves 
understanding of the knowledge and thusly enhances absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Yet much money is also spent on the prevention 
of knowledge exodus, e.g. by investing in knowledge architectures and 
expensive knowledge management systems (Droege and Hoobler, 2003) so that 
one has to consider the articulation pay-offs explicitly. Moreover, codification or 
routinization – both as process and as outcome - can imply rigidity, stifle 
development of new ideas especially in contexts of change, and can never 
completely replace non-algorithmic judgement (Prencipe and Tell, 2001). These 
problems will be exacerbated in high-velocity environments, in which rigidity 
will be a cause for failure. 
III - 3.1.3: Articulation Contingencies 
Hansen et al. (1999) acknowledge that different firms will have 
idiosyncratic preferences for or against knowledge articulation. These 
preferences will be influenced by the ease and risks associated with 
codification. Nelson and Winter (1982) argued in this light that incentives to 
articulate (regarding personal and overall costs) as well as accumulated 
experiential skills will matter a great deal. Besides idiosyncratic aspects, 
context in its temporal, spatial, cultural, and social dimensions need be 
considered in any discussion of knowledge articulation (Cowan et al., 2000, p. 
225). Stable contexts benefit more from codification but in these contexts 
codification is not in the best interests of the firm as long as the firm can keep 
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tacit knowledge in house thereby capturing private information rents (Cowan et 
al., 2000). Dynamic contexts can suffer from overcodification when 
organizations become better at assimilating knowledge that suits their existing 
codification scheme (frame of reference), hence blinding out those aspects that 
do not fit the current schemes (Henderson & Cockburn, 1990), something 
known in psychology as confirmation bias. Additionally, institutional 
differences may make articulation more or less desirable. E.g. the recent jail 
sentence for the Japanese man who created a 3D printed gun (Vincent, 2014), 
following the release of initial 3D firearm blueprints in the USA (Hern, 2013) 
which was also met by public outrage but eventually kick-started the 
emergence of firms making 3D printed guns (Embley, 2013). Thus, knowledge 
articulation can be dialectical both as a process and as an outcome and its 
effect is contingent on a variety of factors. 
In summary, the benefits of codification are contingent upon 
environmental characteristics such as velocity and the likelihood of knowledge 
spill-overs. On the one hand, there are clear benefits to codification as it 
improves learning (Zollo and Winter, 2002) and facilitates information-sharing 
within the organization (Zack, 1999). Articulated problems can also be searched 
in the environment so one could posit a positive relation between articulation-
driven search and innovative success. However, in hypercompetitive 
environments, industry frameworks are not based on historic content but on 
the process of adaptive sense-making so that organizations act based on 
idiosyncratic beliefs, rather than based on shared industry recipes (Bogner and 
Barr, 2000). In such environments, clear articulation of user needs and thus 
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accurate estimations regarding expected value of solutions will be difficult. 
Additionally, time and financial investments in codification face high 
opportunity costs. Codification will then be less likely and without clearly 
articulated problems, searching in the knowledge space becomes potentially 
detrimental, which provides some support for proposition 3.   
III - 3.2: Knowledge Flow 
The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has 
taken place (George Bernard Shaw) 
Knowledge flow is “the aggregate volume of know-how and information 
transmitted per unit of time” (Schulz, 2001, p. 663). In this transmission it is 
important to ask if the sender will rout the information to the receiver, with 
what delay and with what distortion (Huber, 1991). Clearly, there are 
challenges associated with distribution of information so that “the idea of 
effortless ‘knowledge transfer’ is normally misleading and a ‘prepared mind’ 
helps a lot when it comes to absorbing codified knowledge” (Jensen et al., 2007, 
p. 681). Despite these challenges, enabling knowledge flow is of utmost 
important to performance. Schilling and Phelps (2007) found that firms that 
occupy densely clustered network positions benefit from easier communication 
and collaboration because of high information transmission capacity which 
boosts innovative output. Grigoriou and Rothaermel (2014) built micro-
foundations for such findings by arguing that individual networks of inventors 
across firms provide a better way of looking at potential information 
transmission. They found that star integrators with big reach and star 
connectors who bridge structural holes contribute significantly to firm 
innovation. Thus, overcoming barriers to knowledge flow is critical in the 
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escalating recombinant search process of invention. These findings exemplify 
that knowledge flow as a capability includes knowledge of on whose door to 
knock for information.  
Kogut and Zander (1992) argued that a firm’s ability to replicate 
knowledge in different parts of the organization (i.e. an efficient articulation-
flow-absorption loop) will determine the firm’s growth potential to a great 
extent. However, they also acknowledged that the more efficient this replication 
loop becomes, the higher the risk of competitive imitation. Van Wijk et al.’s 
(2008) meta-analytic review of knowledge transfer antecedents and 
consequences shows that flow enhances both innovativeness and firm 
performance. They find that knowledge ambiguity decreases flow, while 
organizational characteristics (size and absorptive capacity) enhance it. 
Network characteristics such as centrality, tie strength, and trust also 
positively influence knowledge transfer while similarity in vision, systems and 
culture have a weak, positive effect as well. These findings exemplify how hard 
it is to disentangle effects of articulation, flow, and absorption. When focusing 
purely on flow, three types of costs emerge that determine its likelihood and 
reliability: collaboration formation costs, collaboration execution costs, and 
institutional support costs. 
III - 3.2.1: Collaboration Formation Costs 
For both agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Ross, 1973) and transaction 
cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1989) goal divergence between self-
interested individuals is a primary problem of organizational design. Incentive 
alignment (agency theory & TCE) and integration of different entities into a new 
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organization to facilitate governance (TCE) are the proposed solutions to 
overcome the risk of opportunistic behaviour. Hence incentive and goal 
misalignments can create cooperative failures so that the escalation process 
(and thus the invention) halts (Williamson, 1981). Importantly, these theories 
presume that finding the potential partner is not problematic. This could be 
rooted in the implicit assumption evident in most work on search and the 
behavioural theory of the firm, namely that the search environment is benign 
(MacAulay et al., 2014). I include this knowledge of where to look as a 
fundamental part of the knowledge flow capability. This capability will first and 
foremost affect the likelihood of tie formation. 
Additionally, as described in section III - 2.2 and in more detail in 
Chapter I, matching theory (Gale and Shapley, 1962) posits that the searcher’s 
resources and capabilities need to match with the favoured partner’s needs 
before a match comes into existence. Thus, specific firm and partner 
capabilities will determine the likelihood of alliance formation (Mindruta, 2013). 
Vissa (2011) showed that individual tie formation intentions are driven by 
social similarity and task complementarity and that these aspects also drive 
actual tie formation. Ahuja (2000b) showed that technical, commercial, and 
social capital all influence the likelihood of establishing linkages and in another 
paper he demonstrated that firms with a more central network position 
(number of direct and indirect ties) and those who span fewer structural holes 
(as suggested by Coleman) are more innovative as well (Ahuja, 2000a). Finally, 
research has shown that prior experience with partnering increases the 
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likelihood of partnering again, although not always with beneficial 
consequences (Goerzen, 2007).  
I am not suggesting these drivers will not play a role during the 
collaboration [they can all resurface, especially with every unit escalation], but 
in first instance they are most likely to affect the likelihood of the formation of 
collaboration. Additionally, expected collaboration execution costs will influence 
whether collaborations come into existence as well. Kotha et al. (2013) found 
that anticipated within-team coordination costs, measured by science distance, 
negatively influence the likelihood of setting up a collaboration in the form of 
licensing and that this effect is attenuated by experience. 
Collaboration formation costs thus determine the likelihood of grafting 
(Huber, 1991) and are driven by incentive (goal) alignment, perceived risks of 
opportunistic behaviour, network resources (including partner-specific 
experience), complementarities and similarities, and anticipated collaboration 
execution and institutional support costs. 
III - 3.2.2: Collaboration Execution Costs 
Once the inventive unit has escalated to at least two people and the 
collaboration formation process is (temporarily) halted, new problems arise 
because “even in the absence of goal conflict, coordination is not a trivial issue” 
(Grant, 1996, p. 120). Within the firm, effective coordination is a prerequisite 
for knowledge integration. Yet “calling for coordination without specifying just 
what it means is simply a lazy way of passing off problems to someone else” 
(Simon, 1991, p. 39). Thus, coordination requires 1) rules and directives to 
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regulate individual interaction, 2) sequencing and thus modularity to avoid 
specialist clashes, 3) routines, and 4) meetings to allow for group problem 
solving (Grant, 1996). Because individuals own the knowledge that is 
responsible for most of the added value a firm creates, hierarchical structures 
are ill-suited to facilitate tacit knowledge exchange because only the knowledge 
owners can deploy the knowledge. Thus, decision-making need be decentralized 
when decisions require access to this tacit knowledge and can be centralized 
when the knowledge source is accessible statistically (Grant, 1996).  
Whenever any of these four requirements fails, coordination costs 
increase with all the ensuing negative consequences on knowledge flow. In their 
qualitative study of team collaboration in software services offshoring, Srikanth 
and Puranam (2013) find that ongoing communication is essential to maintain 
flow, whereas modular approaches seem to fail even in comparatively simpler 
maintenance contracts due to environmental change, echoing problems 
anticipated by March and Simon (1958) regarding coordination by feedback and 
coordination by plan. This failure of modularity is perhaps not surprising. 
Recall that von Hayek (1945) already argued that markets are great because 
they simplify decision processes as they allow actors to act independently from 
one another. In other words, when it comes to the exchange of pre-defined and 
stable outcomes, markets are assumed to be superior to firms. If modularity 
would work, these ‘simple’ maintenance contracts would not be executed within 
an organization but by many independent individuals who trade in markets 
with each other. 
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Coordination is known to be easier when the collaborators possess 
mutual knowledge because this common ground facilitates interpersonal 
communication (Durnell Cramton, 2001). In an international business plan 
competition for students, Durnell Cramton (2011) identified five sources of 
mutual knowledge failure: context of, distribution of, salience of, and speed of 
access to information as well as the interpretation of temporary non-
communication.  
Others have added to these findings by arguing that in a professional 
setting, tacit coordination mechanisms can be used to maintain common 
ground in dispersed collaborations within an organization with a recognized 
authority but that such tacit mechanisms fail between organizations because of 
lack of common ground (Srikanth and Puranam, 2013), or because of lack of 
shared identity the enables the resolution of coordination problems through 
procedural authority (Kogut and Zander, 1996). Also the findings of Kotha and 
Srikanth (2013) regarding Boeing’s efforts to increase visibility of actions in its 
disaggregated value chain support the importance of authority in the 
knowledge-based view. While collaborating firms may build common ground 
over time (Mayer and Argyres, 2004), the absence of a clear authority structure 
is likely to cause permanent frictions in the long run.  
III - 3.2.3: Institutional Support Costs 
Institutional support costs are determined by inter- and intra-
organizational politics, institutional environments, and the relative difficulties 
to obtain organizational support for innovation. We know that power games are 
linked to centralized decision-structures, are often orchestrated by stable, non-
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issue specific coalitions, and are detrimental to performance (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988). The two main drivers for this poorer performance (diversion 
of attention and limitations to information flow) can easily be linked to 
innovation as well: (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Politics will thus raise 
institutional support costs. Entrepreneurs on the onset of a new industry face, 
besides normal pressures associated with entrepreneurship, additional 
challenges associated with cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy (Aldrich and 
Fiol, 1994). The authors propose that “encompassing symbolic language and 
behaviors” (p. 652), “internally consistent stories” (p. 653), “convergence around 
a dominant product/service design” (p. 655), “collective action” (p. 656), 
“linkages with established educational curricula” (p. 661) and “collective 
marketing and lobbying efforts” (p. 663) will all contribute to legitimacy 
creation. These six12 propositions all imply that coherent articulation and 
sufficient flow within and between institutional entrepreneurs is instrumental 
to their chances of success.  
In other contexts, it has been shown repetitively that being part of 
clusters contributes to innovation, even in the increasingly globalized 
knowledge economy (Baptista and Swann, 1998; Porter, 2000), which also 
provides support for the importance of the institutional environment. Finally, 
changes in the legal environment (e.g. with regards to patent protection) or the 
institutional support infrastructure influence the timing of collaboration, such 
that a reduction of the risk of appropriation by a partner accelerates 
collaborative R&D projects (Katila and Mang, 2003). Finally, Anand et al. (2007) 
show that delineating the boundaries of new practices (defensible turf) and 
                                       
12 Aldrich and Fiol (1994) actually make eight propositions, but two are less relevant here. 
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finding organizational support by removing barriers to acceptance by internal 
power holders, leveraging existing clients, co-opting gatekeepers, as well as 
training and resource provisioning, are instrumental to get new ideas accepted 
within the organization. All these actions require efforts on behalf of the 
inventing unit and thus result in costs that need to be borne. This perspective 
obviously assumes that the individuals coming up with the new practice are 
not in a very powerful position. When the new practice is promoted by the 
organizational leaders, coercive implementation might require different 
processes (Canato, Ravasi, and Phillips, 2013). They found that implementing a 
culturally dissonant practice over time changes both the practice and the 
culture of the organization (Canato et al., 2013).  
In summary, knowledge flow is instrumental to invention, but entails 
costs that will influence how well an inventing unit is equipped to find the right 
partner and manage the collaboration. Furthermore, Eisenhardt (1989b) has 
shown that in high velocity environments, the speed of information flow (e.g. 
integration of multiple decisions; active conflict resolution; simultaneous and 
fast consideration of alternatives; real time information) is instrumental to 
decision-making and to performance. Similarly, Srikanth and Puranam (2013) 
found that ongoing communication and constant, direct feedback are 
instrumental to project success. We can thus conclude that a positive 
relationship between knowledge flow and innovative performance exists which 
will be stronger in high-velocity environments. This provides some additional 
support for proposition 3.  However, as I argued before, in such high velocity 
environments, codification is highly problematic because the associated 
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opportunity costs are significant. Additionally, the collaboration formation costs 
will be higher in such environments where it is often difficult to identify a 
possible partner, especially without prior experience. For instance, looking at 
the (biased) sample of established contracts, Carson, Madhok, and Wu (2006) 
find that opportunism is higher under high market and technological volatility, 
characteristics associated with high-velocity environments. This provides some 
limitations to the freedom to search. Following from the above reasoning and 
propositions 1 and 3, it then seems likely that the process of unit escalation is 
likely to halt before crossing organizational boundaries (which drastically 
increases flow costs) and that this is especially so when the industry velocity is 
high. 
III-f, Costs associated with Knowledge Flow 
 Formula 4:  EC(Holder Search)  =  CFC + CEC + ISC 
  CFC  =  Collaboration Formation Cost 
  CEC  =  Collaboration Execution Cost 
ISC  =  Institutional Support Cost  
 
III - 3.3:  Knowledge Absorption 
The gift of fantasy has meant more to me than my talent for absorbing 
positive knowledge (Albert Einstein) 
Knowledge absorption captures how an inventing unit comes to embody 
specific knowledge. It entails three learning mechanisms: experience 
accumulation, absorptive capacity, and the development of shared 
understandings and common ground. Zollo and Winter (2002) propose that 
experience accumulation through learning by doing or using, provides a central 
learning process by which operating routines are assumed to develop. A part of 
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this experience accumulation results in the capability to articulate knowledge, 
which exemplifies how entangled both processes are. As the authors state, 
…“firms learn systematic ways to shape their routines by adopting an 
opportune mix of behavioral and cognitive processes, by learning how to 
articulate and codify knowledge, while at the same time they facilitate the 
accumulation and absorption of experiential wisdom” (Zollo and Winter, 2002, 
p345). Additionally, the accumulation of knowledge over time enhances the 
firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). As stated before, the 
articulation of knowledge itself is likely to have intrinsic value because it 
improves understanding of knowledge which in turn can increase knowledge 
absorption. 
Secondly, knowledge absorption includes absorptive capacity which can 
be understood as the ability to learn, assimilate, or borrow external 
information, not strictly by doing or using, and exploit that knowledge for 
innovative purposes (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Similar to Zahra and George 
(2002), I understand absorptive capacity as an overarching capability that 
captures knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation. 
However, to remain consistent with my theorizing, I interpret the absorptive 
capacity not at the level of the firm but at the level of the escalating inventive 
unit. Knowledge absorption is sensitive to time compression diseconomies 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989) so that inventing units that need to catch up quickly 
and develop coordination mechanisms rapidly will face disadvantages in the 
absorption of knowledge when liken to units that have had more time to 
develop these mechanisms. 
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Finally, individual knowledge absorption (together with articulation) is 
also a driver for the creation of common ground and mutual knowledge. In the 
words of Daft and Weick (1984) interpretation is “the process of translating 
events and developing shared understandings and conceptual schemes” (p. 
286). The ease with which such shared interpretation of new information and 
knowledge within an inventing unit is absorbed, is determined by the 
uniformity of the member’s cognitive maps, the framing and rich portrayal of 
the information, the information load, and the amount of unlearning each 
member has to do (Huber, 1991, p. 102). I will not delve into the question of 
when individual sense-making acts constitute a macro [or meso] social 
phenomenon (Phillips, Sewell, and Jaynes, 2008). I am simply assuming that 
both absorption and articulation will be necessary to create mutual knowledge 
between individuals, without worrying about the exact timing when individual 
knowledge becomes mutual knowledge. Thus, the creation of common ground 
depends on the capabilities associated with knowledge absorption as well as 
knowledge flow, because the common ground is specific to both the interaction 
between partners (knowledge flow) as well as the focal knowledge domain(s) 
that need be made intelligible to the other (knowledge absorption). 
In summary, knowledge articulation, flow, and absorption are three 
interacting processes that have a complex relation to innovative outcomes. The 
evolution towards increasing articulation, which facilitates flow and builds 
absorption, entails both risks and opportunities (Zack, 1999). From an 
organizational perspective however, it is vital to remember that knowledge and 
practices often remain difficult to imitate even within organizational 
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boundaries. Szulanski (1996) found that internal stickiness can be caused by 
1) the recipient’s lack of absorptive capacity (knowledge absorption failure), 2) 
causal ambiguity (knowledge articulation failure) and 3) a bad relationship 
between source and recipient, which relates to trust and coordination issues 
(knowledge flow failure). Von Hippel (1994) as well argued that codification 
might indeed lower costs of transmission of knowledge in general, but if the key 
competitive advantage resides in the tacit or sticky counterpart, the codification 
effort will result in low benefits. Dosi (1988, p. 1131) made a similar point when 
he stated that “information about what other firms are doing spreads quite 
quickly, however, the ability to produce or replicate innovative results is much 
more sticky”. 
III-g, Proposition 8: Knowledge Absorption 
Postrel (2002) suggests that specialized capability (which requires high 
knowledge absorption within the focal domain) and knowledge about the 
capabilities of others or trans-specialist knowledge (which lowers costs 
associated with holder search) are substitutes for one another so that “the 
desirability of knowledge integration depends mostly upon the relative costs of 
acquiring the two types of knowledge” (p. 304). I have implicitly assumed this in 
formula 2:  EC(Search) =EC(Object Search) + EC(Holder Search).  
Given what we now know about knowledge absorption, I can posit the 
following: 
 Proposition 8: The higher the knowledge absorption of the inventing unit, 
the lower the likelihood of escalation 
 
III - 4: Escalating the Inventing Unit 
“Market in the true economic sense, means a process of exchange and 
allocation reflecting the transmission of knowledge” (Lachman, 1956, p. 
38). 
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To what extent articulation, flow, and absorption are important problems 
in the recombinant search process that is invention, depends to a great extent 
on the unit of invention. Mutual knowledge deficits and other collaboration 
execution costs associated with knowledge flow as well as codification 
difficulties typical for knowledge articulation are of little concern when the 
inventive unit is a single inventor. Similarly, cognitive dissonance (the ability to 
maintain two contradictory ideas in one’s mind), over-specialization, 
information overload, and other problems associated with knowledge 
absorption are more likely to trouble a single inventor than a group of 
individuals working in a joint venture.  
These examples suggest that the ownership structure and the number of 
individuals involved in an inventive project are likely to influence both the 
problems encountered in the inventive process as well as the outcomes. In 
order to shed some light on the tenuous relationship between the structural 
escalation of the unit of invention and the barriers to invention, I discuss five 
different entities that are commonly studied in invention-related research: the 
inventor, the team, the firm, the dyadic alliance, and one-to-many open 
innovation. While these entities are not uniform (teams can transcend 
organizational boundaries or can be geographically dispersed, firm sizes differ 
greatly, there is plethora of different interorganizational collaboration formats), 
nor discrete (the boundaries of a firm or a dyadic collaboration are ill-defined), 
nor exhaustive (a division, department, network, or community of practice 
serve as alternative entities), I chose these five as exemplary and instructive 
categories. 
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My overarching hypothesis is that knowledge articulation, flow, and 
absorption all play their part in the spiralling escalation process of invention 
but that their relative importance, as to the barriers they form, will evolve along 
with the escalation of the inventing unit. The reason for this escalation is 
similar to what Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) described as resource 
needs. It are the resource, cognitive, and/or temporal limitations acknowledged 
by a lower entity that faces a knowledge problem that forces that entity to 
search for solutions. In the Carnegie tradition, search processes influence the 
structure of production as search is the driving force in the establishment of 
new-to-the-firm capabilities in line with organizational goals (Cyert and March, 
1963; MacAulay et al., 2014). Analogously, holder search can alter the 
structure of the inventing entity as the problem is escalated to a higher level 
where it gets (re)socialized and interpreted and where it has to cope with 
different problems of articulation, flow, and absorption. Yet, object search can 
halt this escalation process when sufficient information or knowledge is found 
to be available ‘out there’ that can be absorbed without integrating the 
knowledge owner(s).  
III-h, Proposition 9: Escalation versus Articulation, Flow, and Absorption 
Every phase in the escalating recombinant search processes has particular 
challenges. This leads to a simple proposition: 
 Proposition 9: The barriers imposed by the costs and difficulties associated 
with knowledge articulation, knowledge flow, and knowledge absorption 
will change with every escalation of the unit of invention  
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The following table provides a synoptic overview of the strength of 
barriers to invention across the different inventive units (from very low (--) to 
very high (++). With barriers, I refer to those elements of knowledge integration 
that will be most challenging for the inventive unit relative to the other units 
and relative to the other elements. Details of the table are discussed under the 
following five sections.  
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Table III-3: Barriers to Knowledge Recombination 
Knowledge 
Integration 
Articulation Barriers Flow Barriers Absorption Barriers 
Inventor 
(--) No need to articulate 
knowledge. Feedback can 
help inventors which 
raises articulation 
(--) Lack of communication 
eliminates flow, thus 
creating zero flow costs 
(++) Limited cognitive 
capacities; cognitive 
dissonance; domain-
specific. Single filter, 
analogical transfer 
Team 
(-) No need to create 
absorption beyond the 
team. Language use can 
be largely idiosyncratic 
(-) Few people are involved 
and tacit knowledge is 
exploited; deference can be 
effective mechanism, ISCs 
can be high 
(+) More iterations; 
faster combination 
testing; diversity is key 
but homogenising 
tendencies  
Firm 
(+/-) Dominant framing 
in agreement with org. 
identity, procedures are 
flow backbone, strategic 
ambiguity is productive 
(+) CECs (units, divisions, 
departments) are 
important, but if incentives 
are aligned CFCs are ok 
(+/-) Diversification 
attenuates rigid 
information filters, good 
proxies are difficult 
IOR 
(+) Articulation at risk of 
expropriation but 
ambiguity is highly 
problematic 
(++) Different routines, 
mutual knowledge gap, & 
incentive misalignment 
raise CFCs, CECs, and 
ISCs for both players13 
(-) Provided search is 
well-targeted, escalation 
improves absorption 
strongly, thanks to 
diversity 
Open 
(++) Clear articulation is 
the key problem of open 
innovation. Little to no 
meanings renegotiation 
(-) The flow challenge is to 
encounter a person/team 
with right knowledge. Little 
other interaction 
(--) Intelligence of the 
masses and clear 
articulation create high 
knowledge absorption 
 
 
III - 4.1: The Inventor 
As argued before, within the management literature, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the process of invention and to the mechanisms 
inventors employ to create new ideas. In a rare counterexample, Maggitti et al. 
(2013) propose a model consisting of five steps: 1) Stimulus: problem or 
opportunity identification, 2) Net Casting: gathering of domain and non-domain 
information across multiple paths and through various sources, 3) 
Categorizing: a filtering, screening, and ordering process of gathered data into 
                                       
13 It is important to note that following Ahuja et al.’s (2008) calculations, when the costs of 
learning dissimilar knowledge for a firm A are sufficiently higher than the costs of learning 
additional similar knowledge “fairly high levels of organizational, management, and knowledge 
transfer costs can be borne and still leave the collaborators better off” (p. 36) 
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structured information, “the integration of new information obtained by net 
casting into the existing knowledge structures (schema) of the inventors” (p. 
94), 4) Linking: Integration of ideas across disciplines to arrive at 5) Discovery: 
testing and validating. These stages are continually revisited and re-evaluated 
so that feedback (influenced by system complexity, search context, and 
searcher knowledge and experience) allows for adjusting previous knowledge 
and categories.  
From this description, it seems evident that these five steps need not only 
apply to individual inventors but are probably used by larger inventive units as 
well. Singh and Fleming (2010) argue that isolated inventors will in general 1) 
“lack multiple and (to varying degrees) uncorrelated filters”, 2) “uncover fewer 
potential problems”, and 3) “develop more poor ideas” (p. 44). Gruber et al. 
(2013) find that individual characteristics of the inventor affect the breadth of 
knowledge recombination spanning technological boundaries. Scientists and 
individuals with a doctoral degree score significantly higher on technological 
recombination breadth. 
The implication seems to be that for individual inventors, knowledge 
absorption is the key bottleneck to be successful. Due to the cognitive 
limitations they face, they are worse at recombining knowledge components 
which results in poorer quality inventions14. The fact that natural scientists 
and those with a PhD do better than others (e.g. engineers) supports the 
importance of absorbing broader and more complex knowledge bases. This 
                                       
14 In the popular sitcom, “The Big Bang Theory”, the common scorn and derision faced by 
engineer Howard Wollowitz from theoretical physicist Sheldon Cooper about his field being so 
inferior, seem to carry some weight in the process of recombinant search. 
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talent is likely to be correlated with advanced studies in more complex sciences 
(Gruber et al, 2013). In a study of inventors’ rate of invention, breakthrough 
probability, and breakthrough rate, Conti et al. (2014) found that inventors who 
were productive in the past have a higher invention rate and higher 
breakthrough rate but a lower likelihood of breakthroughs than those who have 
not been productive in the past15. This finding, though not restricted to isolated 
inventors, further supports the idea that those with a high rate of invention 
create cognitive bottlenecks such that the likelihood of being really innovative 
decreases. As Singh and Fleming (2010) suggested, insulated inventors spend 
less time iterating through sequential stages of the recombinant search process 
with a view to improve their ideas. 
Unlike for teams, this constraint on acquiring new knowledge or the 
natural tendency to resolve cognitive dissonance by homogenizing conflicting 
ideas (Festinger, 1962), limits the individual’s innovative potential and hence 
stimulates the escalation of the inventing unit. I refrain from delving deeply into 
the mechanisms employed by the inventor to come to new ideas. Magee (2005) 
suggested that analogical transfer, which “occurs when information and 
experiences from one known situation are retrieved and utilized in the search 
for the solution to an entirely different situation” (p33), serves as a cognitive 
mechanism by which recombinant search can create novelty. The study of the 
exact mental and cognitive processes that stimulate creative thinking within an 
individual are better left to psychologists and neuroscientists. I will not go into 
them in the rest of this dissertation. 
                                       
15 This is not a study of lone inventors. Controls for co-inventors are included in the regression 
analysis. 
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III - 4.2: The Team 
Patent studies suggest that team size contributes to innovation impact 
(Alnuaimi, Opsahl, and George, 2012a). Singh and Fleming (2010) for instance 
find that larger teams are more likely to create high impact (top 5%) 
innovations thanks to cycling quicker through a large number of new 
combinations and because greater diversity makes teams more efficient at 
radical recombination. Additionally, teams are also less likely to produce low 
impact innovation thanks to higher total effort as well as quicker yet more 
rigorous selection of ideas (Singh and Fleming, 2010). These effects are 
mediated by both diversity of team member experience and the size of the 
members’ extended social network. Alnuaimi, Singh, and George (2012b) build 
on this work and find that geographically dispersed teams are likely to possess 
more diverse collective knowledge which will increase the range of potential 
inventions.  
However, there are limitations to the benefits of team size. Curral et al. 
(2001) found that large teams have poorer team processes with regards to 
participation, innovation support, emphases on quality, clarity of objectives, 
and commitment to objectives. This is echoed in the economic concept of 
decreasing marginal productivity of labour. Additionally, how team members 
reach out to each other when they are searching for additional information is 
important. Recently, researchers have become interested for instance in 
deference and how it influences team work (Fragale et al., 2012). Joshi and 
Knight (in press) found that dyadic deference (the matching of one person’s 
knowledge domain with that of another) is a critical determinant of the team’s 
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research productivity. When deference is based on social affinity or inspection-
based characteristics (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) that are poor proxies for 
expertise and decision power such as gender and ethnicity, productivity suffers, 
while deference based on task contributions boosts research output. 
Thus, while larger teams are able to absorb more knowledge, the 
escalation of the unit of invention also creates problems around flow and 
articulation. It is important to explicate that size in itself merely increases 
processing power and not necessarily diversity of ideas. A team of ten 100% 
identical individuals is unlikely to be much more innovative than a single 
individual. Size serves as a proxy for diversity. Therefore, while teams within 
organizational boundaries can have very diverse backgrounds, the period they 
have been institutionalized by their current organization increases 
homogeneity. There is some evidence from team research that heterogeneous 
teams have higher performance (Bowers, Pharmer, and Salas, 2000) and that 
the composition of and interaction within top management teams affects 
learning (Nadolska and Barkema, 2014). 
Yet heterogeneity in top management is also a determinant of higher 
turnover, which implies that employee similarity is likely to be higher within 
than between organizations (Wiersema and Bantel, 1993; Wiersema and Bird, 
1993). What really matters is to have diverse individuals with different 
perspectives collaborating. Hoever et al. (2012) found that one key process by 
which diverse teams outperform other teams when it comes to creativity is by 
taking each other’s perspective, which is argued to stimulate information 
exchange and elaboration. It does not seem impossible that this team process 
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could stimulate analogical thinking at the individual level. In another context, 
Nadolska and Barkema (2014) suggested that diverse (top management) teams 
will be more inclined to share experiences, have comprehensive debates, and 
search for more information from outside the team to resolve any lingering 
debates. The authors argue that while such interaction may be time-consuming 
it will be performance-enhancing and find that teams with tenure and or 
educational diversity strengthen the positive effect of acquisition experience on 
acquisition success (Nadolska and Barkema, 2014). In a third study, Barkema 
and Shvyrkov (2007) found that tenure diversity increased the likelihood of 
strategic novelty but that this effect fades over time as team members become 
institutionalised into their organizational environment. The exact opposite was 
found for strong social fault lines that create a divide within the team. 
Thus while overall team size seems to be beneficial for inventive output, 
size is really a proxy for diversity of opinions and perspectives within the team. 
This diversity will obviously be greater than for an individual, as too much 
diversity within an individual would create cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1962). The diverse team will have higher knowledge absorption but at the cost 
of higher knowledge flow challenges. Especially when subgroups are being 
formed within a team, the effects can be very negative. 
III - 4.3: The Firm 
According to the knowledge-based view, the firm can be understood as an 
institution that integrates individuals’ specialized knowledge for productive 
purposes (Grant, 1996). The fundamental difference between the firm and the 
market is exactly that firms are better than markets at sharing and transferring 
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knowledge of individuals because firms create an identity that supports 
coordination and dialogue that facilitate information exchange and the 
discovery of solutions (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996). Specifically, the firm 
can be understood “as competing on the speed by which knowledge is created 
and communicated” (Zander and Kogut, p. 87). However, the discussion on 
knowledge flow (III - 3.2) has shown that even within an organization such as 
the firm, knowledge is not perfectly and instantaneously available to everyone 
who wants access to it. Because the firm is such a highly contested concept 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2007; Cyert and March, 1963; Demsetz, 1988; Kim and 
Mahoney, 2010; Williamson, 1975), it is no surprise that this elusive concept is 
often poorly suited to capture the complex drivers of innovation. 
Simply looking at some very common firm constructs in empirical 
research shows that firm size has been found to be positively (Katila, 2002; 
Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008), negatively (Gruber et al., 2013; Miller, Fern, and 
Cardinal, 2007) or not (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Katila and Chen, 2008) related 
to measures of innovation, often depending on whether a separate absorptive 
capacity proxy (R&D investment, R&D over sales, or patent stock) is included. 
That proxy tends to be positive and significantly related to innovation. For a 
more detailed discussion on firm size and innovation as well as contingencies of 
scope and access to external knowledge, see Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon 
(2008, p. 22 – 51). Firm age has been found to have positive (Lahiri, 2010), U-
shaped (Kotha et al, 2011), or no (Phene et al., 2006) effects on innovative 
outcomes. Sørensen and Stuart (2000) even found a negative effect of age on 
patent citations in the semiconductor industry, whereas they found no effect on 
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biotech patent citations (yet a positive effect when R&D is included) and no 
effect in biotech non-self-citations (yet an inverted U-shaped effect when R&D 
is included). Kotha et al. (2011) found in the biotech sector that branching into 
new technological niches impacts differently on firms depending on their age: 
older firms are more productive but younger firms have higher impact when it 
comes to innovation. Also the firm’s origin and whether or not it is diversified 
are determinants of innovative performance though not always significantly or 
in the same direction (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Katila and Chen, 2008; 
Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008)).  
When it comes to flow, the evidence suggests that many barriers exist 
within the firm. Argyres (1996) found that more innovative firms typically have 
fewer divisional boundaries, while Miller et al. (2007) found that exploiting 
interdivisional knowledge has a more positive impact on innovation than both 
intra-divisional and extra-organizational knowledge. Departments create 
different thought worlds within an organization so that sense-making across 
departments is rather difficult. Organizational product routines seem to 
separate rather than integrate these thought worlds so that both inhibit the 
development of knowledge (Dougherty, 1992). Similarly, Jansen, Van Den 
Bosch, and Volberda (2006) found that while centralization is detrimental to 
exploration and formalization supports exploitation, interconnectedness of 
different units within the firm positively influences both forms of innovation.  
More generally, Henderson and Clark (1990) proffered that over time, 
organizations develop information filters and communication channels that 
limit the free flow of knowledge and hence constrain the range of knowledge 
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domains a firm explores and can absorb. They also suggested that firm 
knowledge may reside in different sub-unit islands, the boundaries between 
which make recombination or flow very difficult (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
This suggests that structural aspects of the organization are likely to influence 
knowledge flow in important ways. If Grant (1996) is indeed right that firms are 
chiefly institutions for knowledge integration, the firm should optimize its 
structure as to maximize knowledge flow. But Amin and Cohendet (2000, in 
Ancori et al., 2000) issue caution: When the governance of competencies is 
devoted to the optimal coordination of knowledge within the organizational 
boundaries, the mechanisms for governing resource allocations and adaptation 
to the environment might suffer. 
This cannot be disentangled from the problem of articulation. While 
articulation of routines and practices enhances the ease of knowledge transfers 
in the firm, it risks constraining creative thinking. In Wittgenstein’s words “we 
cannot step out of our language with language” or “the limits of my language 
means the limits of my world”. The direct implication is that the tools 
organizations use to communicate, affect their ability to create novel ideas: “It 
follows that if the codification does not leave enough room for ambiguity and 
interpretation, it creates inertia in the production of knowledge” (Ancori et al., 
2000, p. 273). Thus, organizations that become increasingly dependent on their 
routinized knowledge run the risk of myopia and associated competency traps, 
path-dependence, and superstitious learning (Levinthal and March, 1993). 
In summary, while overall, the firm as a unit of invention will be better at 
knowledge absorption than a team, the firm is more likely to struggle with 
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articulation and flow. The escalation of size can hamper communication and 
flexibility, but does add additional resources and organizational support upon 
which inventors can rely (Anand et al., 2007). Using survey results, Jansen et 
al. (2006) found that while unit and branch size (with units < branches) had no 
effect on a unit’s exploitative innovation, larger branch size increased 
explorative innovation while this effect was partially offset by the size of the 
unit.  
III - 4.4: The Inter-Organizational Collaboration 
Knowledge flow is crucial to successful innovation, but collaboration 
formation costs and collaboration execution costs are expected to raise higher 
barriers between than within organizations. The effect of institutional support 
costs is ambiguous because such support is often directed toward collaboration 
(see Chapter I) but still two teams need to gain institutional support within 
their organization as well, which makes the effect hard to predict. 
Organizational economists assume bounded rationality, opportunism, and 
asset specificity will stimulate hybrid forms when they are more efficient than 
markets or when firms need to obtain access to complementary resources that 
need be integrated (Barney and Hesterly, 2006). Organizational theories 
propose that partnering occurs to reinforce (latent) relationships with a view to 
gaining power, reputation and legitimacy building, and accessing social capital 
(Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011). When it comes to inter-organizational 
collaborations, the purpose of the hybrid organization is often more important 
than form-based attributes (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011). 
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The influence of inter-organizational collaborations on invention can be 
either direct (i.e. the collaborators create new inventions) or indirect (i.e. one or 
both organizations learn and become more successful innovators in the future). 
Much research focuses on the indirect aspects and uses either a network 
perspective or focuses on single inter-firm linkages. For such single linkages, 
Ahuja et al. (2008, p. 32) state that “under very general and reasonable 
conditions [i.e. increasing returns to scale, knowledge complementarity, and 
public good nature of shared knowledge], collaboration should have a positive 
impact on innovative output”.  
In their review of knowledge transfer, Van Wijk et al. (2008) found that 
network centrality and the number of relations significantly contributed to 
interorganizational knowledge flow but only very weakly to intra-organizational 
knowledge exchange. The authors concluded that because “knowledge within 
firms is likely to be less diverse, the structural characteristics of a unit’s 
network are apparently less critical”. Nonetheless, interfirm collaborations are 
not a perfect substitute for internal knowledge development. Ahuja et al. (2008, 
p. 33) submit four key arguments of why the pooling of R&D to collaboration 
does not transfer in its entirety to the collaborating entities: 1) “additional 
coordination, monitoring, and management costs”, 2) difficulty of internalizing 
the joint R&D, 3) “duplication of research efforts”, and 4) strategic behaviour 
such as sharing poor researchers or deliberately maintaining progress 
ambiguity.  Thus “a unit of R&D done outside the firm may contribute less to 
the firm’s knowledge base than a comparable unit conducted inside the firm”. 
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From a network perspective, Phelps (2010) finds that when firms have 
technologically diverse alliance partners, they are more likely to engage in 
exploratory innovation, especially when the network is closed. By looking at 
established connections, the involved firms had already overcome the 
collaboration formation costs (and thus self-selected out of specific 
collaborations with those who are too different from them), thereby facilitating 
flow. Additionally, Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003) showed that while firms are 
overall less likely to build on distant knowledge, this negative effect is 
attenuated when firms ally with or when they hire inventors from distant 
partners. This suggests that after collaboration formation, knowledge is likely to 
flow, regardless of initial differences in knowledge base. Therefore, better access 
to more diverse partners is likely to stimulate knowledge absorption, as the firm 
gets exposed to more different ideas, which will contribute to exploratory 
innovation16. However, access to and experience with collaborating with others 
is only really beneficial when it sets you apart from the competition. Hoang and 
Rothaermel (2005) found that when it comes to R&D performance, 
pharmaceutical firms, unlike their biotech counterparts do not benefit from 
alliance experience. This could be explained because pharmaceuticals are too 
far down the learning curve, they lack ways to truly absorb the potential 
knowledge transfers when working with innovative biotech companies, or they 
miss the motivation to learn because these alliances are less critical for their 
survival than for biotech firms (Phelps, 2010). Routines, organizational 
complexity, motivational deficit, and size of the big pharma firms create higher 
                                       
16 Notice as well that the focal firm selects diverse partners in the first place. This choice can be 
reminiscent of higher absorptive capacity or willingness to work around collaboration execution 
costs. 
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structural barriers to learning in big pharma than in the small biotech firms 
where individual and organizational learning are often virtually identical (Hoang 
and Rothaermel, 2005).  
Phelps’ (2010) findings also support that flow is easier in a closed 
network where the firms’ partners also partner with each other, than in an 
open network: closure facilitates the emergence of common ground and reduces 
the likelihood of opportunism and stimulates trust. Kogut (1989) found that 
JVs are more viable when partners have multiple ties with each other, with a 
view to facilitate reciprocity. Building on that finding, Park and Russo (1996) 
showed that JVs between direct competitors were more likely to fail, as were 
JVs with a large number of partners. Facilitating flow between competitors is 
hard because transferred knowledge can be used against the partner in the 
market. Hence, the alignment of incentives can be problematic which raises the 
risks of opportunism, even after the establishment of the collaboration. When 
the number of partners increases, articulation becomes more problematic 
because many different mental maps, corporate cultures, and knowledge 
domains need to be bridged in order to develop shared understanding. Kale, 
Singh, and Perlmutter (2000) then show that trust – which emerges after an 
initial period of ambivalence (Gulati and Sytch, 2008) - and relational capital 
create a positive basis for knowledge exchange.  
Preceding Phelps (2010), Sampson (2007) finds that alliances are better 
for innovation when partner technological diversity is moderate17. While Ancori 
                                       
17 While this might seem to counter the work of Phelps (2010), consider this important 
difference that Phelps does not mention. Sampson (2007) looks at diversity of the partner at the 
dyad level. Firms that are too different will find flow too difficult and those that are too similar 
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et al. (2000) still argued that some knowledge ambiguity is required for the 
organization to maintain creative, Van Wijk et al. (2008, p. 841) find that 
knowledge ambiguity is significantly less problematic within than between 
organizations. Within an organization, ambiguity can generally be resolved 
faster, either through authority or through other tacit coordination 
mechanisms (Srikanth & Puranam, 2013). Consistent with earlier reasoning, 
Sampson (2007) also finds that when the focal firm maintains authority in the 
alliance, the effects of working with highly diverse partners strongly improve. 
This suggests that lowering coordination execution costs can offset the 
problems of working with diverse partners.  
III - 4.5: Open Innovation 
Despite the complex network structure typical for open innovation, the 
problems associated with flow are of less importance in 1-to-many open 
collaborations than at the level of the dyadic collaboration. As argued by Alexy 
et al. (2013, p. 271) “selective revealing strategies may also succeed under 
adverse conditions of high partner uncertainty and high coordination costs and 
when known partners are unwilling to collaborate”. 
In the context of open innovation, Henkel (2006) found that firms disclose 
more when they need external support and Clarkson and Toh (2010) advocated 
                                                                                                                           
will not teach each other much. The inverted U makes sense. Phelps (2010) however looks at 
the focal firm’s network diversity. Hence some firms will be very distinct while others will be 
rather similar. Because Phelps (2010) uses an average measure (p. 899) the effect of extremes is 
already attenuated, hence finding a linear effect unlike the hypothesized curvilinear one. In 
addition, the self-selection away from excessively diverse firms that Phelps mentions in the 
discussion (p. 905) exacerbates this effect. This is consistent with the idea that collaboration 
formation costs can lead to the not-formation of a collaboration, which affects the results. 
Additionally, Sampson focuses on all innovations and Phelps (2010) focuses on exploratory 
innovations. This will reinforce the linear effect he found. 
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the potential deterrence benefits of revealing, while Alexy et al. (2013) discuss 
four archetypes of selective revealing. None of these authors touch upon the 
articulation and codification question. Nonetheless, in open innovation, a 
commonly understood language or a transparent and knowable codebook is 
essential. In other words, when selectively revealing, how knowledge is 
articulated and codified will have a great impact on the likelihood of successful 
engagement with external innovators. Unlike within a team, firm or alliance, 
the articulation process is unlikely to be in a constant state of flux as the 
involved members renegotiate its meaning. On the flipside, while articulation 
clarity is instrumental to get results, over-articulation (excessive disclosure) 
can have severe downsides when external firms learn valuable lessons from the 
disclosure without any reciprocity. 
Given its importance in selective revealing, it is noticeable that 
articulation has not yet been discussed in any depth in the literature on open 
innovation. This provides an interesting avenue for future research in contexts 
in which revealing is common but where the codebook is less clear than in the 
case of Linux (Henkel, 2006) or patent re-examinations (Clarkson and Toh, 
2010). Examples could be crowdsourcing websites like www.openideo.com and 
www.ideaconnection.com or internal corporate sites that take the function of a 
collaborative idea-bus. Darren Carroll, CEO of InnoCentive, describes the 
importance of articulation as a key skill for his company: “They [our scientists] 
find ways to describe problems in a manner that is general enough to attract a 
broad audience, but yet is specific enough that it provides enough information 
to actually get a solution” (Allio, 2004, p. 5). Also, open source networks such 
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as StackOverflow (for computer coding) have a very clear blueprint for how to 
ask a good question18 which exemplifies the importance of articulation in these 
open collaborative contexts. 
Finally, selective revealing lowers costs of current and future knowledge 
absorption as the “future knowledge production and spillovers [of partners who 
take in the revealed knowledge] will be of higher value to the focal firm” (Alexy 
et al., 2013, p. 271). This is not to say that firms will not need absorptive 
capacity to reap the revealing‘s benefits, but simply that the induced 
isomorphism facilitates future absorption because it moulds the externally 
produced knowledge in accordance to the firm’s needs (Alexy et al., 2013). 
Much like open source software, selective revealing thus provides a platform 
upon which others can build knowledge, using a language that is understood 
by the firm, and made available to those who want to engage with the firm.  
                                       
18 For R-related problems: http://stackoverflow.com/questions/5963269/how-to-make-a-
great-r-reproducible-example 
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III - 4.6: Overview of Escalation 
The previous five sections can be reduced to five testable propositions that 
determine the relative strength of the different barriers to recombination.  
III-i, Propositions 10a-f: A Break-Down of Proposition 9 by Invent Unit 
Proposition 9 suggested that with every escalation the problems associated 
with knowledge recombination were likely to change. Here, I make a 
proposition for every unit of invention, with regards to the dominant barriers 
to recombination for that inventive unit 
 Proposition 10a: For lone inventors, the effect of knowledge absorption on 
innovative success is positive and stronger than effects of knowledge 
articulation or flow on innovative success 
 Proposition 10b: For teams, the effect of knowledge absorption on 
innovative success is positive and stronger than effects of knowledge 
articulation or flow on innovative success  
 Proposition 10c: For firms, the effect of flow costs on innovative success 
is negative and stronger than the effects of absorption and articulation 
on innovative success 
 Proposition 10d: For dyads, the effect of flow costs on innovative success 
is negative and stronger than the effects of absorption and articulation 
on innovative success. This effect is stronger than for firms 
 Proposition 10e: For dyads, the effect of knowledge absorption on 
innovative success is positive. This effect is stronger than for firms 
 Proposition 10f: For open innovation, the effect of knowledge articulation 
and innovative success is positive. This effect is stronger than effects of 
knowledge absorption or flow on innovative success 
  
 The following figure (III-1) provides a graphic representation of the 
escalation process while indicating the problems associated with escalation 
that are captured in the above propositions as well. The horizontal bottom axis 
shows the need for articulation clarity, which is very low for individual 
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inventors and very high for open innovation as argued above. Note that I 
suggest that articulation can be spread over a large space. Van Wijk et al. 
(2008) found that knowledge ambiguity is more damaging to interfirm 
collaborations than to intrafirm collaborations. Srikanth and Puranam (2013) 
found similar problems suggesting that clear communication is instrumental to 
innovative success. On the other hand the strategic importance of not putting 
all your cards on the table will play a big part as well, because the risk of 
expropriation is always higher when crossing organizational boundaries. 
Additionally, the costs of clear articulation might not outweigh the associated 
benefits.  
The vertical axis represents knowledge absorption. The overarching 
realisation is that unit escalation increases the capacity to absorb more and 
more information. The downward pointing arrows reflect the average distance 
from a component in the knowledge structure (cf. infra), which analogously 
decreases with ‘added brains’, while the thickness of the arrows indicates the 
bandwidth and filter diversity through which object search can occur 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992). Finally, the shading of 
the rectangles reflects the problems associated with flow, which increase from 
individual up to the dyad and then dissipate into the open innovation network 
where articulation clarity is the crucial challenge. 
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Figure III-2: Graphic Representation of Escalation of the Inventing Unit 
 
While I have focused in this section on different units of analysis, it is 
important to realise that the boundaries of these units are malleable and that it 
is often hard to make a clear distinction between them, especially within a 
single organization. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, how inventive 
units are construed, for instance with regards to their location, will be an 
important aspect of their associated barriers to collaborate. Srikanth and 
Puranam (2013) for instance found that in co-located projects, the use of 
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specific coordination mechanisms is independent of crossing organizational 
boundaries, whereas in distributed projects, teams of the same firm rely heavily 
on tacit coordination mechanisms, which is not possible for inter-organizational 
teams.  
Thus organizational boundaries in and of themselves are insufficient 
delimiters of problems associated with invention. While escalating recombinant 
search will increase the number of people involved in the inventive unit, other 
aspects such as geographical proximity will also influence coordination costs 
(Srikanth and Puranam, 2013). Additionally, as the examples on open invention 
have shown, the potential number of individuals with whom to interact is itself 
not responsible for changes in the barriers to invention. What matters more is 
how closely-knit the established ties need to be and how much one can 
structure the knowledge (or the knowledge problem) in order to minimize future 
coordinative effort. To take these aspects into account I propose a simple two 
by two framework in the next section.  
III - 5: Escalating Recombinant Search 
Agrawal and Goldfarb (2008, p. 1578) argue that a “researcher deciding 
whether to add a collaborator to a project will do so if the benefit exceeds the 
cost such that the returns from collaboration are positive for both parties” and 
find that changes in the knowledge structure (e.g. because of a technology 
shock) affect the returns to collaboration differently for different researchers. 
Building on this work, Ding et al. (2010) submit that the benefits of novel IT 
infrastructure accrue more to women and to those working in non-elite 
institutions. These recent findings lead to two fundamental questions that 
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relate to the problem of escalating recombinant search: 1) What are the 
elements of the cost/benefit trade-off in the decision-making process of the 
researcher who considers adding a collaborator to the inventive unit? 2) What 
constitutes the knowledge structure? I first discuss the knowledge structure 
(determined by knowledge articulation), then turn attention to what I call 
ingression costs (a combination of knowledge flow and knowledge absorption, 
which are potential substitutes (Postrel, 2002)). Finally, I discuss how the 
balance between knowledge structure and ingression costs affects the 
likelihood of specific escalations.  
III - 5.1: Knowledge Structure 
Until now, I have not yet discussed what knowledge is and how we ought 
to think about it. While many economists have basically equalled knowledge 
with information that can be transferred and sold in knowledge markets, others 
have pointed out that even the most (if not all) codified forms of knowledge 
maintain a tacit component (Ancori et al., 2000). I lean more towards the latter 
group and hold that knowledge is probably never 100% codified. If this is true, 
a tacit component (e.g. knowledge to use) remains an element of every piece of 
embodied knowledge. As such, the process of invention can be understood as 
the process of knowledge embodiment into an artefact that, once created, does 
not necessitate the creator’s knowledge for the artefact to be useful. This 
embodiment is fundamentally the outcome of an articulation process that is 
undertaken by the joint actions of individuals, organizations, universities, and 
governments responsible for the creation of a knowledge structure. 
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 Lewin and Baetjer (2011) argue in this regard that the knowledge aspect 
of any capital good is more fundamental than the ‘incidental’ physical aspect. 
The ability to use a hammer (i.e. to understand and deploy its function) for 
instance does not require understanding of the knowledge embodied in the tool 
itself (how to melt the iron into shape, how to make the shape’s curvature, how 
to attach the materials together…). There is thus a clear distinction between 
the physical embodiment of the knowledge (which is a manifestation of the 
knowledge of how to design and make an artefact) and the knowledge of how to 
use that embodiment to accomplish a function, which is idiosyncratic to the 
entity that aims to access and deploy to the artefact. “Capital goods, then, are 
embodied knowledge of how to accomplish productive purposes” (Lewin and 
Baetjer, 2011, p. 344). The traditional view of the organization as an 
information-processing machine shows that embodied knowledge is present in 
processes as well. Factory workers need not understand what their colleagues 
are doing, nor have any clear idea of the eventual outcome of the production 
process to be able to fulfil their own tasks (Nonaka and Toyama, 2003).  
The knowledge structure can then be understood as globally amassed 
embodied knowledge. This knowledge can be embodied in artefacts, processes, 
data, information, routines, but also in the bodies of knowledge holders who 
keep knowledge at varied levels of articulation. The extent to which knowledge 
has been codified or remains tacit, whether the knowledge landscape (Fleming 
and Sorenson, 2004; March, 1991) is easy or hard to navigate with many or few 
local optima, whether the knowledge sources are geographically concentrated 
or dispersed (Jaffe et al., 1993), public or private (Hicks, 1995), and the degree 
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of specialization determine the objective complexity of the knowledge structure. 
In general, the more complex the knowledge structure, the more tacit it is, the 
more local optima exist in the landscape, the more private connections are 
necessary to grasp it, and the more treacherous its pitfalls. Following Demsetz 
(1988) and Postrel (2002), the degree of specialization is determined by inherent 
complementarities in learning of specific components. Some knowledge objects 
are (more) easily learnt together than others, and those that are highly 
complementary drive specialisation. The higher the complementarities between 
knowledge components, the more difficult it is to access the knowledge without 
prerequisite knowledge and the higher the time compression diseconomies 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989). I thus propose that the knowledge structure is 
objectively out there although it is socially constructed and technologically 
constrained.  
Yet it is exactly the process of social construction that creates a 
knowledge structure that has some exogenous (i.e. independent of the searcher) 
stability. As argued by Cowan, David, and Foray (2000), “in an important 
sense, the progress of research involves – and requires – the stabilization of 
meanings, which is part of the social process through which the stabilization of 
beliefs about the reliability of knowledge comes about” (p. 247). While I opine 
that idiosyncratic differences in ingression costs (costs to obtain and exploit 
knowledge, cf. infra) will define how easy or hard it is for some specific unit of 
invention to access the knowledge, I also proffer that the knowledge structure 
can be investigated as if it were a real multidimensional landscape that exists 
‘out there’ while acknowledging that it is being constantly co-created and 
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reshaped by knowledge holders who infuse it with new ideas, information, 
codified and tacit knowledge as well as place themselves at multiple positions 
on the playing field. Thus, “the social construction of knowledge not only relies 
on how existing knowledge is shared, but includes also the process through 
which knowledge is obtained” (Ancori et al., 2000, p. 279), because both 
aspects of flow (sharing of knowledge) and absorption (obtaining knowledge), 
will have a direct influence on how and whether new ideas get articulated. 
This echoes Lachman’s understanding of capital structure as “always in 
the process of being formed, a process continually interrupted by unexpected 
change” (1956, p. 82). There are many parallels between knowledge structure 
and Lachman’s perspective on capital structure. Lachman (1956) argues that 
like most capital goods, knowledge cannot be understood as a simple stock 
because “knowledge is as refractory to quantification as capital is” (p. 7). 
Knowledge also “lacks a natural unit of measurement” because of its 
heterogeneity (p. 12), so that one “must regard the stock of capital, not as a 
homogenous aggregate but as a structural pattern” (p. 14), that is characterized 
by heterogeneity in use, and thus multiple specificity which in turn implies 
complementarity and capital [knowledge] combinations so that the 
combinations form the elements of the capital [knowledge] structure (p. 22). 
Multiple typologies of knowledge have been created before. Spender 
(1996) for instance differentiates between individual and social knowledge and 
between explicit and implicit knowledge. Ancori et al. (2000) differentiate four 
layers of the knowledge structure: crude knowledge, consisting of stimuli and 
messages, knowledge of how to use knowledge, which affects knowledge 
 200 
integration and action, knowledge about how to transmit knowledge, which 
requires insight in the receiver, as well as “mastery of codes of codes and/or 
languages”, and finally knowledge about how to manage knowledge, which 
presupposes “the ability to modify even drastically the context of production 
and exchange of knowledge” (p. 266 – 268).  
Both Spender (1996) and Ancori et al. (2000) construe their framework of 
knowledge upon a specific knowledge holder, respectively the firm, and the 
individual. Cowan et al. (2000) however build more on the idea of an existing 
and available knowledge structure that individuals can access differentially. 
The authors differentiate between three knowledge zones: articulated (and thus 
codified), unarticulated, and unarticulable. They argue that the last one is of 
little interest to the social sciences and the second one needs to be split up in 
unarticulated knowledge for which the codebook has been displaced (“within 
the group context the codebook is not manifest” (p. 232)), which will come to 
rely on search, and unarticulated knowledge for which there is no codebook. In 
the absence of a codebook, a situation with no disagreements will create “a 
stabilized uncodified knowledge, collective memory, convention” (p. 233), 
whereas disagreements will either need to be settled via procedural authority if 
it exists, alternatively we enter the terrain of the guru (Cowan et al., 2000). My 
operationalization of the knowledge structure as objectively out there but 
subjectively accessible by the escalating inventive unit is in this regard similar 
to Cowan et al. (2000).  
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III - 5.2: Ingression Costs 
Because information asymmetries are fundamental to markets (von 
Hayek, 1945; Denrell et al., 2003) actors are unequally aware of where 
information resides or who controls specific knowledge (Kirzner, 1997). Even if 
this was not true, “prior experiences, personality traits and familiarity guide 
how people perceive new knowledge that they are exposed to, [so that] it is 
highly unlikely that two individuals will conceptualize and embody knowledge 
in exactly the same way” (Alnuaimi et al., 2012b, p. 947). Such subjective 
interpretations yield “provisional judgments, to be confirmed by later 
experience; imperfect knowledge capable of being perfected” (Lachman, 1956, p. 
31). Therefore, depending on the knowledge complexity and the focal knowledge 
domain (this can be envisaged as a small cube within figure III-2, cf. infra), how 
easy or hard it will be for a specific IU (inventive unit) to obtain the desired 
knowledge will depend on the IU’s idiosyncratic characteristics.  
For example, with regards to individual characteristics we know that 
inventors in the EU are less likely to be female, are around 45 years old with 
more than 75% chance of having attended university and about 25% chance of 
having a PhD (the latter two vary rather strongly by sector and country) (Giuri 
et al., 2007). Organization type matters as well because in general firms are 
more focused on appropriation of knowledge and hence on patenting and 
secrecy, whereas governmental organizations or universities are more keen on 
knowledge generation and hence more open to collaboration regardless of 
appropriation (Giuri et al., 2007), although the divide between private and 
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public science is becoming smaller (Mowery et al., 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 
2002).  
Given that the IU evolves through the inclusion of new knowledge 
holders, the way the IU perceives and accesses the knowledge structure evolves 
with every escalation. That is of course the key purpose of the escalation of the 
IU, to be able to gain access to specific knowledge elements more easily. It is 
therefore hard (of not impossible) to provide a succinct (let alone exhaustive) 
list of what affects the ingression costs of the IU. As I attempted to clarify in 
section III-4, every escalation brings with it changes in the capacity of the IU to 
facilitate knowledge articulation, flow, and, absorption while at the same time 
mounting or raising barriers to the efficiency of these three processes as the 
flip-side of the medal: The relative barriers imposed by the ingression costs in 
accessing knowledge will be determined by the relative costs associated with 
flow and absorption19.  
Absorption. The capacity to accumulate and absorb knowledge is widely 
agreed to be an important factor in the inventive process (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Zahra and George, 2002). I underline the source-specific nature of 
knowledge absorption because inventors access different sources for invention 
(e.g. customers, patent literature, scientific literature, competitors…) and might 
differ in their ability to extract value or interpret information from different 
sources [e.g. due to differences in relational skills (see chapter I, part 2), or 
                                       
19 Notice that articulation still matters in this context but chiefly with reference to the match 
between the idiosyncratic articulation of the IU and the way the knowledge is articulated in the 
knowledge structure. This ability to articulate is, as I proposed before (section I-3.1 and I-3.3) 
determined by knowledge absorption.  
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network structure and composition (see Phelps, 2010; Grigoriou and 
Rothaermel, 2014)]. Additionally, knowledge absorption is domain-specific. High 
absorptive capacity in pharmaceuticals does not necessarily influence one’s 
ability to acquire biotech knowledge or to benefit from collaborations with 
biotech organizations (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). Finally, knowledge 
absorption is also code-specific. If the entire knowledge structure consists of 
elements that are not intelligible to the IU because it either lacks the codebook, 
or because the codebook does not exist (in terms of Cowan et al., 2000) then 
regardless of the source and the domain, the knowledge will not be able to be 
absorbed. This is a key problem of internationalization where the organization 
might possess abundant domain- and source-specific knowledge and the 
knowledge structure might be very simple and transparent, but the lack of 
cultural filters or linguistic capabilities (literally not understanding the 
language) disable absorption to occur in any meaningful way.  
Flow. The effectiveness of escalation is chiefly determined by costs 
associated with knowledge flow (with open innovation as an exception). 
Whether or not collaborations come into existence will depend to a great extent 
on the collaboration formation costs (which include the expected collaboration 
execution costs) and the ability to secure institutional support for the 
collaboration. The likelihood of finding partners who want to work with you, the 
bargaining power and unique resources held by the IU, the incentive structures 
within the organization(s) for collaborative invention will all influence search 
motivation. Yet, “little research in the management domain has looked at the 
issue of incentive structures for innovation” (Ahuja et al., 2008, p. 59). Giuri et 
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al. (2007) show that inventors are motivated more by social (prestige, 
satisfaction) and organizational benefits than by individual money or career 
progress and while social desirability could have influenced the answers of the 
surveyed inventors, “creativity, the search for knowledge, and the ability to 
show that something is possible, can be personally enticing” (p. 1113). As Dan 
Pink argued in his famous TED talk about the art of motivation, what really 
motivates people is not the monetary rewards neoclassical economists put their 
faith in; behavioural economists have shown that autonomy, mastery, and 
purpose matter a great deal more (Pink, 2011). 
Additionally, the size of the problem and the imagined components that 
will need to be integrated to find a satisfactory solution will influence how 
significant expected collaboration execution costs will be. The more distant the 
components are in the knowledge structure, the higher the expectation of 
finding little mutual knowledge upon which to build a successful collaboration 
(Kotha et al., 2013). "The formation of expectations is nothing but a phase in 
this continuous process of exchange and transmission of knowledge… 
[Expectations] reflect an attempt at cognition and orientation in an imperfectly 
known world” (Lachman, 1956, p. 33). The bigger the size of the problem, the 
more people are likely to be integrated, in order to create sufficient problem-
solving capacity. While this will in general increase absorption, the problems 
associated with flow will increase accordingly. 
In summary, Ahuja et al. (2008, p. 68) pointed out that “few studies have 
examined the costs of recombination as a determinant of innovation practices 
and outcomes”. I propose that ingression costs could serve as a good proxy for 
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these recombination costs. Ingression costs are the idiosyncratic search costs 
faced by the inventing unit (IU) when the IU attempts to access / learn a 
particular knowledge component within the knowledge structure. Following 
Pastrel (2002) knowledge flow and knowledge absorption are thus seen as 
potential substitutes. It is in this context perhaps sensible to reframe some of 
the formula from before in this new language. 
III-j, Reconceptualization and Extension of the Formulas 
The simple formulas I have presented thus far are reprinted below: 
 Formula 1:  Search    P[EV(Solution)]  > EC(Search) 
EC  =  Expected Costs 
 EV   =  Expected Value 
 P  =  Probability to find 
 Formula 2:  EC(Search)    =  EC(Object Search) + EC(Holder Search) 
 Formula 3a: Escalation  EC(Holder Search) < EC(Object Search) 
 Formula 3b: MV(Component) > min(MC(Object Search), MC(Holder 
Search)) 
 Formula 4:  EC(Holder Search)  =  CFC + CEC + ISC 
CFC  =  Collaboration Formation Cost 
CEC  =  Collaboration Execution Cost 
ISC  =  Institutional Support Cost   
Given these formulas and the preceding discussion, I can now posit the 
following. Ingression costs (IC) as I defined them are the expected costs of 
search. Thus formula 2 gets extended: 
 Formula 5: IC = EC(Search) = EC(Object Search) + EC(Holder Search) 
From formula 4, we know what constitute the expected costs of holder search 
but until now I had not been able to explicate the expected costs associated 
with object search. These costs will be determined by the exogenous 
knowledge structure (KS) and the idiosyncratic knowledge absorption (KA) of 
the escalating inventing unit. 
 Formula 6a: EC(Object Search) = f(KS, KA) 
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A very simple representation of this unknown function f() suggests that the 
search for information will be determined by the relative complexity of the 
knowledge structure, the knowledge absorption of the IU, and by their 
interaction. This leads to the following adjustment: 
 Formula 6b: EC(Object Search) = αKS + βKA + γKS*KA + ε 
  With ε an error term and γ >> max(α,β)20 
Thus adapting formula 3a, I submit that escalation occurs when the costs 
associated with flow are smaller than the costs associated with absorption 
 Formula 7: Escalation  CFC + CEC + ISC < αKS + βKA + γKS*KA + ε 
I can now revisit formula 3b, which suggested that inventors will add a 
knowledge component when the marginal value of the additional component 
exceeded the minimum of the marginal costs associated with object search or 
holder search.  
 Formula 8: MC(Object Search) = β + γKS  
The knowledge structure can be conceived of as constant during the 
period during which the component decision is made 
Finally, building on the propositions developed in section I-4.6, I can posit 
that for specific escalations, the marginal costs of holder search will be 
dominated by different costs. I thus propose: 
 Formula 9a: MCind-team(Holder Search)  ≈ CEC 
 Formula 9b: MCteam-firm(Holder Search)  ≈ ISC 
 Formula 9c: MCfirm-dyad(Holder Search)  ≈ CFC + CEC + ISC 
 Formula 9d: MCfirm-open(Holder Search)  ≈ MC(Object Search) 
The escalation from firm to open innovation is the odd one out (as was 
hopefully clear from section III-5) because the likelihood of successful open 
innovation will indeed depend chiefly on the knowledge structure at large and 
the capacity to absorb knowledge β, which includes the accumulated 
knowledge the firm has gained to articulate a problem in a clear and 
accessible way (Allio, 2004). 
  
                                       
20 This equation should hold conditionally on adequate rescaling such that KS, KA and their 
interaction KS*KA have the same lower and upper boundaries. Else γ should be a more 
significant predictor of the object search costs 
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III - 5.3: Towards a Framework of Escalating Knowledge Recombination 
Imagine the knowledge structure as the product of all articulated, 
unarticulated, and unarticulable knowledge that is currently known (or at least 
vaguely grasped) by some person or other entity in this world. It is constantly 
expanding through innovation, scientific progress, and serendipitous 
discoveries. We can imagine that it looks somewhat like the image below 
(Figure III-2). 
Figure III-3: The Universe as Metaphor for the Knowledge Structure21 
 
Assume the colours represent different types of knowledge (simple to 
complex embodied knowledge) and imagine picking any place within this three-
dimensional knowledge structure. Outside the box lays the unknown potential 
knowledge, that what is yet to be discovered. Within the box your starting 
position not only determines what you can easily ingress, but also the 
components and the combinations you can conceivably imagine. Individuals 
                                       
21 Source: http://very-amazing.blogspot.co.uk/2014/10/cosmology-universe.html  
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tend to be highly specialized so it is rare that an individual occupies multiple 
different places within the knowledge structure. Such a person would be a 
knowledge structural hole, someone who is, to use an analogy of quantum 
mechanics, present at multiple distinct places at the same time. An example 
would be an electrical engineer with an advanced degree in medicine, or an 
anthropologist with excellent coding skills.  
In this conceptualization, the knowledge to access embodied knowledge 
elements and the knowledge to use those elements form part of the ingression 
costs (i.e. the idiosyncratic costs of the focal entity, determined by knowledge 
flow costs [access] and the entity’s knowledge absorption [use]).  
In summary, I posit that the knowledge articulation of the entire global 
community creates a socially constructed knowledge structure that consists of 
embodied knowledge. Inventors, scientists, firms, universities, governments, 
and philosophers co-create that knowledge structure by embodying knowledge 
into objects or embody the knowledge themselves. The table below captures 
this notion and differentiates between ingression costs and objects or holders in 
the knowledge structure. I want to emphasize that in the time-consuming 
process of escalating recombinant search, the decision whether to integrate a 
new component from the knowledge structure (via either object or holder) is 
taken on a component-by-component basis, such that the proposed process 
iterates many times before an invention is eventually ‘finished’.   
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Table III-4: Ingression Costs and Knowledge Structure 
Escalating 
Recombinant 
Search* 
Knowledge Structure 
Objects (information, 
codified) 
Holders (tacit, socially 
complex, dispersed) 
In
g
re
s
s
io
n
 C
o
s
ts
 High KA, 
Low KF 
Learn without escalation Force access, or  
Open Innovation 
Low KA, 
High KF 
Escalate within the 
organization 
Escalate within and beyond the 
organization 
Low KA,  
Low KF 
Exit / Fail or Entrepreneur  Exit / Fail or Entrepreneur 
High KA, 
High KF 
Minimize Marginal Costs  
(see III-j) 
Minimize Marginal Costs  
(see III-j) 
*KA refers to the inventive unit’s capability for knowledge absorption, while KF 
represents the capability to enable knowledge flow 
The table provides eight different scenarios, depending on the relation 
between and the absolute value of the capacity for knowledge absorption (KA) 
and the capacity for knowledge flow (KF). The first row exemplifies a highly 
absorptive IU with low flow capabilities. This could be a very smart, yet isolated 
inventor, or a disconnected firm with specific expertise. When the sought after 
knowledge is available in the form of an object in the knowledge structure, the 
IU can exploit its learning capability to learn without escalation. However, when 
the knowledge is socially complex and available only in the minds of holders, 
the poor flow capability disables the IU to easily gain access. Its options are to 
force access by breaking out of its comfort zone or to engage in open 
innovation, which can work under high partner uncertainty and coordination 
costs (Alexy et al., 2013).  
The second row offers the opposite scenario in which the IU has high flow 
capabilities but lacks the focal knowledge to really absorb the necessary 
information itself. When the knowledge is available in the form of objects, the 
advice is to escalate the IU within the organization (or start an organization and 
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hire an expert). Note that the fact that the information is objectively available 
does not disallow the option to escalate and find a holder who already owns the 
information. The lower flow costs are, the higher the likelihood of rapid 
escalation here. I do suggest that escalating beyond the organizational 
boundaries is probably not the best idea. Despite high knowledge flow 
capabilities, the IU’s lack of knowledge about the focal domain makes it ill-
suited to find the optimal partner in the first place, which will also influence a 
potential bargaining process. Because the knowledge is relatively simple and 
available in the knowledge structure without necessary interaction with others, 
the likelihood of making a good deal outside the organizational boundaries is 
rather slim. If necessary, hiring an expert in the organization is a better option. 
When the knowledge is controlled by specific holders, the advice is to escalate, 
also beyond organizational boundaries. The IU’s flow capabilities will assist in 
the process but once beyond organizational boundaries, the relational 
capabilities (and potential complementary assets in other related domains) will 
determine the benefits of the invention. Much of the pharmaceutical-biotech 
collaborations fall in this quadrant. 
The third row offers the situation in which the IU is lacking both 
capabilities hence acquiring or accessing the desired knowledge is highly 
problematic. The advice is to exit and if not, the risk of failure is very high. 
However, this is a situation not unfamiliar to wannabe entrepreneurs. The 
entrepreneurial solution to this problem is to learn more and to become better 
networked, as entrepreneurs stretch their own resources to become better at 
things they do not know and develop their networks along the way. If the 
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entrepreneur succeeds in developing either the knowledge absorption or the 
knowledge flow, the problem will move to a different quadrant and the solution 
might be different. The key determinant here will be commitment to overcome 
alleged insurmountable barriers, something entrepreneurs are known to do.  
The final row presents the situation in which both knowledge flow and 
knowledge absorption capabilities are high for the IU. The advice is to minimize 
the marginal costs of knowledge ingression which can mean either absorb 
(slightly more likely for objects) or escalate (slightly more likely for holders) but 
it will depend on the constitution of the IU. As suggested at the end of section 
III-5.3, the marginal costs associated with holder search will depend on the 
unit of analysis. They will be chiefly determined by collaboration execution 
costs when an individual aims to escalate to a team, by institutional support 
costs when the team plans to escalate to a firm, by all flow costs when a dyad 
needs to be formed and by the knowledge structure if open innovation is on the 
agenda. The latter is however a less likely scenario because the focal 
organization would basically abstract from its high flow capability. Once the 
escalation to a different unit has occurred, it is likely that further escalation 
within those boundaries (e.g. adding team members, including additional firm 
divisions) will face rather low escalation costs when additional knowledge needs 
to be acquired. 
In general, socially complex knowledge cannot easily be extracted from its 
owners. It is frequently tacit so that it requires some form of interaction with 
others to access it. However, to what extent IUs find it easy or hard to access 
specific complex knowledge depends in the IU’s idiosyncratic capabilities. IUs 
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might find it relatively easy to access socially embedded knowledge in a 
network of information in which they perform a brokerage function or are in 
central positions with wide reach (Grigoriou and Rothaermel, 2014). Hence 
what matters is not strictly whether the knowledge is socially complex or not, 
but whether the IU occupies a space in the knowledge structure that permits 
exploiting these complex resources by accessing the relevant holders.  
Giuri et al. (2007) for instance find that in Europe, universities and 
public research labs are scarcely used knowledge holders. However, the 
scientific literature is a much valued and used source of creative inspiration 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). As they argue “the links with universities or 
public research labs require effort and investment in establishing relationships” 
whereas the “scientific literature is readily available provided that one has the 
required absorptive capacity” (Giuri et al., 2007, p. 1117). So for an IU that 
does not build bridges to those complex sources, the tacit knowledge from 
universities and research labs remains inaccessible, whereas the scientific 
literature is to a great extent available in embodied objects (published papers).  
In summary, an IU can develop necessary R&D skills or focus on network 
resources as an alternative strategy. Ahuja et al. (2008) convincingly showed 
that the ratio of costs for internal development of distant versus similar 
technology is the key determinant of whether or not collaboration makes sense 
(p. 35 – 38). Extending their perspective, I propose that inventive units do not 
simply consider the cost of internal development but look at the total ingression 
costs of acquiring a new knowledge component. Even if they realise no other 
entity possesses the needed component, collaboration can still be the best 
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option if a willing partner can be found who is much better placed to turn an 
unfamiliar piece of knowledge into a familiar component. Such a partner can 
then help the focal IU integrate that new component into the problem-solving 
endeavour. Of course, such collaborations come with high risk, especially when 
it comes to appropriation. Hence whether an IU will go it alone or include 
another holder will be determined by the trade-off in ingression costs of flying 
solo versus collaborating. I hope future research will further unpack and test 
the importance of specific ingression costs in predicting the escalation of the 
unit of invention. 
III - 6: Conclusion 
This chapter conceptualised the inventive process as a process of 
escalating recombinant search. Following recent contributions from Rothaermel 
and colleagues (Grigoriou and Rothaermel, 2014; Rothaermel and Boeker, 
2008; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007), I propose an evolutionary model of search 
in which the inventing unit escalates over time through search so that the final 
unit of invention is the result of an iterative search process for knowledge 
components. This means that multi-level studies in which multiple levels of 
invention (e.g. individual, team, firm, and/or network) are needed to better 
understand the differences in innovative output.  
I proposed that 1) search as process is an understudied phenomenon, 2) 
the searcher is assumed to be stable and non-changing, and 3) the object of 
search can have agency (a knowledge holder), which commonly holds for 
knowledge that is tacitly controlled by individuals, or that is dispersed within a 
complex knowledge structure. These realisations infused an evolutionary 
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perspective in which the inventing unit escalates from a single individual with a 
half-hunch to a larger entity in an iterative fashion, constantly changing the 
relative importance and the barriers imposed by knowledge articulation, 
knowledge flow, and knowledge absorption. I submitted that one can 
understand escalating recombinant search as a process that aims to navigate 
the knowledge structure at minimal ingression costs and in doing so creates an 
engine for escalating the inventing unit. These ingression costs are determined 
by the inventing unit’s idiosyncratic capabilities to facilitate knowledge flow, 
and absorption.      
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IV – CHAPTER FOUR: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND REFLECTIONS 
ON KNOWLEDGE 
 
Reflecting on the contributions to knowledge of this dissertation on 
“individual and organizational effects of knowledge production”, I can only be 
reminded of and humbled by Aristotle’s statement in his book “On the Heavens, 
Manual of Greek Mathematics”: 
“It is not once nor twice but times without number that same ideas make their 
appearance in the world” (Aristotle, c. 330 BC) 
In the world of management, this idea has itself been recycled and 
reinvented by amongst others Schumpeter (1942), Nelson and Winter (1982), 
and those more current authors in the field of recombination (Katila, Ahuja, 
Fleming, Singh, Nerkar, Yayavaram, Kaplan, Vakili, …). However, as Magee 
(2005) argued, a strictly combinatorial approach ignores the creativity required 
to repackage old ideas into new ones by reapplying them to new and previously 
unimagined fields of enquiry. I can only hope that to some extent this 
dissertation passes that bar.  
I have proposed that invention can be understood as a process of 
escalating recombinant search, in which the sought knowledge can be provided 
by knowledge objects that are accessible in the knowledge structure or by 
knowledge holders who can be integrated within the inventing unit. I proffer 
that these two processes are iterative and interdependent so that the evolution 
of the searching unit should ideally be studied in conjunction with the search 
for information. Empirically however, such a study requires data that are not 
easily accessible so I have not yet been able to test the model I am proposing. 
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However, the two empirical studies I did conduct were instrumental in my 
ability to conceive of the invention process in the way I did. Conducting first a 
study on collaboration and then a study of recombination gave rise to some 
cognitive dissonance. While both studies clearly have their own identities, there 
was a bigger picture lurking behind the scene that had escaped me. As is often 
the case, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. That is exactly the 
creativity needed in component combination and I think my personal search 
process in combination with the foundational building blocks underlying the 
two first chapters provide some qualitative evidence for my third chapter. I was 
of course not allowed to escalate the unit of invention, although discussions 
with Gerry and some other colleagues surely helped in the articulation of my 
ideas. Whether or not I succeeded in making them entirely clear to anyone is 
still to be seen, but I have at least some hope that this dissertation is an 
intelligible document with some valuable insights. 
Building on earlier work in matching theory and preference rating (Gale 
and Shapley, 1962; Herrnstein, 1961), I investigated how individual 
characteristics influence collaboration preferences. Improving our 
understanding regarding collaboration preferences is fundamental to capturing 
joint knowledge production. While most extant research has looked at existing 
collaborations and derived antecedents to collaboration ex post (Stuart and 
Sorenson, 2007), this line of reasoning is subject to positive selection bias 
because only established collaborations are considered (Mindruta, 2013). 
Criscuelo et al. (2014) make a similar point about the selection bias inherent in 
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the research on patenting: only patented inventions are considered so there is 
heavy trimming on the negative outcome side.  
While the ex post rationalization of organizational similarities or 
complementarities may indeed provide fruitful ground to explain why particular 
forms of joint knowledge production are successful, they do not necessarily 
shed light on what enables joint knowledge production in the first place. In this 
light, Boudreau et al. (2014) suggested that the dynamics underlying the 
formation of ties might consist of entirely different elements than those 
determining the success of such collaborations. My first chapter has tried to 
illuminate those determinants of joint knowledge production ex ante, i.e. before 
any collaboration comes into existence. The conjoint analysis methodology 
allowed me to expose respondents to various hypothetical scenarios and deduce 
the important elements within those scenarios that affect their preferences. 
Although the relationship between individual preferences and actual 
organizational behaviour is not straightforward (Powell et al., 2013), the 
formation of inter-organizational (and intra-organizational) partnerships is 
fundamentally a process that involves human interaction.  
I found that individual aspirations as well as an individual’s relational 
capability were crucial determinants of that person’s general predisposition 
towards collaboration and thus towards joint knowledge production. Perhaps 
these results are unsurprising, but within management research at least, our 
main attention has been to the domain knowledge of the individual, e.g. to what 
extent a scientist is a star researcher in his or her field (Hess and Rothaermel, 
2011; Zucker and Darby, 2006). The findings suggest that at the individual 
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level, idiosyncratic complementary resources and attitudes are drivers of 
collaborative preferences and potentially success as well (see Hess and 
Rothaermel, 2011; Singh and Fleming, 2010). This challenges the primacy of 
domain knowledge and absorptive capacity in much organizational research.  
My process model suggests, following Postrel (2002) and Ahuja et al. 
(2008), that an actor’s capability to learn and assimilate knowledge could be 
substituted by an actor’s capability to locate and collaborate with knowledge 
holders. This raises important questions about the contingencies that affect 
how both capabilities will influence invention results. We know from Tsai 
(2001) that two-directional interorganizational network centrality increases a 
unit’s knowledge productivity and that this effect is strengthened by the unit’s 
absorptive capacity. From an individual’s perspective, this raises questions 
about what to invest in? If both becoming a domain expert (knowledge 
absorption) and becoming a central network figure (knowledge flow) serve as 
partial substitutes in invention, how does one have to allocate its time and 
resources optimally and under what contingencies? It seems probable that the 
optimal choice will involve some kind of threshold behaviour such that a 
minimum of either absorption or flow is necessary to succeed. Depending on 
the career stage, different thresholds might form stair-like functions rather 
than simple linear models.  
Investigating such questions will require more complex methods such as 
spline functions or potentially tree models with random forests (Gareth et al., 
2013; Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2008), something I have been 
experimenting with in the last year. Methodologically, this dissertation 
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reintroduced conjoint analysis to innovation studies. I believe this is a valuable 
method / research design to add to the management field’s arsenal and will 
discuss its merits in some more detail in a subsection later.  
Focusing on recombination, the second chapter suggests that innovative 
success is rooted in a combination of familiar combinations and unfamiliar 
components that are added, subtracted, reconfigured, or replaced. These four 
methods underline the importance, not only of knowledge component 
recombination in the invention process, but also of the linkages between 
different components that have been used together in the past. In my process 
model, combinations of components have not been explicitly included. This is 
not to say that they are not important. Much recent research has focused on 
such recombinations or coupling of knowledge components and found 
combination-specific experience has an impact on innovation (e.g. Fleming, 
2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008; Yayavaram 
and Chen, 2013). Also Eisenhardt (1989b) suggested that in fast paced 
environments, decision-makers that considered multiple alternatives at once 
were more likely to succeed. There is thus little doubt that combinations 
matter.  
Within the recombinant search process I proposed, the engine of search 
is the inventing unit’s current knowledge base. Both failed and successful 
previous combinations are an important part of this knowledge base. Also, it 
could be argued that frequently used combinations behave as an individual 
component within the inventor’s mind. Gorman and Carlson (1990) for instance 
stated that Edison had various mental maps that served as guidelines to his 
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thinking: “Edison liked to use a double-action pawl to convert rectilinear 
motion to rotary motion and he employed such pawls in inventions ranging 
from his stock tickers to his first motion picture machine” (p. 141). This is the 
kind of constructive tinkering with existing combinations Magee (2005) was 
talking about when he proposed analogical thinking as a mechanism that 
drives creativity. I thus submit that familiar combinations become an integral 
part of the inventor’s knowledge base. They can be challenged when new 
knowledge holders join the inventing unit, disconfirmed by object search, or 
potentially fall through the cracks when attempting to integrate the familiar 
combination with new components, leading to processes such as replacement 
or subtraction as described in the second chapter.  
The empirical findings in the semiconductor industry also suggested that 
the time between consecutive inventions (the combination-recombination 
pathway) mattered. The temporal lapse between two consecutive inventions has 
a negative influence on the impact of the recombination (recycled or renewed 
invention). Before considering the duration of the invention process this finding 
initially puzzled me. I had assumed this effect would be curvilinear (inverted U-
shaped) because of the need for learning in between two inventions. In the 
extreme case, a negative linear effect suggests that the highest impact for a 
recombination will be for the one that is applied for one day after the original 
patent. When thinking about this in a quantitative way (assuming, as patent 
research does, that the entire invention process is condensed into a single 
moment in time), this finding is hard to swallow. A grace period between two 
consecutive inventions that build upon one another should be beneficial to the 
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learning curve, much like the submission and resubmission of a manuscript in 
the academic publication process. 
The process model however suggests an alternative explanation. First, 
the timing of the submission of the patent is subject to orchestrating 
organizational support for the invention (Criscuelo et al.¸2014). Additionally, 
the timing of the submission does not teach us anything about the duration of 
the antecedent iterative search process. Understanding invention as a process 
clarifies that both patents are likely the outcome of overlapping and iterative 
search projects in which various inventors within the semiconductor firm 
combine and recombine knowledge components in various ways. Hence, the 
learning is concurrent and two sequential and related inventions can be 
offspring of the same project, with the one who gets submitted first the most 
important one that near the end of the invention process gains most attention 
from the inventors involved. This reasoning is consistent with the theoretical 
argumentation I made in the first chapter around how individuals will develop 
higher preference for collaboration when they have higher perceived 
behavioural control of the outcome (Siegel, 1957). When inventors have more 
faith in one trajectory than in another, they will pursue the favourite pathway 
more rigorously and with more urgency. Hence, the first patent could be the 
first merely because of this selection process.  
The process model provides also an additional rationale for why renewed 
inventions would fare worse (as found in chapter two). The specific component 
combination gets tested and retested several times until a satisfactory outcome 
is found that results in a patent application. An alternative iteration trajectory 
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that was temporarily benched (because it was less promising) used a similar 
combination with an additional component (renewed inventions in chapter two). 
After the filing of the initial patent, the alternative trajectory is finished and 
submitted to the USPTO as well, perhaps mainly to protect the initial patent. 
Such a patent is more negatively affected by temporal lapse than a recycled 
invention. The more time evolves, the more the renewed invention components 
get experimented with which could improve the quality, but the inventors also 
risk losing track of the benefits of the initial combination as organizational 
memory dissipates or as experimentation breaks the linkages that made the 
initial invention successful. Staying closer to the original invention (recycling 
invention in chapter two) is presumably simpler cognitively and the knowledge 
about that original invention dissipates more slowly over time. 
Future research could then investigate whether the negative effect of time 
on recombination is reinforced by inventor overlap. This would provide support 
for a process-based hypothesis in which inventors select which invention to 
push through first and in which cognitive overlap diminishes attention to the 
second follow-up invention. A curvilinear prediction could be made using a 
learning-based hypothesis, i.e. inventors learn from previous inventions and 
some time in between two consecutive inventions will prove beneficial to 
invention until after some period the time in between two consecutive 
inventions annihilates the learning benefits. Such a hypothesis would be 
consistent with literature that (implicitly) presumes that the invention happens 
at the time of the patent application rather than during an unknown period 
before.  
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After this short discussion of the key insights in this dissertation, I 
review five specific contributions I believe this dissertation makes. The first 
three stem chiefly from chapter one, the second two from chapter two, and 
ideas from the third chapter pop up in all five.  
IV - 1.1: Contributions to University – Industry Collaboration Research 
I have extended research on collaboration between commercial 
organizations and universities (Geisler, 1995). Such research typically focuses 
on why firms collaborate with universities (e.g. Hanel and St-Pierre, 2006) or 
why universities collaborate with firms (Santoro and Gopalakrishnan, 2001) or 
why academic scientists collaborate with each other (Bozeman and Corley, 
2004), but very little research has investigated why and under what 
circumstances, firms prefer to ally with other firms or with universities and vice 
versa. Also, most research in the university-industry intersection focuses on 
large firms, with some exceptions (e.g. Fontana et al., 2006; Hadjimanolis, 
2006). The research extends this field in three ways. Firstly, by not only 
focusing on large organizations we increase understanding of the drivers of 
SME collaboration preferences. I did not find any notable differences between 
smaller and larger organizations but I did find that overall university 
respondents are more favourable towards collaboration within the knowledge 
transfer network than firms are. Secondly, by introducing matching theory and 
especially preference rating to university-industry collaborations I extend the 
theoretical framing of the field beyond the more common resource-based and 
institutional perspectives (Boardman, 2009). Thirdly, the chosen approach laid 
bare some differences between drivers of collaborative R&D projects. As the 
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research design invited firm and university respondents to rate scenarios that 
included collaboration with either organization type, it provided some insights 
into preferences for institutional similarity. 
Despite the common belief that firms join knowledge transfer networks to 
collaborate with universities, I found in an unreported regression that 
institutional similarity is a significant predictor of preferences for firm 
respondents but not for university respondents who seem to be indifferent 
between collaborating with either a firm or another university. Preference for 
institutional similarity was especially strong for SMEs as they drove the 
similarity effect completely. This adds to research that compares the relative 
preference of firms over universities as collaboration partners. Bercovitz and 
Feldman (2007) for instance found that firms prefer to work with universities 
rather than other firms when conflicts over intellectual property are likely. Also, 
the finding confirms that SMEs are indeed less interested in collaborating with 
universities (Woolgar et al., 1998). Further research should delve deeper and 
investigate for which specific collaboration goals firms prefer firms over 
universities and vice versa. 
IV - 1.2: Contributions to Behavioural Foundations of Strategy 
The assumption in strategy has often been that we cannot say anything 
about individual preferences, which explains the lack of research on how 
individuals make choices that shape networks (Kilduff and Brass, 2010) and 
strategic action (Felin and Foss, 2005). Thus, most research on the antecedents 
of collaboration and collaborative knowledge production has ignored 
collaborator characteristics. I theorized that individual aspirations influence 
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collaboration preferences (in a U-shaped form) and that relational capability, 
captured by networking skills, openness, and network information, affect an 
individual’s perceived probability of success which in turn will affect the 
individual’s preference (Siegel, 1957). In doing so, relational capability 
dimensions moderate the aspiration-gap – preference relationship.  
Behavioral strategists have argued that strategic decision-making 
matters exactly because differences between individuals perpetuate 
organizational heterogeneity (Bromiley, 2009; Levinthal, 2011). Recent 
attention turned to behavioral and psychological foundations of dynamic 
capabilities (Abell et al., 2008; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011; Winter, 2012). 
The second part of the first chapter adds to the behavioral foundations of 
collaboration. Especially within sciences, complementary relational capability 
may be a crucial component in the process of collaborative knowledge 
production and can partially compensate for partner quality and dyadic trust. 
In the terminology of the process model proposed in chapter three, knowledge 
flow capabilities regarding coordination execution and formation could partially 
offset an initial lack of mutual trust and knowing where to look or network 
information can compensate for inferior capabilities regarding domain 
knowledge. Future research could disentangle the importance of trust versus 
openness or domain expertise (high knowledge absorption) versus networking 
skills (see for instance Grigoriou and Rothaermel (2014) and Gruber et al. 
(2013)). 
It is not self-evident to extend individual preferences to a higher level of 
analysis. Powell et al. (2011) argued that behavioral researchers must avoid the 
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trap of simplistic “mental scaling” in which an organization’s actions 
correspond to an individual’s decisions. How much aspirations, relational 
capability, and preferences contribute to actual collaborations is a matter for 
future longitudinal research. My ambition was to show that the complex 
aspiration-gap – capability - preference relation is likely to play a significant 
role in determining whether scientific collaborations come into existence in the 
first place. Chapter three provides an evolutionary perspective that could be 
interpreted as complex mental scaling, in which the actions of one individual 
with a hunch escalate into team, firm, dyadic, or open forms of knowledge 
production.  
Turning preference into action faces three obstacles: (1) Not every 
organization wants to work with your organization (Mindruta, 2013); (2) 
Internal power dynamics can affect the likelihood of a specific person setting up 
a collaboration; and (3) Preference mismatches abound. The significant signs 
for respondents being respectively more (b = -0.23, p ≤ 0.05) or less (b = 0.22, p 
≤ 0.05) senior than a potential partner (Model 5, table I-4) suggest that much of 
the research findings on similarity are likely to be a consequence of a dynamic 
in which people only want to work with someone who is as at least as “good” as 
them. This could inspire future research on homophily and similarity. Is what 
we observe a consequence of preferences or a consequence of negative selection 
in the partner pool? Additionally, Phillips, Tracey, and Karra (2013) suggest a 
third option: homophily can be a strategic rather than subconscious process. In 
their entrepreneurial case study, they found that entrepreneurs can 
deliberately exploit potential homophily through engaging in narrative identity 
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work based on varied sources of similarity.  Whether an ego’s homophilous ties 
are strategically designed, the consequence of subconscious preference, or 
determined by negative partner selection is likely to impact how and whether 
such ties affect innovative output. 
IV - 1.3: Contributions to Methods: Conjoint Analysis and Beyond 
My co-authors and I are among the first to use conjoint analysis in 
innovation studies (Riquelme and Rickards, 1992). This method allows for the 
weighing of complex match characteristics, embedded in different scenarios 
(Green, 1984; Green et al., 1981; Green et al., 2001; Green and Srinivasan, 
1978, 1990; Green and Wind, 1975). In doing so, it explicitly incorporates 
important interactions between different attributes in a not necessarily linear 
way. Unlike the individual attributions of characteristics’ importance, the 
conjoint approach compares and weighs more realistic scenarios to derive 
actual preferences. This methodology thus provides a novel way of investigating 
preferences, perceptions and judgements of companies that could prove fruitful 
in different managerial fields.  
The results of the conjoint analysis demonstrate a more complex 
interdependency among preferences than has previously been identified, 
suggesting that it is not only important to take various attributes into account 
in predicting network members’ preferences, but also to consider the weighting 
of these attributes in the preference function. However, the method has some 
drawbacks as well. It is for instance important to note that our findings in the 
first part of chapter I are dominated by research funding. Implicit in the 
methodology of conjoint analysis, is the belief that people are able to weigh 
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different attributes of a focal object or scenario (Green et al., 2001). When one 
of the attributes appears to be non-compensatory, in that it forms a threshold 
(Riquelme and Rickards, 1992), this has a severe impact on the appreciation of 
the other characteristics. Future research that uses conjoint analysis could 
improve granularity of findings by developing scenarios in which specific 
attributes that are expected to be non-compensatory, are excluded or analysed 
differently. This would allow for greater variance amongst the compensatory 
attributes.  
As hinted at before, regression models are generally ill-suited to 
incorporate discrete choice behaviour because they presume linearity. In other 
words, it is hard to find a regression that is able to untangle the following 
statement: if A happens, then I care about B and C; if A does not happen, B 
still matters a little bit, C does not matter at all but D becomes crucial. While 
two-way and three-way or even more complex interactions are possible and 
increasingly used, the complications in interpretation and the methodological 
accuracy of such interactions is questionable. Tree models provide an 
interesting method that has so far escaped management scholars’ attention. 
The tree model branches on the variable that explains the highest variance in 
the response and splits the sample accordingly. This process repeats itself until 
a specific tree length is obtained that has an acceptable error rate. The three 
can afterwards be pruned to ensure better out-of-sample fit if necessary, or 
alternative methods such as boosting and random forests can be used to 
increase the explained variation. Such models are potentially useful for 
decision-making if one presumes decisions are made based on threshold 
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behaviour. Within management, the likelihood that the occurrence of a specific 
event affects which strategic variables matter does not seem farfetched. It is my 
hope to look further into these possibilities in the future. 
In the second part of chapter one, I use conjoint analysis in a novel way. 
By explicitly controlling for all scenario aspects and focusing on the individual’s 
propensity to collaborate, I managed to explain some of the individual random 
effect variance found in the first part of this chapter. In this way I used conjoint 
analysis not to delve into product (or scenario) attributes as it is commonly 
used (Green et al., 2001) but to expose individual predispositions that are 
transparent in the attributed ratings but do no stem from the product (or 
scenario) attributes. This could be a meaningful way of using the methodology 
in marketing, innovation, and entrepreneurship research in the future, when 
the goal is to expose individual (fixed effects) characteristics that impact on 
intentions, decision-making, and actions. 
I also proposed some new and simple metrics to analyse the goodness of 
fit for models with count variables as response variables. The measures showed 
high correlation with established measures such as AIC but are, in my eyes, 
more meaningfully interpreted as they specifically serve to explain deviations 
from count variables. Graphic representation of errors is something that is 
rather uncommon in managerial research. No single paper I read in the course 
of the PhD has graphically represented errors (except perhaps for logit models) 
while this is often a much more intuitive way to judge model fit than an AIC, 
Log Likelihood or even adjusted R-square statistic. Another research project on 
patent data in the pharmaceutical sector has taught me how difficult it is to 
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appropriate control for time- and firm-specific effects when using such 
(negative binomial) data. Researchers could improve methodological rigour, 
especially in panel data sets by providing a scatterplot of the errors and 
explaining how they solved (or tried to solve) the tendency of errors to trend 
upward or downward in such settings. 
IV - 1.4: Contributions to Recombination Research 
Chapter two contributes to the literatures on organizational learning and 
to the resource-based view of the firm. While a focus on the benefits and 
drawbacks of both exploration and exploitation has persisted ever since 
March’s (1991) seminal work, different forms of exploitation and their 
implications have received relatively less attention (Katila and Ahuja, 2002). 
Exploitation can be beneficial because opportunities exist for firms to combine 
existing components to generate new inventions (Schumpeter, 1939), and these 
solutions can at times outperform explorative efforts (Henderson and Clark, 
1990). A contribution to this stream of literature is the differentiation between, 
and description of four different ways in which a firm can exploit its existing 
knowledge resources to generate valuable inventions; namely subtraction, 
reconfiguration, addition, and replacement. 
The study also extends work on experiential learning. Previous efforts in 
conducting certain tasks allow firms to later benefit from their accumulated 
experiences for learning new and related knowledge (Bruneel, Yli‐Renko, and 
Clarysse, 2010; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Because recombination involves 
the re-use of combinations, a firm can draw on its prior knowledge to generate 
new innovations. The submitted research findings suggest that when it comes 
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to recombinative inventions, more recent experiences are favourable. Also, the 
regression analysis suggests that efficacy of learning from experience varies 
with the inventive activities (recycling or renewing). As discussed above, the 
interpretation of these findings is contingent on the assumptions made about 
the importance of the inventive process. I have provided some alternative 
suggestions in the beginning of this final chapter. 
Apart from experiential learning, the chapter also contributes to the 
literature on vicarious learning. The outcomes of vicarious learning and 
experiential learning on innovation are often examined in separation. However, 
this study demonstrates how the two complement one another. Specifically, the 
findings on search show that a firm that absorbs more knowledge from the 
environment in which it operates generates combinative inventions with greater 
value. Thus, even when a firm uses its previously accumulated knowledge as a 
base for generating new inventions, it can benefit from being aware of 
technological advances that take place externally, and from being able to learn 
from these advances. Furthermore, the extent to which experiential learning 
and vicarious learning complement one another varies according to the 
different types of recombinations.  
In the process model, vicarious learning is an outcome of object search 
that inspired the iterative reintegration of components. As discussed above, the 
process model presented is not entirely consistent with the reasoning suggested 
in chapter two. In that way it exactly exemplifies the process of invention: 
knowledge components get recombined and alter the perception of how they 
work together. If this new perception becomes validated over time, a previous 
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theory gets falsified. However, as Mitchell and James (2001) point out, the field 
of management has been particularly bad at falsification of theories. While 
some theories fare better than others most review papers suggest that support 
for a specific theory is found in about 50% of published papers, which clearly 
provides a biased sample of research (success bias).  
The process model has been a pure thought exercise, a combination of 
knowledge components deduced and derived during a three year long process 
of immersion into the wonderful world of management scholarship. It has not 
been tested so it has no place in confirming or disconfirming any theory. This is 
why I left the second chapter unaltered after completing the final chapter; 
perhaps hoping that this artefact that I entrust the knowledge structure with 
would somehow reflect the cognitive dissonance in my own mind.  
IV - 1.5: Implications for Managers 
Finally, I believe this dissertation offers a number of insights that are 
noteworthy from a managerial perspective. When it comes to generating new 
and creative ideas, innovators and managers are often asked to think outside 
the box, and this detracts attention from thinking “inside the box” (Boyd and 
Goldenberg, 2013a, 2013b). This study offers insight into how firms and 
inventors can generate useful inventions by finding inside-the-box solutions, 
and the importance of doing so. Specifically, I showed how four different 
knowledge combinations can transform old inventions into new inventions, and 
how each of these lead to more valuable inventions than if a firm were to invent 
using a combination of components that it is unfamiliar with. 
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The results of the influence on temporal lapse and external search offer 
other managerial implications. Specifically, they suggest that while prior 
experience is important, there is a tendency for organizations to forget 
experiences that were accumulated in the distant past, and this negatively 
influences innovation. This finding emphasizes the importance of investing in 
knowledge management systems that allow a firm to efficiently retrieve and 
reuse knowledge and insights from its prior inventions (Ahuja et al., 2013; 
Garud and Nayyar, 1994; Hansen et al., 1999). Finally, the study also 
emphasized the importance of external search, even for inside-the-box 
innovations; making it important for firms to invest in R&D and other related 
activities which have been shown to enhance absorptive capacity and adding to 
the consensus that finding a balance between exploitation and exploration is 
important to create value (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 2006). As argued by 
Posen and Levinthal (2012), depending on the conditions of the environment in 
which the firm operates, environmental change can be a call to greater to 
adaptation and to renewed focus on existing capabilities.  
With regards to the first and the third chapter, the main implications are 
for managers and researchers who are engaged in knowledge production. 
Although it might be a bridge too far to suggest that collaboration preferences 
automatically translate in collaborations; it seems less farfetched to argue that 
collaboration preferences will increase the likelihood of future collaborations. 
Also, while the escalating recombinant search model I proposed did not 
explicitly include aspirations, I did talk about how slack and distress search 
influence associated costs. Hence, collaboration preferences might be evident in 
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knowledge flow capabilities. Findings in chapter one suggested that these 
relational capabilities did correlate to preferences so this seems a reasonable 
position to take. Therefore, preferences are likely to affect the costs associated 
with holder search and perhaps influence the knowledge flow capabilities as 
well (people are often better at what they like doing).  
If so, the advice seems to be that to do well, two complementary 
pathways exist. Individuals can become domain experts and become attractive 
partners because of their high knowledge absorption, or can become relational 
stars whose main capability is interconnecting (see Grigoriou and Rothaermel, 
2014). The best trajectory will be correlated with an individual’s idiosyncratic 
preferences, which is something to be cheerful about. Postrel (2002) suggested 
that both can serve as substitutes in the knowledge production process. As 
long as there are enough specialists, there will be a need for connectors. As 
such, he suggested that the knowledge-based view, the foundational theory 
that underlies much of what I have written in this dissertation, suggests that 
management is concerned with “selecting, operating, and governing, islands of 
shared knowledge in a sea of mutual ignorance” (p. 304). 
Thus, managers either have to be those individuals who navigate the 
ocean and bring specialists together, or be smart enough to realize that a room 
full of incredible smart researchers does not make an invention. Breaking the 
departmental, divisional, and domain barriers down is not easy (see Boudreau 
et al., 2014) but it is probably not necessary. As long as there are people who 
can slip through the walls and connect distant ideas using analogical thinking 
(Magee, 2005) or any other mechanism that instills creativity, invention will 
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continue to happen and Jones’ (2009) burden of knowledge is not that 
problematic, because it is also that burden that pushes us deeper into 
understanding new and exciting things about the world at large. 
Finally, while I have not formally attempted that, I have implied that it 
could be possible to mathematically devise a heuristic that helps in making the 
optimal decision for the invention unit. While turning knowledge absorption 
and knowledge flow costs into actual numbers is undoubtedly a challenging 
endeavour, there might be smarter people than me interested in trying. I would 
welcome such endeavors. Perhaps more importantly, the process model has 
some normative implications. Managers can assess to the best of their ability 
the skillsets of their co-workers and see whether knowledge absorption, 
articulation, or flow capabilities are most present and most absent and adjust 
their hiring policies or internal training and education programs to give their 
organization the best chance to succeed in the future. 
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